

# Rethinking Canadian Foreign Policy



**Review by Students of Norman Paterson School of  
International Affairs**



# Foreword

By: Dr. David Carment

## Canada in a Time of Turbulence

Canada's role as an international actor is often understood in terms of constructive multilateral collaboration to pursue global and national goals. Today, under Justin Trudeau, there is a realisation that Canada's commitment to multilateralism and international institutions has begun to shift due to changes in the global economy. The Liberals now realise that the multilateralism that Canada helped develop and which was initially beneficial for Canada as a middle power works differently today. The global economy faces a number of pressing issues over the coming decade, but in an integrated world, the ability of most countries to address them is affected by and often constrained by their position in the hierarchy of countries and their relation to the two dominant powers, the USA and China. These two powers have shown a willingness to pursue their own interests by sacrificing the interests of allies and other partners. Countries like Canada find themselves forced to rethink their foreign policy agenda and priorities.

It was with these ideas in mind, that last fall NPSIA students enrolled in my Canada and International Affairs gradate seminar embarked on a four month evaluation of Canada's foreign policy priorities. The collated results, are presented here. Working in groups, the students had the good fortune to have their class coincide with an election year, giving them an opportunity to not only look to the past but to consider the future. The reviews presented here, covering everything from defence and diplomacy to aid and immigration. Supported in part by the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal and its affiliate [iaffairscanada.com](http://iaffairscanada.com), this review would not have been possible but for the hard work of all those students who contributed to its completion. Identified by name below, each should be congratulated for their effort.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Policy Review recommends that the Honourable Minister of International Development and La Francophonie enhance the credibility of Canada's international development strategy through the creation of a comprehensive international development coherency framework that defines national priorities. It would serve as an umbrella to generate consistency among existing policies, building off of Canada's 3D approach and incorporating the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), Canada's commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other key areas of spending in the International Assistance Envelope (IAE).

Canada is one of the thirty members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which accounts for 80% of all Official Development Assistance (ODA) worldwide. However, Canadian contributions to ODA are below the DAC average and since 2016, the expenditures have increased only at pace with inflation. Moreover, between 2016 and 2017, Canada jumped from providing assistance to 20 priority countries to 130 countries, spreading the assistance budget thin. While Canada should increase ODA, identifying distinctly articulated priorities is a necessary first step to ensure our assistance is effective.

Inspired by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) "Principled Aid Index" (PAI), the new development framework balances the division of funds between areas where Canada has geopolitical or economic interest with areas that are most in need. It recommends that 60% of ODA be directed toward selected priority countries where Canada wishes to deepen bilateral relationships. At the same time, the remaining 40% of resources will allow Canada to exercise continued leadership as a middle power in protracted crises and humanitarian emergencies. This framework is needed to make informed decisions on resource allocations; so Canadian aid is targeted and impactful without sacrificing the opportunity to engage multilaterally. By linking ODA to robust results measurements, the framework can also facilitate the generation of reports demonstrating Canada's impact overseas to the international community.

Global trends indicate an overall decrease in ODA spending. Canada needs to continue to engage with DAC while also protecting its own interests. Moreover, other financial flows such as remittances and private investment outstrip ODA. Canada has been working to leverage these sources to achieve global development goals. By focusing on certain countries, Canada can explore these channels in a focused manner. While Canada has shifted away from tied aid, national interest can still be promoted on the world stage. This new framework will help Canada keep its footing as a middle power by directing its contributions toward both international development and international partnerships.

The new framework should:

- 1) Provide principled assistance by balancing humanitarian principles and economic/geopolitical interests;
- 2) Ensure that Canadian ODA is effective and make Canada a leader in promoting global peace and stability through development;
- 3) Seek to ensure that actions taken by Canadian non-state actors abroad do not undermine our international interests and relations abroad.

Through development assistance, Canada can nurture positive relationships through which it can share its values and develop influence in a way that is consensual and not coercive. This will also contribute to Canadian aid effectiveness and accountability in delivery of results. Becoming a more effective donor will improve Canada's credibility, positioning it to engage in multilateral conversations on international development from a point of strength. In helping to shape globally coordinated efforts toward sustainable development Canada would be supporting a more peaceful and stable world, which then gives rise to increased prosperity for everyone.

# ABBREVIATIONS

| Acronym Used                             | Definition  |
|--|---|
| 3D                                       | Policy coherence framework between defence, development and diplomacy   |
| Aid Effectiveness*                       | Understood in terms of the five central pillars of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Ownership, Alignment, Harmonization, Managing for Results and Mutual Accountability) as well as the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, which calls for greater partnership between different parties working on aid and development.                                 |
| BRICS                                    | Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa   |
| CIDA                                     | Canadian International Development Agency (now incorporated into Global Affairs Canada)   |
| CSR                                      | Corporate Social Responsibility   |
| DAC                                      | Development Assistance Committee  |
| DFAIT                                    | Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade   |
| DFI                                      | Direct Foreign Investment   |
| EDC                                      | Export Development Canada   |
| EU                                       | European Union  |
| FDI                                      | Foreign Direct Investment   |
| FIAP                                     | Feminist International Assistance Policy  |
| GAC                                      | Global Affairs Canada   |
| GDP                                      | Gross Domestic Product  |
| GNI                                      | Gross National Income   |
| HI-Humane Internationalism**             | “An acceptance by the citizens of industrialized states that they have ethical obligations towards those beyond their borders and that these in turn impose obligations on their governments.”  |
| IAE-International Assistance Envelope*** | “...the main planning instrument for funding the federal government’s portion of Canada’s aid. While the majority of Canada’s aid is funded by IAE, it is not the only source of funding. For example, given its conditional and transitory nature, bilateral debt relief is not managed within the IAE framework.”   |
| International Assistance***              | As defined in the Official Development Assistance Accountability Act (ODAAA), is compatible with the international definition created by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC). Unlike the international definition, the Act does not cover assistance from provincial or municipal sources. |

\*Definition from the OECD<sup>1</sup>

\*\* Definition by Cranford Pratt as quoted by David Black in Rethinking Canadian Aid<sup>2</sup>

\*\*\* Definitions are directly quoted from the Global Affairs Canada website<sup>3</sup>

# ABBREVIATIONS

| Key Terminology  | Definition  |
|--|---|
| ISED   | Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada   |
| MDGs   | Millennium Development Goals  |
| MNC  | Multi-National Corporation  |
| NGOs   | Non-Governmental Organizations  |
| NRC  | National Research Council   |
| ODA-Official Development Assistance***                       | “As defined in the Official Development Assistance Accountability Act (ODAAA), is compatible with the international definition created by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC). Unlike the international definition, the Act does not cover assistance from provincial or municipal sources.” |
| ODAAA-Official Development Assistance Accountability Act**** | “ The Official Development Assistance Accountability Act came into force on June 28, 2008. Its purpose is to ensure that all Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA) is focused on poverty reduction and is consistent with aid effectiveness principles and Canadian values. It applies to all federal departments and agencies that provide ODA.”            |
| OECD   | Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development   |
| SDGs   | Sustainable Development Goals   |
| UN   | United Nations  |

\*\*\* Definitions are directly quoted from the Global Affairs Canada website<sup>4</sup>

\*\*\*\* Definitions from the Global Affairs Canada ODAAA website<sup>5</sup>



# BACKGROUND, HISTORY, POLICY PROCESS

## PROBLEMS FACING THE NATION

After his election in 2015, Trudeau boldly declared that, “Canada’s back, and here to help,”<sup>6</sup> alluding to the Liberal government’s intention to restore Canada’s presence on the global stage. Four years and a full political term later, this review considers the following two overarching problems facing the nation and their subsets, demonstrating their relevance to the development file:

### **1. Canada is losing its status as a middle power:**

- Development spending is low compared to other OECD-DAC countries
- There is a missed opportunity to use development assistance as a form of soft power to improve Canada’s reputation and international relations (**See Annex A**)

### **2. Bold government rhetoric is out of step with results, threatening Canada’s credibility:**

- Despite work on 3D, policy coherence is lacking; across the whole of government approach, between trade and development and between GAC’s development priorities.
- While Canada projects an image of the “honest broker” to the world, there is an imbalance between expenditures that serve Canada’s geopolitical and economic interests and those that target areas with the greatest need for assistance.
- The lack of regulation of non-state actors’ activities abroad can undermine Canada’s international image further (particularly in the extractive sector).
- FIAP promised transformative results, but has difficulty demonstrating delivery without proper mechanisms in place to monitor impact

In short, this Policy Review proposes that improvements in the delivery of Canadian international development assistance could build Canada’s reputation and global influence with soft power. Lacking policy coherence across the 3D approach (defence, development and diplomacy) and between trade and development at GAC, Canada is failing to deliver on the progressive values and transformative agenda it aims to promote abroad through its commitment to the SDGs and FIAP (**See Annex B & C**). Much work still needs to be done in order to ensure the effective implementation of the international assistance agenda, particularly when it comes to funding decisions, delivering on global commitments and the measurement of results.

## PAST POLICIES AND CRITICAL DECISIVE MOMENTS


|        | Past Policy/Critical Moments   | Details  |
|--------|--|--|
| ~1990s | Canada transitions away from the use of tied aid                           | Until the 1990s Canada's foreign aid practices consisted of tied aid. Tied aid is a term given to aid that can only be used to buy goods and services from the country providing the assistance. From a development perspective, tied aid is not effective.                              |
| ~2000s | Millennium Development Goals   | 191 UN member states agree to try and achieve 8 goals by 2015 ranging from the eradication of poverty, universal primary education, promote gender equality and empowerment of women, reducing childhood mortality, increasing overall health and ensuring environmental sustainability. |
| 2005   | Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness                                     | Development strategy based on aid effectiveness composed of a few key principles: recipients ownership of their poverty reduction strategies, donor's alignment with this vision, and harmonization among donors.  |
| 2005   | Countries of Focus Program   | 25 countries were chosen to be priority countries of Canadian aid, most of which are aligned with Canadian geopolitical and economic interests.  |
| 2008   | Prime Minister Harper's minority government adopts ODAAA                   | ODAAA has three main objectives:<br>1) Aid contributes to poverty reduction;<br>2) Takes into account the perspectives of the poor and<br>3) Is consistent with international human rights standards   |
| 2009   | Development of Canada's CSR strategy                                       | Strategy aimed at encouraging Canada's extractive sector to engage in socially and environmentally responsible operations that support sustainable development.  |
| 2013   | CIDA merges into the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade | Prime Minister Harper merges CIDA and DFAIT into Foreign Affairs Canada.   |
| 2014   | Canada's Countries of Focus strategy reduced to 20 countries               | The majority of these priority countries are locations of mining and economic interest for Canada, and not those who are in more need of aid.  |
| 2014   | Canada enhances its CSR strategy   | Strengthened CSR support for initiatives in Canada's diplomatic network of missions abroad, increased training to ensure Trade Commissioners are equipped to detect issues and contribute to their resolution.   |
| 2015   | Adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development                    | 192 UN member states adopted the agenda to try achieve 17 ambitious goals aimed at sustainable development by 2030 making it the world's leading and most widely agreed upon set of sustainable development goals ( <b>See Annex B</b> ).  |
| 2017   | Adoption of Canada's FIAP  | Places an emphasis on 'leaving no one behind' and focuses generating development policy with a feminist lens. Also sees the transition away from the Countries of Focus Program.   |

## TRENDS AND INDICATORS

### Remittances, FDI and Private Sector Investments


Given the high volume of financial flows entering the developing world through remittances (Figure 1<sup>7</sup>) in recent years, there has been increasing interest in leveraging these funds for development purposes<sup>8</sup>. While remittances improve the GDP of recipient countries overall, they are sent through personal channels. As a result, extending their impact beyond individuals to coordinated development programming that can benefit entire communities can be a challenge.<sup>9</sup> Though FDI declined globally in 2017, it remained relatively constant in emerging markets in the developing world (see Figure 2)<sup>10</sup>. Linking FDI to ODA to go “from billions to trillions,” is not yielding the initially anticipated results.<sup>11</sup> A 2019 report indicates, “On average, one dollar of public investment from multilateral development banks and bilateral development finance institutions mobilizes just 75 cents of private investment in low and middle income countries. This falls to 37 cents in low-income countries.”<sup>12</sup> Despite these barriers, efforts toward both of these alternative streams are relatively new and present significant opportunities. By learning from experiences where efforts have been successful, Canada can improve the impact of spending in these areas moving forward.

**Remittances 1990-2017**



**Figure 1**

**FDI Inflows, Global and by Group of Economies**



**Figure 2**

Private flows exceed ODA. Canadian extractive industries operating abroad have a history of producing environmental and societal harms which go against international human rights norms of ‘doing no harm’,<sup>13</sup> which hinders international development (see Annex D & E). Following international trends to help the extractive sector behave more responsibly, Canada has implemented CSR strategies. CSR strategies seek to ensure that companies act responsibly and uphold ethical standards. Canada has historically diverted ODA funds to extractive CSR practices. However, CSR is voluntary and some strategies are not effective in preventing harm in local communities, which can continue to undermine Canada’s image and international development efforts.

A positive relationship has also been found between Canadian ODA and trade with developing countries. This relationship generates a win-win-win scenario for the impact of development, Canada’s international priorities and trade and investment diversification. Studies show that Canadian ODA can generate a return on investment. Studies show that \$1 in ODA can result in higher exports between \$1.10 and \$1.19<sup>14</sup>(See Annex F). If CSR strategies are made more effective it can reduce the amount of harm produced by the extractive sector then economic interests can be better aligned with development goals. This can further the marketability of Canadian businesses seeking to operate in developing countries. Effective CSR strategies has the potential to lead to more trade which can prove beneficial to all stakeholders involved.

### Rise of South-South and Triangular Cooperation

Traditional donor flows have often been dispersed through North-South Cooperation (See Figure 3<sup>15</sup>), however recent trends demonstrate a rise in both South-South and Triangular Cooperation. These are both new modalities, which Canada can use to implement the aid effectiveness agenda (discussed in further detail below).

The UN defines South-South cooperation as: “...technical cooperation among developing countries in the Global South. It is a tool used by the states, international organizations, academics, civil society and the private sector to collaborate and share knowledge, skills and successful initiatives in specific areas,” and “Triangular cooperation, as the name implies, involves three actors, two from the South and one from the North. The latter, which can also be an international organization, provides the financial resources so that the countries of the South can exchange technical assistance on a specific topic.”<sup>16</sup>




Figure 3

## Primacy of OECD Donors

DAC Donors (Figure 4) shows that the BRICS countries now rank within the top 20 global economies of the world, with the exception of South Africa.<sup>17</sup> While their increasing contributions are important to the distribution of ODA, the “DAC Share of ODA” graph<sup>18</sup> demonstrates how the 30 DAC 17 member countries<sup>19</sup> (none of which are BRICS) still provide about 80% of total ODA spending.<sup>20</sup>




Figure 4

Of the 30 DAC member countries, Canada ranks 10th in terms of total USD value of ODA. More commonly, OECD DAC countries are compared in terms of the percentage of GNI they contribute. By this metric Canada ranks 15th (Figure 5)<sup>21</sup>. This is both below the DAC average (in blue) and Norway and Ireland, which are primary competitors for the UN Security Council seat.<sup>22</sup>




Figure 5

### Decline in ODA Overall

New findings demonstrate that there is an overall global decline in ODA, particularly when it comes to those countries that are most vulnerable (Figure 6).<sup>23</sup>




Figure 6

## National Trends

Figures 7-9<sup>24</sup> demonstrate how in terms of percentage of GNI, Canada peaked in 2010 at 0.34%, then declined until hitting 0.24% in 2014. Canada dropped to an all time low in OECD DAC rankings in 2016 (#20). Between 2016-2018, although ODA increased in total dollar value (more or less on par with inflation), the % of GNI hovered around 0.26% with slight improvements from 2017-2018 increasing to 0.28%. Relatively speaking, Canadian aid remains at historic lows. The 2018 DAC peer review report recommends an increase national flow of ODA, indicating Canada is not contributing its fair share.<sup>25</sup> (See Annex G).




Figure 7




Figure 8




Figure 9

## CURRENT POLICIES AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES

### Canada’s International Assistance Priorities<sup>26</sup> : FIAP and SDGs

The government has selected 5 SDGs to target: absolute poverty (SDG 1), health (SDG 3), gender equality (SDG 5), inequality (SDG 10), and climate change (SDG 13).<sup>27</sup> In 2017 Canada released FIAP, accompanied by its own additional 6 core “Action areas”, each with associated indicators<sup>28</sup>: Gender Equality, Human Dignity, Growth that Works for Everyone, Environment and Climate Change, Inclusive Governance and Peace and Security. Additionally, the Government of Canada website prioritizes development innovation and climate finance.<sup>29</sup>

Figure 10 was generated through a simple word count, observing the number of times each SDG was mentioned in FIAP. Cohesive mechanisms to measure Canada’s contributions toward FIAP and the SDGs are not in place at the project level making it difficult to determine if GAC funds are spent in full alignment with the policy frameworks outlined in its multifarious commitments (See Annex H).

### Mapping FIAP Key Performance Indicators to SDGs




Figure 10

## Canada's Top Countries of Focus Prior to FIAP



Figure 11<sup>30</sup>

## Distribution of Canada's Assistance 2017-2018 (With FIAP)



Figure 12<sup>31</sup>

### *Aid Effectiveness and Accountability*

In 2005 Canada signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (see Figure 13).<sup>32</sup> In 2008, Canada reaffirmed this commitment at the summit in Accra Ghana, passing the ODAAA<sup>33</sup> in the same year. However, these commitments have fallen off the agenda.<sup>34</sup> Carment et al. argue that Canada faces “the fragmentation and coherence problematique”<sup>35</sup> and Brown and Swiss explain that “fragmentation of a donor's foreign aid across too many recipient countries is widely believed to be detrimental to aid effectiveness”.<sup>36</sup> At the same time, concentrating aid in too few countries can be overly restrictive. As a middle power, Canada needs to strike a balance (See Annex I).

## Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness



- **Ownership:** Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.
- **Alignment:** Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems.
- **Harmonisation:** Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication.
- **Results:** Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured.
- **Mutual accountability:** Donors and partners are accountable for development results.

Figure 13

### *Moving Towards Development Effectiveness*

Canada should engage with discussions on “development effectiveness”<sup>37</sup> that incorporate cooperation between donors, non-traditional actors, and emphasizes policy coherence. Canada can enhance development effectiveness through continued multilateral activities, engagements with the private sector and through whole of government approaches such as the Canada 3D approach.<sup>38</sup>

## POLICY ANALYSIS

### INTERESTS AND VALUES

Canadians expect the government’s actions and policies to reflect Canadian values, which include inclusive accountable governance, environmental responsibility, respect for human rights and diversity and generosity of spirit.<sup>39</sup> Pursuing development strategies directed at reducing poverty and creating 38 opportunities for the world’s most vulnerable contributes to the exportation of Canadian values abroad. Moreover, international assistance also helps create peace and security, which is beneficial to everyone globally.

While promoting development assistance is beneficial for everyone, Canadian ODA has historically been linked with Canadian economic and geopolitical interests and does not always go to those most in need. The division between self-interest and altruism is constant in Canada’s international development history.<sup>40</sup> While aid spending levels were higher under Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s government, that aid was targeted towards 39 countries where Canada had economic and geopolitical interests. Under FIAP there is a potential to move closer toward altruism. Canada can provide both self-interested and altruistic aid, what is needed is balance. Developed by ODI, the “Principled Aid Index” offers some insight into how to achieve this in practice (See Annex I). It is in Canada’s interest to balance conflicting views so that the country can establish a clear set of priorities.

### GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

1. To develop a principled international assistance policy by balancing aid allocation that is directed by enlightened self-interest with humane internationalist principles.
2. To ensure that ODA is effective, and then increase contributions to make Canada a leader in promoting global peace and stability through development.
3. To ensure that actions taken by non-state actors abroad do not undermine international relations strategies in key countries.

## STAKEHOLDERS

This Policy Review finds that most pressing programmatic needs in the Canadian international development file is the identification of **clear and coherent priorities** within:

| Stakeholders   | Description   | Ally or Detractor  |
|--|---|--|
| <b>Canadian Public</b>                                   | Canadians have opinions of where Canadian money should be spent.  | <b>Mixed:</b> Canadian public opinion is mixed on whether or not money should be spent on international development.   |
| <b>Civil Society Organizations, NGOs and Foundations</b> | These groups are non-profit, voluntary movements which organize to pursue a shared set of values and goals.   | <b>Ally:</b> Canada has a history of working with these organizations to address global issues. These groups often have specialized knowledge, skills and local connections.   |
| <b>DND</b>   | Responsible for the protection of Canada and Canadians, and contributes to maintaining international peace and stability.                               | <b>Ally:</b> Development assistance helps create international stability by aiding in conflict and conflict prevention.  |
| <b>EDC</b>   | The job of EDC is to support and develop Canada's export trade by helping Canadian companies respond to international business opportunities.           | <b>Ally:</b> Investing in development abroad sees positive trend in trade. If companies see this benefit they may be more inclined to partake in development assistance.   |
| <b>Emerging Donors</b>                                   | New donors are new actors that are able to contribute to international development assistance.  | <b>Mixed:</b> While new donors provide more options for developing countries, the increase in donor numbers means that Canada has to increase its marketability.   |
| <b>GAC</b>   | GAC is responsible for Canadian diplomatic and consular relations and international organizations in-charge of implementing Canada's development goals. | <b>Ally:</b> GAC sets the agenda for Canadian development assistance.  |
| <b>Local Governments</b>                                 | Recipients of ODA, and/or hosts of Canadian development projects or extractive industry operations.   | <b>Mixed:</b> Development is a global initiative and requires a multilateral approach. Local governments must be respected for multilateralism to work, but local governments might not want international assistance. |
| <b>Local Population</b>                                  | The benefactors of development assistance.  | <b>Mixed:</b> With ODAAA, local voices should be respected and taken into consideration. Local populations may or may not be willing to work with non-state actors or foreign governments.                             |
| <b>Private Sector (Extractive Industry)</b>              | Canada has the largest extractive industry. Projects undertaken by Canada's industry operate in developing countries.                                   | <b>Mixed:</b> The private sector can undermine Canadian development initiatives by acting against development strategies. Given that private flows exceed ODA, Public-Private partnerships are a potential ally.       |

## PROGRAMMATIC NEEDS

This Policy Review finds that most pressing programmatic needs in the Canadian international development file is the identification of **clear and coherent priorities** within:

|    |  |   |
|----|--|---|
| 1. | <b>Canadian Government Ministries and Crown Corporations</b> | Coherent and clearly identified priorities are needed to ensure a unified vision for Canadian Foreign Policy across all government departments including but not limited to GAC, DND, ISED, NRC and EDC.  |
| 2. | <b>GAC</b>   | Coherent and clearly identified priorities are needed to bridge the gap between trade and development.  |
| 3. | <b>GAC's Development Branch</b>                              | Coherent and clearly identified priorities are needed to clarify the relationships between FIAP, SDGs, Climate Finance, ISED, FinDev etc. These should also be reflected in funding appeal and results measurement requirements to ensure expenditures fulfill policy objectives and commitments. |

## ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### COSTED OPTIONS

#### *1. Public-Private Cooperation/Partnerships*

In taking a whole of government approach Canada should implement mandatory CSR strategies to enforce the accountability of Canadian companies operating abroad to ensure that corporate interests are not undermining Canada's international development strategy (**Annex D & E**). If Canadian non-state actors can uphold Canadian values abroad this will increase Canada's reputation as a force-for-good on the world stage, while also increasing the reputation of Canadian industries. Maintaining a reputation that displays coherence between rhetoric and practice will help Canada increase its influence within developing regions. Moreover, the positive trend between ODA spending and trade indicates that the development assistance indirectly contributes to Canada's private sector. Constructing a more accountable Public-Private relationship within Canadian international development policy can lead to a win-win-win scenario for Canada, developing countries and Canadian private interests.

#### *2. Clearly Articulating Funding Decision Mechanisms and Tying These to Results Measurement Requirements for Development Effectiveness*

Keeping track of progress towards global commitments poses a challenge. In order to maintain its credibility as a member of the DAC community, Canada needs to both closely monitor the promises it makes on the international stage and develop funding decision and results measurement mechanisms to demonstrate delivery. Canada could then consider priorities both at the start of the funding process as well as when it comes time to measure project impact and results. As such, this mechanism would build off of the Center for Global Development "Result-Based Aid"<sup>41</sup> concept to empirically and continuously demonstrate where Canada is excelling and where it is falling behind, enabling more informed decision making in development spending.

### 3. Adopting a Comprehensively Defined, Coherent Development Framework Based on the Principled Aid Index and Canada’s 3D Approach

Canada should be transparent about balancing the division of ODA between areas where it has geopolitical or economic interests and areas that are most in need. In so doing the government will be able to demonstrate deep impact in clearly targeted areas, while still making good on global and policy commitments to help the poorest and most vulnerable. This framework should include a clear hierarchy of priorities (SDGs, FIAP, DFIs, etc.), which can later be reflected downstream in funding decisions and results measurement. This will enable Canada to deepen its commitment and bilateral relationships, without sacrificing the opportunity to engage multilaterally, exercising its leadership as a middle power in protracted crises and humanitarian emergencies. It will also demonstrate contributions to the international community.

|   | Pros  | Cons   |
|---|---|--|
| 1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Private interests will not be able to undermine Canada’s reputation abroad.</li> <li>Enhances the reputation of Canada’s extractive industries, making it more likely for them to obtain a social license to operate.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The economic burden of respecting local labour and environmental laws, as well as the costs of community development will be felt by the private sector.</li> <li>This may incentivize some companies to relocate outside of Canada.</li> </ul> |
| 2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Demonstrates the effectiveness of Canada’s contributions to the international community.</li> <li>Streamlines funding according to logical and clear objectives.</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>May not align perfectly with current spending, so certain stakeholders may not receive the same funding moving forward.</li> <li>Data collection can be costly and time consuming.</li> </ul>   |
| 3 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Balances Canada’s interests with international development needs.</li> <li>Organized priorities in a coherent fashion.</li> <li>Enhances Canada’s ability to coordinate more multilateral activities.</li> </ul>                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reorganization of current policy, rather than proposing something new.</li> <li>Time consuming and painstaking process at first, with long term gains to be seen in the future (2-5 years).</li> </ul>  |

### RECOMMENDATION

This review proposes moving forward with Option 3, with elements from Options one and two incorporated. Option 3 will create clearly defined and ordered priorities for Canada’s international development assistance spending. It would be difficult to effectively implement the funding and Center for Global Development result-based aid mechanism proposed in Option 2 without first dealing with the identification of clear and coherent priorities. Also, the government will be able to engage more effectively with the private sector actors, once it is clear whether they are active in Canada’s key bilateral relationships.

## KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND TIMELINE

| TIMEFRAME          | RESPONSIBLE PARTY                             | ACTION UNDERTAKEN   | KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS  | COMMUNICATION STRATEGY   |
|--------------------|---|---|---|--|
| Present-March 2020 | GAC Policy                                    | Development of a new comprehensive international assistance framework through engagements with relevant stakeholders in a consultative process.   | 1) Consultative process completed<br>2) New framework communicated to Canadians through roll out of “Stronger World, Stronger Canada” campaign. | “Stronger World, Stronger Canada” campaign launched in March 2020 both online and advertised in public spaces. The process should also be included in talking points for the Speech to the Throne in May 2020. |
| March-June 2020    | GAC Policy and Evaluation & Statistics Canada | The multiple sets of indicators of Canadian development assistance should be combined into a single framework.  | New set of holistic indicators developed and published online, linking FIAP, SDGs and all other Canadian international assistance priorities.   | New indicators published on Government of Canada Website.  |
| 2021-2030          | External Evaluation Firm                      | Transparent, annual reports generated demonstrating where Canada is contributing to those most in need vs. how development efforts are contributing towards improved bi-lateral relationships abroad. | Annual reports generated beginning in 2021.   | Annual progress reports conducted by impartial 3rd party consultations and published on the Government of Canada website.  |
| 2030               | GAC Reporting                                 | Canada is able to easily, clearly and empirically generate a report on direct contributions towards achieving the SDGs.   | Summary report generated from annual reports to demonstrate “A Decade of Action.”   | “A Decade of Action” report published on Government of Canada website demonstrating Canada’s concrete contribution toward SDGs.  |

## ANNEX A: IS CANADA'S PRESENCE ON THE WORLD STAGE IN DECLINE? CAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE HELP?

The terrain of global politics is shifting in a way that is making it difficult for Canada to hold its footing as a middle power. Randolph Mank argues that Canada is caught in the middle of the overlapping struggles for global power and influence, as well as the struggle over technological and trade dominance between the United States and China.<sup>42</sup> Mank goes on to explain how Canada is a potential battle ground between the two countries in their competition to expand their influence and in obtaining dominance in trade and technology sectors which is exemplified in the Huawei dispute in which Canadian officials detained the company's CFO on extradition charges from the US. In looking at how Canada can stand its ground, looking towards development is a good place to start.<sup>43</sup>

Looking at history, it is known that the United States was able to cement its influence globally after World War Two with the implementation of the Marshall Plan, which sought to rebuild Europe. The Marshall plan was relatively successful in allowing the United State to set the rules for the liberal international order which allowed its influence to remain unchallenged for quite a while. Now, with the rise of China and the implementation of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative we see China attempting to promote its influence over African nations through the provision of aid. China understands that development can help it increase its influence globally.

At the same time we are seeing an increase of other new donors to international development. Many of these new donor countries are not OECD-DAC members.<sup>44</sup> New donor countries want to partake in international development in order to enhance their states legitimacy as advanced and influential nations. "Being a donor has been institutionalized as a global norm that signals state reputational legitimacy, which directly incentivizes [New Donor Country] proliferation."<sup>45</sup>

Contributing to international aid and development is beneficial for countries in two main ways which highlights the potential reasons behind the increase in new donors. The first is a more altruistic desire that states might have to promote ethical behaviours and global justice, and the second reason is the promotion of self-interests. Aid can be beneficial to trade and investment which can persuade states to become donors.

Gulrajani and Swiss look at norm diffusion literature to further explain the proliferation of new donor countries. New donor countries can possibly adopt the status of a donor country because providing aid is now considered appropriate behaviour for states, as is now considered to be common-sense behaviour. If development aid is considered appropriate behaviour, then in joining the ranks of donor countries new donors hope to increase their reputational legitimacy. Aid is seen as a tool to increase one's status on the world stage and promote one's interests and influence simultaneously.

If this is true for new donor countries it is equally true for current donor countries such as Canada. What the proliferation of new donors does do however, is limit the influence that Canadian aid can have abroad due to the new and increasing number of competing voices. New donors that are not OECD-DAC members and are largely Southern nations promoting a different set of values in their development programs. "Contemporary Southern donors draw on Bandung to anchor their development programming in principles like solidarity, horizontality among equals, sovereignty and non-interference, non-conditionality, mutual advantage and voluntary cooperation"<sup>46</sup> New donors with different values means that developing nations have more options and opportunities to choose from which is a good thing as having more choices indicates that recipients of aid can choose that works best for them.

However, this limits Canada's marketability in its pursuit to promote Canadian interests and values abroad. Development and aid spending are historically successful ways in promoting national influence abroad as seen with the Marshall Plan and China's new Belt and Road initiative. In order for Canada to hold its footing, it should commit more resources to effective aid and development spending, to 'put our money where our mouth is' and promote Canada as a legitimate actor that developing nations will *want* to work with.

Moreover, Canada’s international strength according to Mank, rests of its ability and willingness to work multilaterally with others. Thus, Mank argues that Canada needs to step up to the plate and engage in more purposeful and relevant multilateral efforts which meet the world’s most pressing issues. International development helps alleviate poverty, it increases global access to healthcare, education and increases opportunities for the worlds most marginalized. Contributing to international development assistance also helps generate global peace and security, which is good for everyone.<sup>47</sup> In developing a new aid framework based on the principled aid index, Canada will be able to balance national self-interest with altruistic endeavors. The proposed framework will also allow Canada to deepen its bilateral and multilateral relationships allowing the country to exercise its leadership as a middle power.

## ANNEX B: UN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS<sup>48</sup>



## ANNEX C: FIAP CORE ACTION AREAS<sup>49</sup>



## ANNEX D: CSR AND DEVELOPMENT

### *What is Corporate Social Responsibility?*

Canada initiated its CSR strategy in 2009 under Former Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Canada set out expectations for Canadian companies to meet high standards of CSR, such a strategy aims at creating a win-win scenario for both Canada and the host countries of Canadian companies abroad. A major focus of Canada's CSR strategy is its extractive sector. In 2008 Canadian extractive companies made up 75% of the words extractive industry.<sup>50</sup> These companies hold many properties in Canada and in over 100 countries.<sup>51</sup> Companies working in developing countries can adopt voluntary CSR measures to operate in an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable manner in order to tackle the unique social and environmental challenges that they pose for their host countries.

### *Through the CSR Initiative, Canada Will<sup>52</sup>:*

I. Support initiatives to enhance the capacities of developing countries to manage the development of minerals and oil and gas, and benefit from these resources to reduce poverty

II. Promote, primarily through the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Natural Resources Canada, following the widely recognized international CSR performance guidelines with Canadian extractive companies operating abroad:

International Finance Corporation Performance Standards on Social & Environmental Sustainability for extractive projects with potential adverse social or environmental impacts;

Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights for projects involving private or public security forces; and,

Global Reporting Initiative for CSR reporting by the extractive sector to enhance transparency and encourage transparency and encourage market-based rewards for good CSR performance

Canada has applied to join the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights as a participating Country,

III. Set up the Office of the Extractive Sector CSR Counsellor to assist stakeholders in the resolution of CSR issues pertaining to the activities of Canadian extractive sector companies abroad.

IV. Support the development of a CSR Centre of Excellence within an existing institution outside of government to encourage the Canadian international extractive sector to implement these voluntary performance guidelines by developing and disseminating high-quality CSR information, training and tools"

Canada's CSR Policy is aligned with OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Canada had established a National Contact point within DFAIT and enhanced the capacity of its officers. As well, DFAIT created a \$170,000 CSR fund to assist Canadian offices abroad and in Canada to encourage CSR-related activities.<sup>53</sup>

CSR initiatives aim at building up the capacity of the host country in which Canadian extractive companies operate. CSR aims at providing a path to sustainable economic growth and long-term poverty reduction. GAC plays a role in assisting developing countries through CSR initiatives by helping to establish bilateral and multilateral networks with the government, mining companies and affected communities to develop requirements for social and environmental management.

## *CSR and Development*

Historically, Canada's engagement with CSR has been questionable. The Harper government diverted a portion of Canada's Official Development Assistance to the private sector which prioritized the extractive sector over development.

In 2011 Canada started three projects with Canadian NGOs and mining companies in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Peru. The total budget of these projects was \$9.5 million in which CIDA contributed 70% of the budget.<sup>54</sup> These projects received a total of \$6.7 million of Canada's ODA. The announcement of these projects was controversial due to the fact that these CSR initiatives are indirectly subsidizing successful mining companies.<sup>55</sup> The project in Burkina Faso was the largest of these three pilot projects and was a youth training program, which according to CIDA would implement training linked to market needs of the mining company suggesting that the mining company involved in this program, IAMGOLD would reap the benefits from this training. Suggesting that CIDA was subsidizing employee training. Under the Harper government there was a CIDA trend whereby aid was going to communities impacted by Canadian mining.<sup>60</sup>

In working with CIDA mining companies were able to increase their CSR projects and it allows them to improve the image within their host community and allows the companies to reinvent themselves as philanthropist. This can be problematic as it shifts focus away from the negative actions and their impacts taken by the various extractive companies.

Broader literature questions the effectiveness of CSR as the impact that it has on development is largely under-theorized. Dragana Bodruzic argues that development literature has not sufficiently engaged with the trend of corporate involvement.<sup>61</sup> Those who argue that CSR is positive point the fact that it can alleviate some of the negative effects of globalization, and it allows for MNCs to have a positive social impact. Whereas those critical of CSR argue that it serves to proliferate commercial and managerial assets instead of addressing poverty or sustainable development.<sup>62</sup> Whether or not there is a positive or negative link between CSR and development, extractive companies still operate and contribute a significant amount of harm to their host communities. CSR initiatives should continue to try to make the extractive sector more socially responsible even if it is for self-interested reasons. However, this means that CSR strategies need to be more effective and mandatory. Currently CSR strategies have the tendency to go against Canada's ODAAA initiatives.

## *Crimes Committed by Canada's Extractive Sector*

In 2011, the UN Human Rights Council brought forward the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights which determined that since businesses can impact the entire spectrum of internationally recognized human rights, that corporations have a responsibility to uphold these rights and to not cause harm to human rights.<sup>63</sup> In 2014, an international treaty was adopted that made respecting human rights an obligation of for businesses. Despite the implementation of the new international norm regarding human rights and business, and the implementation of Canada's CSR initiative, there is evidence to suggest that big players within Canada's extractive industry do not adequately comply with the new standard of international norms.

The UN's Guiding Principle on Business details the right to remedy for victims of human rights abuses. Despite this clause there are gaps in the accessibility for victims to seek justice as corporations can find loopholes to avoid legal implications for the harm caused by their operations. In addressing the gap, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General proposed that grievances can be addressed at the operational level through creation of grievance mechanisms led by the corporation responsible for harm.<sup>64</sup> Barrick Gold, a Canadian extractive company, created such a mechanism to provide a remedy for victims of sexual assault by mine personnel. Barrick Gold's staff has a history of beating and sexually assaulting local women and shooting local men near mining operations in Papua New Guinea.<sup>65</sup> The crimes attributed to Barrick employees are quite gruesome. There are approximate 119 rape and gang rape victims. In one case a child was left to drown in mine waste while the mother was attacked.<sup>66</sup>

Remedy mechanisms were put in place by Barrick Gold in 2012, which provided a narrow definition on what victims could seek remedy for. Women could only file complaints against mine security personnel, not mine contractors. Moreover, many local victims are not made aware of the remedy mechanism or they found out about the mechanisms too late for claims to be made. Even more troubling is that Barrick's remedy mechanism provided remedy to those victims of sexual assault in the form of legal waivers, making them sign over rights to take legal action against the company.<sup>67</sup> When victims are able to seek remedy from Barrick Gold, they are often not met with just compensation. In November of 2016 the victims of sexual assault called for UN intervention as they grew tired of waiting for justice.<sup>68</sup>

## ANNEX E: CANADIAN EXTRACTION IN PERU

International development strategies originating from western states often project the idea of exporting democratic institutions. The reality of the matter is that more often than not local populations often do not get to exercise their democratic voice in areas of sustainable or corporate development.<sup>69</sup> Canada is guilty of suppressing democratic processes in Peru in order to promote Canadian extractive projects within the region. This is a problem in that it contradicts Canadian values and undermines the development project by rejecting one of the ODAAA principles which is to take into consideration the voices of the poor. Both Canadian and American embassies operating in Lima have placed diplomatic pressure on the local governments to support the extractive industry. As a result, there was violent police repression against farmers protesting a copper-molybdenum operation in northwest Peru in which one protester was killed. There is also evidence that representatives from the extractive companies asked the diplomats to place pressure on the local government to institute reforms making it harder for anti-mining groups to organize.<sup>70</sup> If one of the goals or benefits of international development is to help create a more peaceful and stable international arena, then pressuring local governments to place foreign extractive companies above the wishes of their population is counter-intuitive.

First, creating restrictions and making it difficult for local groups to mobilize and organize around a particular issue that directly affects them is undemocratic. Second, if such pressure by Canada generates violent conflict between police and local populations then Canada is pursuing activities that risk destabilizing regions which goes against the idea that development leads to peace and security.

These actions not only undermine Canadian values as well as Canadian and International development strategies but also makes Canadian development assistance less marketable as it impacts our credibility as positive force globally. Instituting mandatory CSR initiatives which thoughtfully include local concerns strengthen the democratic initiatives of development while aiding in the 'whole of government approach to international development. Canadian diplomatic channels and the extractive sector need to align themselves in a positive multilateral partnership with the local government and local people to ensure that Canadian international activities increase Canada's reputation and contribute to effective sustainable development.

## ANNEX F: TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: POSITIVE CASE STUDIES

Canadian International Development Platform has generated two studies looking at the positive trend between Canadian development assistance and trade. The studies reason that the potential reasons for this beneficial relationship is that goodwill and aid can work as an indirect promoter of Canadian goods; Aid can alter the recipients preferences for donor technology; development spending can promote Canadian expertise in trade-related practices which can build trade relationships between Canada and developing countries; and sustained development assistance can lead to market creation, expansion as well as relationship building and knowledge transfer and exchange.<sup>71</sup>

### *Costa Rica*

From 2006-2010 Canadian experts supported Costa Rican officials in adopting regulations and practices that met with International Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, which are standards that are deemed necessary to protect human, animal and plant life or health. In 2006, an undetermined risk status was placed on Costa Rica for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy determined by the World Organization for Animal health. This restricted Costa Rica beef exports to enter the EU. Canada delivered aid, technologies and knowledge to help Costa Rica comply with SPS standards and gain entry in the European market. This aid unintentionally led to Costa Rica lifting the ban on Canadian beef products, and in 2010 both countries started to modernize their bilateral free trade agreement.<sup>72</sup>

### *Burkina Faso*

Canadian international development consulting firm, Cowater Sogema implemented a four year project which started in 2017 which seeks to connect fourteen rural areas which includes multiple health clinics to a national energy grid. The energy project focuses on renewable energy and aims at building solar farms with a Canadian independent power producer Windiga Energy. This project which receives GAC funding will contribute to the local nation's energy pool. This Canadian partnership between two companies and GAC advertises Canada's competitive advantage in the renewable resources technology. This ongoing project is projected to further Canada's socio-economic development priorities in Burkina Faso while also increasing commercial ties between the countries.<sup>73</sup>

## APPENDIX G: NATIONAL TREND DATA

|              | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|--------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| OECD Rank    | 16   | 17   | 17   | 17   | 15   | 15   | 16   | 17   | 19   | 17   | 20   | 18   | 15   |
| Inflation    | 1.67 | 2.38 | 1.16 | 1.32 | 2.35 | 2.3  | 0.83 | 1.24 | 1.47 | 1.61 | 1.5  | 1.87 | 1.99 |
| USD Billions | 3843 | 3902 | 4413 | 3999 | 4575 | 4454 | 4601 | 4089 | 3685 | 4334 | 4104 | 4305 | 4650 |
| GNI %        | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.33 | 0.30 | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.27 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.28 |


## ANNEX H: DEVELOPMENT, DIPLOMACY AND DEFENCE <sup>74</sup>

| Country                      | Human Development Index Rank (189 least developed, 1 most developed) | 2019 Global Peace Index Rank (163 least peaceful, 1 most peaceful) | Rank in Canadian Development Spending (1 is the most spending) | Canadian International Assistance in millions (2018) |
|------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Niger                        | 189  | 126  | 28   | 45.2   |
| Central African Republic     | 188  | 157  | 44   | 22.2   |
| South Sudan                  | 187  | 161  | 12   | 101.5  |
| Chad                         | 186  | 137  | 39   | 29.4   |
| Burundi                      | 185  | 135  | 53   | 15.2   |
| Mali                         | 182  | 145  | 4  | 136.6  |
| Burkina Faso                 | 183  | 104  | 21   | 63.4   |
| Sierra Leone                 | 184  | 52   | 55   | 14.8   |
| Liberia                      | 181  | 59   | 62   | 9.9  |
| Mozambique                   | 180  | 94   | 15   | 85.9   |
| Afghanistan                  | 168  | 163  | 1  | 254  |
| Syria                        | 155  | 162  | 8  | 124.5  |
| Yemen                        | 178  | 160  | 18   | 74.5   |
| Iraq                         | 120  | 159  | 11   | 106.3  |
| Somalia                      | N.A.   | 158  | 30   | 43.1   |
| Libya                        | 108  | 156  | 87   | 4.8  |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | 176  | 155  | 10   | 112.9  |
| Ethiopia                     | 173  | 131  | 2  | 198.1  |
| Tanzania                     | 154  | 54   | 3  | 141.3  |
| Nigeria                      | 157  | 148  | 5  | 133.8  |
| Jordan                       | 95   | 77   | 6  | 133  |
| Bangladesh                   | 136  | 101  | 7  | 132.1  |
| Haiti                        | 168  | 87   | 9  | 121.9  |

The table above demonstrates the discrepancy of aid spending between those who are considered to be the least developed areas and those that are high conflict zones. As well this table indicates which countries are the top recipients of Canadian aid assistance.

Afghanistan is the largest recipient of Canadian development assistance while it ranks 21 points higher than Niger which is the least developed country according to the Human Development Index. Afghanistan is not within the top ten least developed countries yet it received 254 million dollars from Canada where Niger received \$45.2 million. Canada spends a total of \$523.81 million on the world's least developed countries, while it spends 590 on the world's least peaceful states according to the Global Peace Index.<sup>75</sup> This ranks Afghanistan as the least peaceful state. If development is a contributor to global peace and security, then this a potential reason why Canada would spend more in conflict zones as opposed to the less developed. Canada and its NATO allies adopted a 3D approach to attempt to establish stability in Afghanistan as the integration of development, diplomacy and defence strategies are considered to be a essential to establishing peace and stability.<sup>76</sup>

However, Canada's aid to Afghanistan has been largely ineffective due to a lack of proper engagement with Afghan civil society members and a focus on short term, quick impact development strategies that are not sustainable as a result long-term project that could achieve sustainable development and democratization were sidelined.<sup>77</sup> The figure below demonstrates the overall decline in Canadian ODA spending in long-term development strategies.<sup>74</sup> The 3D approach to Afghanistan was security oriented and favored engaging with NGOs over civil society and often bypassed state channels which diminished the credibility and impact of such initiatives among the local population. Overall, Canada's aid policies are lacking mechanisms that measure and assess the effectiveness of aid spending.



## ANNEX I: PRINCIPLED AID INDEX

The Principled Aid Index is a ranking system, which evaluates whether or not each donor country considered “targets aid to countries that need it most, supports global cooperation and adopts a public spirited focus on development impact rather than a short-sighted domestic return”. Below are the rankings for each of these categories, as well as the total overall ranking. For more information on the methodology behind measuring each of these indicators, visit the Working Paper: Understanding Donor Motivations Developing the Principled Aid Index” Available on the ODI website.<sup>78</sup>

|                 | Overall | Needs | Global co-op | Public spirit |
|-----------------|---------|-------|--------------|---------------|
| Luxembourg      | 1       | 4     | 9            | 1             |
| UK              | 2       | 3     | 4            | 7             |
| Sweden          | 3       | 2     | 7            | 14            |
| Ireland         | 4       | 1     | 15           | 4             |
| Norway          | 5       | 5     | 5            | 13            |
| Canada          | 6       | 8     | 3            | 15            |
| Japan           | 7       | 22    | 1            | 2             |
| Finland         | 8       | 9     | 6            | 12            |
| US              | 9       | 6     | 10           | 20            |
| France          | 10      | 21    | 2            | 18            |
| Denmark         | 11      | 7     | 19           | 6             |
| Korea           | 12      | 20    | 8            | 5             |
| Iceland         | 13      | 11    | 17           | 3             |
| Australia       | 14      | 16    | 11           | 9             |
| Switzerland     | 15      | 19    | 12           | 10            |
| Germany         | 16      | 12    | 14           | 22            |
| Netherlands     | 17      | 14    | 16           | 19            |
| Belgium         | 18      | 17    | 22           | 8             |
| New Zealand     | 19      | 28    | 13           | 11            |
| Italy           | 20      | 23    | 18           | 24            |
| Spain           | 21      | 24    | 20           | 23            |
| Portugal        | 22      | 27    | 24           | 17            |
| Czech Republic  | 23      | 13    | 23           | 26            |
| Hungary         | 24      | 25    | 25           | 21            |
| Slovenia        | 25      | 26    | 26           | 16            |
| Poland          | 26      | 10    | 28           | 25            |
| Austria         | 27      | 18    | 21           | 29            |
| Greece          | 28      | 15    | 29           | 28            |
| Slovak Republic | 29      | 29    | 27           | 27            |

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# Environment

By: Dean Ortega and Lena Smith

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As it stands, current policy is not projected to meet Canada's 2030 international commitment of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 30% below 2005 levels. This signals a lack of alignment between the Federal Government's intention and policy action. The danger of climate change is proven to be imminent around the world and within Canada ([See Annex A](#)). Standing in the way of meaningful climate action in Canada are three key problems: conflicting policies, emissions from non-renewable sources and inconsistent cooperation nationally.

In consideration of these key problems it is recommended that Canada:

1. Prioritize investment and expand use of Carbon Capture, Utilisation and Storage technology ([See Annex B](#)) to reduce emissions while generating incentives for a new industry.
2. Revamp and give a new mandate to the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment ([See Annex C](#)) so that they can act as a more appropriate forum for federal-provincial consultation, coordination and negotiation on environmental matters.

This review on Canada's climate change policy is intended for the Honourable Jonathan Wilkinson, Minister of Environment and Climate Change, and the Honourable Seamus O'Regan, Minister of Natural Resources of Canada.



# ABBREVIATIONS

| Acronym Used    | Definition  |
|-----------------|---|
| CAT             | Climate Action Taker                                      |
| CCCR            | Canada's Changing Climate Report                          |
| CCME            | Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment          |
| CCUS            | Carbon Capture Utilisation and Storage                    |
| CCS             | Carbon Capture and Storage                                |
| CO <sub>2</sub> | Carbon Dioxide  |
| ECCC            | Environment and Climate Change Canada                     |
| GDP             | Gross Domestic Product                                    |
| GHG             | Greenhouse Gas  |
| IPCC            | Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change                 |
| ISED            | Innovation, Science and Economic Development              |
| KPIs            | Key Performance Indicators                                |
| NDCs            | Nationally Determined Contributions                       |
| NRCan           | Natural Resources Canada                                  |
| NSLSC           | National Student Loans Service Centre                     |
| O&G             | Oil and Gas   |
| PBO             | Parliamentary Budget Officer                              |
| PCF             | Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change |
| R&D             | Research and Development                                  |
| UK              | United Kingdom  |
| UNFCCC          | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change     |
| WMO             | World Meteorological Organization                         |

# BACKGROUND, HISTORY, POLICY PROCESS

## PROBLEMS FACING THE NATION

Canada's efforts to meet its emissions targets and to contribute to the Paris Agreement's long-term goal of keeping warming below 2°C and ideally as low as 1.5°C<sup>1</sup> are hampered by:

### *Conflicting Policies:*

Canada is implementing policies to reduce emissions.<sup>2</sup> It is simultaneously encouraging the use of fossil fuels through fossil fuel subsidies.<sup>3</sup> This encourages investment in the fossil fuel industry by artificially reducing costs.<sup>4</sup> In addition, Canada's current plan to continue developing its O&G capacity through pipeline expansion, even with its current climate action, will result in Canada not meeting its 2030 target.<sup>5</sup> Overall, current Canadian policy does not align with international commitments, namely through the Paris Agreement.

### *Non-Renewable Energy Emissions:*

Canada relies heavily on O&G. O&G extraction contributed to 7% of Canada's GDP in 2018.<sup>6</sup> Petroleum products make up 19.7% of Canadian exports.<sup>7</sup> Carbon dioxide emissions from the burning of fossil fuels is the dominant source of heat-trapping emissions globally,<sup>8</sup> and O&G production contributes the most to Canada's GHG emissions (See Annex A).<sup>9</sup>

### *Inconsistent Cooperation Nationally:*

While the Federal Government can set emissions targets, the provinces have the constitutional responsibility to implement changes to reach these targets. Provinces' opposition slows down the implementation of federal policy and legislation.<sup>10</sup> Some provinces have increased emissions levels even though the federal government has committed to reduce emissions.<sup>11</sup> Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario and Quebec have resisted government legislation to implement a carbon tax that would help to reduce emissions. Ontario<sup>12</sup> and Saskatchewan have taken the federal government to court, on the grounds that it is infringing on the province's jurisdiction; both lost their cases and have submitted appeals to the Supreme Court.<sup>13</sup> In addition, Alberta and Ontario have been decreasing the number of clean and renewable energy projects, as well as emissions reducing projects.<sup>14</sup>

## PAST POLICIES AND CRITICAL DECISIVE MOMENTS

In the late 1980s, the Federal Government became increasingly involved in environmental policy, whereas before it largely left such issues to the provinces.<sup>15</sup> This was likely a result of increasing international concern which would lead to Canada making international commitments to climate action. Former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney championed developing an international framework convention on climate change. However, his domestic policy to increasingly subsidize the oil industry did not align with his international action.<sup>16</sup> Inconsistent international and domestic action is a longstanding issue in Canadian climate change policy.

Eventually Canada signed onto the UNFCCC.<sup>17</sup> This was followed by the Kyoto Protocol in 1997<sup>18</sup> which initially Canada strongly supported.<sup>19</sup> Even though Canada withdrew from Kyoto, it marked the start of a new era of international cooperation on tackling climate change.<sup>20</sup> Canada also signed the Copenhagen Accord in December 2009<sup>21</sup>, where it committed to reducing emissions by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020.<sup>22</sup>

Under the 2015 Paris Agreement, Canada has committed to produce NDCs emissions targets every five years.<sup>23</sup> While the Paris Agreement does not legally bind Canada to any particular target, it does set norms. Breaking these norms comes at the risk of international shame and environmental damage.<sup>24</sup>

What may pose a challenge to the international climate change regime is the start of the withdrawal process from the Agreement of one of the world's biggest polluters, the US.<sup>25</sup> It is predicted that if the US does not honour its NDC commitment, there will be GDP loss in the other countries having to mitigate the effects of American emissions.<sup>26</sup>

## CURRENT POLICY

The former Harper government introduced a target to reach a 17% emissions reduction from 2005 levels by 2020, and a reduction of 30% by 2030. This has not been changed by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.<sup>27</sup> However, Trudeau made a campaign promise during the 2019 election for Canada to produce net-zero emissions by 2050.<sup>28</sup> This indicates the desire for a more aggressive climate change policy.

The Federal Government and Provinces are attempting cooperative action through the PCF. The PCF emphasizes pricing carbon pollution, actions to reduce emissions across Canada, adaptation and climate resilience, clean technology, innovation, and jobs.<sup>29</sup> The Provinces were given the opportunity to meet the carbon price set by the federal government through a program of their choice. Ontario, New Brunswick, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan did not comply and had a federal carbon tax implemented.<sup>30</sup>

Canada has invested in technology to reduce emissions. Over the last few years, the provincial governments of Saskatchewan, British Columbia, Alberta, and Nova Scotia, and the Federal Government, have spent \$1.8 billion on CCUS initiatives to develop the technology<sup>31</sup> (See Annex B).

## TRENDS AND INDICATORS

In his 2015 mandate letter, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau highlighted the urgency of reducing emissions and named it a priority for former ECCC Minister Catherine McKenna. He also highlighted the importance of partnerships with the provinces and territories in order to implement emissions reductions strategies.<sup>32</sup> However, in some provinces, emissions have been increasing. For example, Alberta has had the greatest absolute increase in emissions. Overall in Canada, reductions by 2017 were only 2% below 2005 levels (See Table 1).<sup>33</sup>

CAT reported that current Canadian policy is insufficient to the Paris Agreement goal of keeping warming below 1.5 °C. If every country in the world took comparable policy action, warming would reach up to 3°C.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, in 2019, PBO reported that with current policies, Canada will not reach the less ambitious 2030 goal<sup>35</sup> (See Figure 1).


### Changes in GHG Emissions Between 1990-2017 by Provinces/Territories

| Province/Territory        | 1990 | 2005 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | Change (%)<br>2005 to<br>2017 |
|---------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------------------------|
| Total                     | 602  | 730  | 711  | 722  | 723  | 722  | 708  | 714  | -2.0%                         |
| Newfoundland and Labrador | 9.4  | 9.9  | 9.4  | 9.4  | 10   | 11   | 11   | 10   | 6.9%                          |
| Prince Edward Island      | 1.9  | 2.0  | 2.1  | 1.7  | 1.7  | 1.7  | 1.8  | 1.8  | -10%                          |
| Nova Scotia               | 20   | 23   | 19   | 18   | 16   | 17   | 16   | 16   | -33%                          |
| New Brunswick             | 16   | 20   | 17   | 15   | 14   | 14   | 15   | 14   | -28%                          |
| Québec                    | 86   | 86   | 80   | 80   | 78   | 78   | 78   | 78   | -9.8%                         |
| Ontario                   | 180  | 204  | 169  | 168  | 166  | 165  | 162  | 159  | -22%                          |
| Manitoba                  | 18   | 20   | 20   | 21   | 21   | 21   | 21   | 22   | 14%                           |
| Saskatchewan              | 44   | 68   | 71   | 73   | 76   | 79   | 76   | 78   | 14%                           |
| Alberta                   | 173  | 231  | 261  | 271  | 276  | 275  | 264  | 273  | 18%                           |
| British Columbia          | 52   | 63   | 60   | 61   | 60   | 59   | 61   | 62   | -1.5%                         |
| Yukon                     | 0.5  | 0.5  | 0.6  | 0.6  | 0.5  | 0.5  | 0.5  | 0.5  | -1.3%                         |
| Northwest Territories     | NA   | 1.6  | 1.5  | 1.3  | 1.5  | 1.7  | 1.6  | 1.2  | -19%                          |
| Nunavut                   | NA   | 0.4  | 0.5  | 0.7  | 0.7  | 0.6  | 0.6  | 0.6  | 33%                           |

Figure 1

## Canada's GHG Emissions Projected Under Current Policies

Megatonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent



Source: Environment and Climate Change Canada.

Note: Projected emissions levels correspond to the Additional Measures Case in Environment and Climate Change Canada's 2018 GHG emissions projections report. LULUCF refers to Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry. The projection period covers 2017 to 2030.

Figure 2

## TRENDS AND INDICATORS

Some parties to the Paris Agreement have pledged to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Some have reached this goal, and others have passed national legislation to bind themselves legally to reaching this target.<sup>36</sup>

Increasing carbon pricing is another method of reducing emissions. This is politically unfeasible in Canada at this time due to current resistance to carbon pricing.<sup>37</sup>

Tree planting is another option for emissions capture, however, for it to be effective, more than a trillion trees will need to be planted. This requires widespread global cooperation. Such efforts would take time and time is restricted as climate change is reducing the usability of the land needed for tree planting.<sup>38</sup>

## CONSTRAINTS

### **Political:**

The Federal Government has the jurisdiction to make international climate change agreements.<sup>39</sup> It also has jurisdiction over setting standards to regulate emissions across Canada.<sup>40</sup> However, the Provinces have the constitutional right to establish measures to reduce emissions within their borders.<sup>41</sup> Therefore, while the Federal Government can set standards, implementation is in the hands of the Provinces.

### **Capacity:**

The task of reaching Paris Agreement goals requires international cooperation from all countries. As Canada cannot reduce global emissions goals on its own, other countries will need to make emission reductions.

### **Financial:**

Technological innovation to reduce or remove emissions is costly.

# POLICY ANALYSIS

## GOAL AND OBJECTIVES

### **Goal:**

Reconcile international climate change commitments with the interests of a variety of Canadian Stakeholders.

### **Objectives:**

- Improve policy coherence and coordination between different levels of government to reduce the offsetting of climate action policy caused by contradictory policies and actions.
- Promote economic growth while balancing social interests.
- Increase Canadian and global capacity in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reduction.

## INTERESTS AND VALUES

Interests that must be reconciled are Canada's standing in the global climate policy regime and sustainable economic growth. It is in Canada's interest to maintain its contribution to international climate policy as to not risk harmonious relations with like-minded allies, to maintain its international integrity and to project Canadian values. Climate action has been prioritized in the recent federal elections by Canadian citizens<sup>42</sup> and campaign platforms.<sup>43</sup>

## STAKEHOLDERS

| Government Stakeholder           | Ally or Detractor | Role  | Interests   |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|---|---|
| <b>NRCan</b>                     | Ally              | Distribute finances to CCUS developers.   | Responsible development and use of Canada's natural resources and the competitiveness of resulting products.  |
| <b>Colleges and Universities</b> | Ally              | Develop specialized low-carbon sector educational and training programs.  | College and university programming.   |
| <b>NSLSC</b>                     | Ally              | Provide specialized grants for students entering low-carbon sector education.   | To promote access to education by managing student loans.   |
| <b>Ministry of ECCC</b>          | Ally              | Key player in the implementation of Canada's climate change policies.   | Reaching emissions targets while maintaining economic growth.   |
| <b>Provinces</b>                 | Mixed             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementing policy change.</li> <li>• Pooling of resources for unified and efficient action.</li> <li>• Investment in CCUS.</li> <li>• Investment in CCME.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some provinces (i.e., British Columbia and Quebec) have a track record of emissions reductions that meet or surpasses federal targets. These provinces have proven their commitment to climate action.</li> <li>• Provinces with large O&amp;G sectors (i.e. Alberta and Saskatchewan) can be expected to be wary about the impact of measures that curb GHG emissions. However, they are interested in profitable industry development. CCUS is in their interests.</li> <li>• Some may be hesitant to spend on new initiatives, especially if climate change is not a political priority (i.e., Ontario).</li> </ul> |
| <b>CCME</b>                      | Ally              | Implement CCME changes.   | Mutually beneficial responses to climate change.  |
| <b>ISED</b>                      | Ally              | Development and export of green technology.   | Investment in technology development and innovation performance.  |
| <b>Opposition in Parliament</b>  | Mixed             | Work with the Liberal minority to pass legislation and approve funding.   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NDP agenda focuses on climate change action but their support will require consultation and negotiations.</li> <li>• Conservative Party is a potential ally. They have shown support for CCUS investment.<sup>44</sup></li> </ul>  |

| Industry Stakeholder                            | Ally or Detractor | Role   | Interests   |
|---|-------------------|--|---|
| CCUS Industry                                   | Ally              | R&D and production of CCUS tech and carbon goods.  | Interested in financing and development of CCUS for eventual profits.   |
| Carbon Capital Corporations (i.e. O&G Industry) | Mixed             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contribute to R&amp;D in carbon capture and renewable energy tech</li> <li>Implementing technology to capture emissions from production.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop technology for the use of carbon captured so that they can sell the carbon or use it to produce goods.</li> <li>Might experience some pushback due to costs of implementing technology and contributing to R&amp;D.</li> </ul> |

| Individual Stakeholder | Ally or Detractor | Role  | Interests   |
|------------------------|-------------------|---|---|
| Canadian Citizens      | Mixed             | Ultimate beneficiaries of any efforts to combat climate change. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Have voiced environmental interests: Pushing for greater climate action.<sup>45</sup></li> <li>CCUS and expanding CCME is a long-term solution; might want immediate fix.</li> </ul> |

| International Community   | Ally or Detractor | Role   | Interests   |
|---|-------------------|--|---|
| United States   | Mixed             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>R&amp;D partners: Partnerships to increase R&amp;D capacity.</li> <li>One of the largest carbon emitters.</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Some US states (i.e. California and Texas) are interested in climate action progress. For example, Texas has a CCUS plant.<sup>46</sup></li> <li>Donald Trump has stated intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, signalling waning support at the federal level for climate action.</li> </ul> |
| Parties to the Paris Agreement Who have Proven Their Commitment to Climate Action | Ally              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Meet global emissions reduction targets. Especially those who have committed to net-zero emissions by 2050 (i.e. France, UK and Norway).</li> <li>Trade partners</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Canada's increased engagement would result in greater burden sharing.</li> <li>Increase capacity to reduce emissions.</li> <li>CCUS tech and carbon good trade deals can benefit trading partners.</li> </ul>  |

## PROGRAMMATIC NEEDS

- A key barrier to lowering the cost of the CCUS technology is funding for research.<sup>47</sup> NRCan's and ISED's increased capacity for CCUS research and innovation is required to boost innovation and investment.
- Skills diversification is needed.<sup>55</sup> Provincial ministries of education need to develop education programs specific to carbon industry. NSLSC needs to support training and education through grants.
- Improved sharing of technical information and best practices in the realm of R&D through partnerships.
- A process to invigorate CCME and its capacity, mandate, powers and efficacy to improve its ability to act as a forum for coordination and negotiation.

# ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATION

## COSTED OPTIONS

### Option One:

**Prioritize investment and expand use of CCUS technology.**

### Expected Outcome:

- Improved efficiency and reduced costs of the technology.
- Becomes a viable choice to reduce global emissions.
- Once using captured carbon for the production of goods is efficient enough, it can result in profits.

| Option 1: Prioritize Investment and Expand Use of CCUS Technology  |   |
|--|---|
| Pros   | Cons  |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Canada has the infrastructure necessary to scale up its carbon technology industry.<sup>49</sup></li> <li>• Most effective way of reducing and permanently storing CO<sub>2</sub>.<sup>50</sup></li> <li>• Carbon can be used for the production of goods and eventual profits.<sup>51</sup></li> <li>• Eventual alternative to O&amp;G Industry.<sup>52</sup></li> <li>• Costs expected to decrease drastically (<b>See Annex B</b>).</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Currently limited due to transport and storage costs. Cost of capturing and storing all of Canada's carbon emissions in 2017 would have been USD \$49.36 billion.<sup>53</sup></li> <li>• Using carbon to make goods is presently limited by the cost of energy required.<sup>54</sup></li> <li>• Risk of investing in a relatively new industry.</li> <li>• Requires substantial government investment (<b>See Annex B</b>).</li> </ul> |

## **Option 2:**

**Redirect fossil fuel subsidies to subsidize the renewable energy sector.**

### **Expected Outcome:**

- Reduction and eventual elimination of O&G subsidies would disincentivize investment in the industry; and at the very least, freeze emission levels.
- Money would be used to subsidize renewable energy, and there would be a shift to a greater participation in the renewable energy sector.<sup>55</sup>

| <b>Option 2: Redirect Fossil Fuel Subsidies to Renewable Energy Sector</b>  |  |
|---|--|
| <b>Pros</b>   | <b>Cons</b>  |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Reduces incentives to participate in an industry that is the biggest producer of emissions.</li><li>• Freed up \$1.6 billion CAD in 2019 for the Federal Government to spend in the renewable energy sector.<sup>56</sup></li><li>• Can use the money to invest in technology that will reduce net-carbon emissions.</li><li>• Could redistribute subsidy money to the lowest income individuals to offset cost incurred with increase in O&amp;G prices.</li><li>• Reputational benefit as Canada will be seen as promoting renewable energy.<sup>57</sup></li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Potential increase in O&amp;G costs likely to result in increased transportation, energy and general living costs.</li><li>• Currently lacking capacity for renewable energy to fully replace O&amp;G.<sup>58</sup></li><li>• Alberta and Saskatchewan would take an economic hit.<sup>59</sup></li><li>• Experts disagree on how to define inefficient subsidies.<sup>60</sup></li><li>• Incomplete reporting by the government about how much is being spent on subsidies prevents thorough analysis on impact of removing subsidies.<sup>61</sup></li></ul> |

## **Option 3:**

**Expand power of CCME.**

### **Expected Outcome:**

- Increased opportunity to reach consensus and collaboration between Federal and Provincial Governments.
- Improve the effectiveness and ease of implementation of climate change policy.

| <b>Option 3: Expand Power of CCME</b>   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>Pros</b>   | <b>Cons</b>  |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Address frequently changing current events related to climate change with all relevant parties.</li><li>• Improve channels of communication; more opportunity to come to a consensus and work together.</li><li>• Overcome collective action hurdles.</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Can slow down the Federal Government's decision making process.</li><li>• Additional costs of enhanced administrative capacity.</li><li>• No guarantee that there will be a consensus.</li></ul> |

## RECOMMENDATION

All of the options mentioned above can benefit Canada's climate change policy. However, an investment in CCUS technology and the expansion of CCME have the strongest potential and the greatest long-term benefits. These recommendations are the most compatible with interests of stakeholders and face the least constraints.

### **Recommendation 1: CCUS Investment**

Canada should increase its investments in the development and use of the CCUS; where it is already a global leader. It should focus on developing the capacity to use captured carbon to produce goods and lowering overall costs of CCUS. The federal government should invest in R&D for CCUS and implement the technology widely once it is economically feasible.

Powerful nations are committing to a pledge of net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 and they as they will need the CCUS technology to fulfil this goal, this opens the door to future export markets for Canadian companies.<sup>62</sup>

Development of CCUS appeases the interests of the O&G industry as it has the potential to use the captured carbon to produce and then sell goods, but also to make its O&G extraction process more efficient.<sup>63</sup> With the carbon emitting O&G industry making up a substantial proportion of Saskatchewan's and Alberta's GDP, the Provinces would be interested in a solution that does not eliminate the industry immediately. Moreover, it will eventually be cost-effective to use the carbon they capture in to produce goods. In the long-term, CCUS provides an alternative to O&G as Canada taps into its potential in the low-carbon industry. Manufacturers would move towards exporting the technology, and goods produced from CO<sub>2</sub>, to sell on the global market.

#### **Impact:**

- Reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and the development of technology that will be crucial in the reduction of global emissions.
- The development of the CCUS industry will create jobs.


#### **Evaluation:**

NRCan would perform evaluation using the KPIs annually and publish the report on their website. The report will be an indicator of whether the investment has achieved the objectives and aid in the determination of potential investment renewal.

## Recommendation 1: CCUS Investment

| Costs  | Implementation  | KPIs  | Communication   |
|--|---|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Funding for training and education grants.</li> <li>• Federal and Provincial Government commitment to increase investment in R&amp;D, and operating costs to CAD \$3.6 billion over the next 5 years with the potential to be renewed.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct industry analysis.</li> <li>• Provision of long-term financial investment from Federal and Provincial governments to CCUS R&amp;D, and operational costs.</li> <li>• Develop new partnerships with others investing in the technology to reduce costs through shared R&amp;D.</li> <li>• Provide educational grants to ensure a sufficient workforce for current needs and future needs when the industry expands and manufacturing needs grow.</li> <li>• Negotiate CCUS technology and goods trade agreement.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cost of CCS per metric ton of CO<sub>2</sub>.</li> <li>• Overall metric tons of carbon released into the atmosphere.</li> <li>• Cost of producing goods with captured carbon.</li> <li>• Units of goods sold.</li> <li>• Profits from units sold.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote industry training by highlighting the future collective and individual economic benefits of engagement in this field. Communicate through social media campaigns and the Government of Canada webpage.</li> <li>• NSLSC and Government of Canada would announce new investments on their respective websites.</li> </ul> |

## TIMELINES: RECOMMENDATION 1



## **Recommendation 2: Expand role of CCME**

In recognition of the federal-provincial nature of climate policy, implementation and the difficulties posed by contrasting visions, the CCME should be given a greater role to act as a forum to mediate and collaborate.

The CCME should be consulted prior to the implementation of any national climate policy— increasing the opportunity for the exchange of information and where necessary, negotiation. While the federal government would retain the authority to introduce legislation as it sees fit, it would be best practice to first attain support from a majority of the members of the CCME.

### **Impact:**


- Greater engagement with the provinces in climate change policy.
- CCME would take on a more significant policy coordination role. When provincial and federal government are More efficient policy implementation.

### **Evaluation:**

External evaluation to be completed two years after program changes have been implemented to determine efficacy of council.

| <b>Option 2: Expand Role of CCME</b>  |   |  |  |
|---|---|--|--|
| <b>Costs</b>  | <b>Implementation</b>   | <b>KPIs</b>  | <b>Communication</b>   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Doubling of overhead costs.</li> <li>• Provincial and Federal financial contribution to the CCME will be doubled.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Designated Federal and Provincial Ministers will meet to discuss details of the changes.</li> <li>• Members will meet once every four months.</li> <li>• Increase secretariat capacity.</li> <li>• After the evaluation, Ministers are to make a decision about whether to continue with the changes or make adjustments.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased policy consultation and coordination.</li> <li>• Number of recommendations to legislatures and relevant Government Entities.</li> <li>• Disputes settled through CCME rather than through courts.</li> <li>• Acceleration of emissions reductions.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Federal and Provincial leaders will highlight the need for a united Canada in the fight against climate change. This will be done on their respective social media pages.</li> <li>• CCME would promote its improved capacity as a forum to unite the provinces in developing efficient and effective policy. This will be communicated through a press release.</li> </ul> |


## TIMELINES: RECOMMENDATION 2



## Annex A: CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE WORLD AND CANADA


In 2018, the WMO reported record highs in GHG concentrations. Worldwide, the average temperature reached 1.0 °C above pre-industrial levels- the world is not on track to meet targets set out by the Paris Agreement.<sup>66</sup> Human activity has led to a warming of the climate in Canada that is “on average, about double the magnitude of global warming,”<sup>67</sup> (See Figure 2). This is associated with increased likelihood of flooding, extreme heat, and extreme cold, among other environmental stresses.<sup>68</sup> In 2018, the IPCC reported that the world will feel extreme climate impacts by 2030 if action is not taken to keep average global temperature rise below 1.5 °C.<sup>69</sup>

**Observed Changes (°C) in Annual Temperature Across Canada (1949-2016)<sup>70</sup>**



**Figure 2**


**Greenhouse Gas Emissions for the World and Top 10 Emitting Countries (2005-2014)<sup>71</sup>**



**Figure 3.**

GHG emissions linked to human activity are found likely to be the dominant cause of warming and climate change.<sup>72</sup> Canada is in the top 10 of the world's carbon emitters. In 2016, Canada produced the third highest level CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita.<sup>73</sup> Overall, Canada ranks 9th in the world for the overall amount of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions<sup>74</sup> (See Figure 3). The majority of Canadian emissions are coming from the O&G industry and transportation, respectively emitting 27% and 24% of total emissions (See Figure 4).

**Breakdown of Canada's Emissions by economic sector (2017)<sup>75</sup>**



**Figure 4**

## ANNEX B: BACKGROUND ON CCUS

**Carbon Capture:** There are three main methods for capturing carbon from industrial sources. These are post-combustion, pre-combustion and oxy combustion. However, new technology has developed the capacity to remove CO<sub>2</sub> by filtering vast quantities of air; this is called direct air capture.<sup>76</sup>

**Carbon Storage:** Captured carbon is transported by truck, pipeline or ship to be injected into a suitable site. It can then be stored deep underground.<sup>77</sup> It can also be injected into cement.<sup>78</sup>

**Carbon Utilization:** This is the process of using captured carbon in the production of goods or to enhance production processes. For instance, it is used to enhance oil recovery. Carbon can be injected deep underground to lift oil out.<sup>79</sup>

### **What is the Potential of CCUS?**

The IPCC reports that emissions reductions are not enough to limit warming to 1.5°C. Removal of existing CO<sub>2</sub> through CCUS and similar technologies is necessary to attain the 1.5°C goal.<sup>80</sup> CCUS alone has the potential to contribute to 20% of the world's required emissions reductions by 2050.<sup>81</sup> Moreover, the market is estimated at \$800 billion.<sup>82</sup>

Current costs of capturing and storing are high, as much as 100 USD per metric ton.<sup>83</sup> However, by the 2020s, costs are predicted to go down to \$40-57/ metric ton,<sup>84</sup> and \$20/metric ton in the 2040s.<sup>85</sup> This is made possible, for example, through current research in capturing carbon that is examining ways to reduce costs by developing improved solvents that will make capture more efficient by reducing energy and infrastructure requirements.<sup>86</sup>

What is particularly attractive about the technology is that it has the potential to capture carbon from industries where it is not likely that they will ever be able to stop emitting. These include agriculture and flying.<sup>87</sup>

With decreased costs, eventually captured carbon can be used in the mass production of goods. There is current technological capacity that allows for the use of carbon in the production of building materials, synthetic rubber, plastic, potash (to make soaps, and detergents among other products), carbon neutral fuel, materials to build cars, and even fishmeal. It should be noted that this is not an all-encompassing list.<sup>88</sup>

### **Canada and CCUS:**

Two key CCUS projects in Canada are Boundary Dam in Saskatchewan and Quest in Alberta.<sup>89</sup> Quest is a CCUS facility that has captured 4 million tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>.<sup>90</sup> Boundary Dam is a coal-fired power plant. The plant's captured carbon is sold for oil recovery projects. It is predicted that Canadian projects will result in 3% of the reduction needed to meet the 2030 emissions target.<sup>91</sup>

### **What is needed to develop CCUS in Canada?**

To develop CCUS capacity, and reduce costs, constant research and projects—meaning stable funding for these projects, is required. Current government funding is limited when it comes to operating costs, most funding covers only infrastructure and piloting costs.<sup>92</sup> CCUS development requires government financing<sup>93</sup>; there is limited incentive for private or corporate investment because of the long wait on returns.<sup>94</sup>

As mentioned previously, the low carbon industry also requires a diversified skill set of workers. Specialized training programs will be required to match worker capacity to industry needs.<sup>95</sup>

## ANNEX C: CCME BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The CCME is an intergovernmental forum made up of the 14 Federal, Provincial and Territorial Environment Ministers. They meet about once a year to address collective action issues that are relevant to Canada nationally and internationally.<sup>96</sup>

Recognizing that jurisdiction over the environment is shared according to the Constitution, the CCME is meant to overcome collective action problems requiring efforts by multiple governments. It is tasked with achieving positive environmental outcomes. It also establishes working groups to meet more specific technical goals and receives financial and in-kind support from the environmental departments of each jurisdiction. The chair rotates on an annual basis and is currently held by Dustin Duncan, Minister of the Environment of Saskatchewan.

While not only focused on climate change, the CCME does have a climate change working group and is part of the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change. It is responsible for examining options “for the reporting of emissions and inventories to ensure consistency across provinces and territories, to support Canada’s reporting to the UNFCCC, and for a pan-Canadian offset protocol framework and verified carbon credits that can be traded domestically and internationally.”<sup>97</sup>

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# CYBERSECURITY

By: Christopher MacDonald and Jacob Wright

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Canada's cyber future is marked by tremendous economic opportunity and potential. Data storage and accumulation, as well as algorithmic processing capacities are increasing exponentially. The emergent Internet of Things, held together by hyper-speed 5G internet infrastructure, is nothing short of an economic and technical revolution.

The future is also dangerous. Self-serving individuals, predatory criminal organizations, fanatical terrorist groups, and aggressive states alike will continue to search for, and find, vulnerabilities in our cybersecurity architecture.

Canada has done much to prepare for this future, but the cyber world is one of flux. We must constantly adapt. Three new challenges are on the horizon. To secure a prosperous future, Canada must:

- Restore trust.
- Secure new technology.
- Articulate and entrench international cybersecurity rules.

Canada will face up to these challenges in a manner consistent with our underlying values. Security and resilience are top priorities but must be managed in democratic and accountable way. We must assert ourselves internationally but foster collaboration with our allies and partners.

### **We Recommend that Canada:**

- Standardize record keeping practices across government institutions. Canadians have a right to know what information is being collected and how it is being held and to whom it might be disclose.
- Adopt a 'Made in Canada' approach to the IOT, especially in regard to 5G infrastructure. This gives Canada the ability to monitor and counter threats from various sources while also deepening our digital sovereignty and stimulating the domestic telecommunications sector.
- Host an annual international conference in Waterloo to define the standards of international cyber practice for now and ever forwards as technology constantly evolves.

The scale of these projects cannot be understated. Yet the task is not the government's alone. Multiple stakeholders must be involved, including the technology giants, small and medium sized enterprises, and democratic civil society. Some sunk-costs will need to be overcome (i.e. our domestic telecommunications sector has already invested over \$1 billion in foreign 5G technology). But, with strategic action we can seize lucrative opportunities.

Canada must always strive to reach the future first. The proposed policies outlined in this review seek to do so in a prudent yet decisive way. Opportunities will be seized, adversaries will be confronted, and the future secured, for all Canadians.

# ABBREVIATIONS

| Acronym Used | Definition  |
|--------------|---|
| 5G           | Fifth Generation Technology                         |
| CCCS         | Canadian Centre for Cyber Security                  |
| CSE          | Communications Security Establishment               |
| CSIS         | Canadian Security Intelligence Service              |
| DDoS         | Distributed Denial of Service Attack                |
| DND          | Department of National Defence                      |
| DOJ          | Department of Justice                               |
| G7           | Group of Seven                                      |
| GAC          | Global Affairs Canada                               |
| IOT          | Internet of Things                                  |
| ISED         | Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada |
| NCSS         | National Cybersecurity Society                      |
| PCO          | Privy Council Office                                |
| PMO          | Prime Minister Office                               |
| PSC          | Public Safety Canada                                |
| RCMP         | Royal Canadian Mounted Police                       |
| SCISA        | Security of Canada Information Sharing Act          |
| US           | United States                                       |

# BACKGROUND, HISTORY, POLICY PROCESS

## PROBLEMS FACING THE NATION: TRUST

The internet is founded on trust. Without trust in the basic security of the system, governments and corporations would not digitize their most sensitive military and industrial information. Individuals would withdraw their online assets and downgrade or eliminate entirely their online personalities. Trust is secured when rules around data collection and management are transparent and consent-based and when all players can be confident that data is secure from theft.

Unfortunately, recent survey results and observations of online behaviour reveal that Canadians are losing trust in the ability of the government and private organizations to protect sensitive information.<sup>1</sup> These fears are not unreasonable. Data breaches are becoming common place. In 2018-19 alone, approximately 19 million Canadians fell victim to data breaches in one form or another.<sup>2</sup> Responding to the loss of trust, Canadians have changed their internet behaviour.

Unfortunately, the solutions individuals are turning to are marked by heavy opportunity and transaction costs. Moreover, piecemeal solutions, such as opting to dark-web or other encrypted services, carry with them their own security vulnerabilities. The estimated economic costs of these changes run into the billions.<sup>3</sup>

Canada has done much already to address this trust deficit. Bill C-59 increased democratic accountability over the nature of data gathered and stored by the federal government. The Minister of Public Safety Canada, the newly appointed Intelligence Commissioner, mandated vetting by CSIS, and even the annual approval of the Federal Court are all now involved in the maintenance of Canadian data.<sup>4</sup>

The Canadian government has also sought to improve trust within the private sector. In 2018, CCCS was formed and tasked to improve communication on cyber issues in the private sector and amongst the public at large.<sup>5</sup> Recent changes in Canadian privacy law have mandated greater transparency regarding data security between the private sector and the public.<sup>6</sup>

There is still more work to do. Despite the changes to Bill C-59, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada concluded that the current information regime “will remain a threat to the privacy of individuals.”<sup>9</sup> Canada also needs to do more to push for greater transparency in the private sector. When feasible, citizens should be able to opt out of their services or at least have a say in how their information is gathered, used, and shared.<sup>10</sup>

*49% of Canadians said that distrust caused them to post less personal information online.<sup>7</sup>*

*32% of Canadians said that they have some degree of confidence that the algorithms used in social media feeds are unbiased.<sup>8</sup>*

21% of businesses reported that they were impacted by cybersecurity incidents.

About 10% of businesses reported that they lost revenue as a result of cyber attacks.

54% of businesses reported that cyber incidents prevented employees from carrying out day-to-day work.

30% of impacted businesses experienced additional repair or recovery costs.

94% of businesses in Canada had some level of in-house cyber defence expenditures.

On average, Canadian businesses spent \$78,000 on implementing such measures.

Data is from Statistics Canada 2019<sup>11</sup>

## PROBLEMS FACING THE NATION: MANAGING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

Canadians must also keep pace with technological advances. Three challenges in particular present themselves.

First, the IOT—a network of billions of interconnected, wireless objects will supercharge the existing problem of DDoS attacks.<sup>12</sup>

Second, and relatedly, IOT networks are only as strong as their weakest node. Since many of these products are often built on the cheap, these nodes are likely very weak indeed. As virtually everything will soon be connected to such a network, the challenge is daunting and current trends are not encouraging. One study estimates that 2.9 billion attacks were launched in 2019.<sup>13</sup>

Thirdly, the IOT is also inextricably linked to the question of 5G, which enables the expansion of such a network in the first place.<sup>14</sup> 5G networks pose a challenge of their own because of how the physical network is constructed. Not only does the network expand the attack surface due to its increased reliance on both hardware and software technologies, but the hardware's designers can also build-in security vulnerabilities. Firms like Huawei are liable to do this because of the interests of underlying state-backed supporters. Canadians today must ask themselves whether we want a Chinese firm to set the standards and pace of information technology for decades to come.

Canada has thus far approached the IOT from a cyber-hygiene perspective.<sup>15</sup> On the question of 5G networks, Canadian telecommunications companies are already heavily invested in Huawei's technologies. However, the physical infrastructure required to sustain the network has not yet been built and the question of who will build that network has not yet been answered.

## PROBLEMS FACING THE NATION: THE INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE

The third problem facing Canada concerns the laws and customs of international cyberspace, which is an ill-defined and fluid realm. This fluidity presents Canada with a tremendous opportunity to shape and entrench the nature of this realm in a manner consistent with Canadian values and interests.

At the moment, Canada faces an epidemic of cybercrime, much of which is transnational. Canadians already pay the highest costs of ransomware attacks, at \$8,764 per attack. “Business Email Compromise” scams defraud employees and customers of thousands per year. In total, Canadians lost \$17 million in 2018 to such activity.<sup>16</sup>

The most severe offenders are foreign states. Sometimes, Canadians are deliberately attacked, as we were in the 2017 North Korean-backed WannaCry attack. At other times, Canadians have fell victims to indiscriminate cyberwar. In 2017 Russia launched the NotPetya virus against the Ukrainian government and private sector. Within days, the weaponized virus had spread unintentionally through the entire internet. Over \$10 billion in damages were recorded.<sup>17</sup>

The question of encryption is also an important one. On the one hand, encryption is a key defensive tool that sustains trust in the internet. On the other, it can be—and is often—exploited for nefarious purposes. Although governments can break encryption through the invention of ‘backdoor’ keys, the security of these keys themselves is not guaranteed.

The final question concerns the appropriate procedures and boundaries for offensive cyber operations. To give one example, in late 2016, the US Cyber Command wiped ISIL propaganda off a sever located in Germany, without the permission of the German authorities. Canada also possesses these capabilities and vulnerabilities.


Canada has made important strides in recent years towards confronting these challenges. We have engaged in naming and shaming, a first step in setting the boundaries of acceptable international behaviour. Beginning with the 2018 Charlevoix G7 communiqué, Canada moved beyond the Five Eyes community, towards developing multilateral consensus. The first concrete results were delivered in January 2019, when the Canadian government developed a Rapid Response Mechanism that will share information and threat analysis with other G7 countries.<sup>18</sup>



# POLICY ANALYSIS

## INTERESTS AND VALUES

Amidst a global economy increasingly reliant on cyber capabilities, the Canadian government has a keen interest and duty to navigate the future of cyberspace. Doing so effectively requires Canada to consider the potential trade-offs between security and privacy, the protection of domestic businesses against cheap technological imports, and how we can enforce our own cybersecurity regulations with the maintenance of an international, rules-based, approach to cyber governance. Canada's 2018 NCSS clearly articulated Canadian values and interests in the cyber domain.



## GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Rebuilding trust requires the Canadian government to be transparent about the data it collects and responsible in how it manages that data. The same standards must be applied to businesses and any other data-collecting organization.

The technological challenge requires Canada to secure the vulnerabilities wrought by the IOT. With regards to 5G, we have a tough decision to make. On the one hand, Huawei offers quick, cheap, development, potentially letting Canadian entrepreneurs enter the 5G network first. On the other hand, there are undeniable security risks and diplomatic costs that come from using Huawei. Moreover, if Canada does choose to reject Huawei, considerable national investment will be required to build our own 5G network, in conjunction with our allies.

On the international front, we need to move beyond the G7 to develop a global cybersecurity consensus. We must clearly articulate how we think international law ought to be applied to cyberspace and, more generally, the boundaries of sovereignty that are in the cyber domain.

Responsibility for cybersecurity policy and maintenance has traditionally been housed within Public Safety Canada. However, the most recent major policies in the field, namely the NCSS and Bill C-59, have implications and impacts affecting a wide array of government agencies and mandates.

Meanwhile, the 2019 Federal Budget contained several sources of funding for various departments under the blanket of “cybersecurity”, including money for CSE, Democratic Institutions, GAC, ISED and University Hosted Research Centres.<sup>19</sup>

In light of Canadian values, it is important to identify the often-competing interests put forward and find ways to reconcile them with the goals and objectives needed to enact a modern Canadian cybersecurity strategy.

## STAKEHOLDERS

| Government Agency | Interests and Relationship to Policy   |
|-------------------|--|
| PSC               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Responsible for the 2018 NCSS.</li> <li>• Received most federal funding for cybersecurity initiatives.</li> </ul>                       |
| CSE               | Expanded mandate for offensive cyber capabilities and domestic data harvesting.  |
| CSIS              | Expanded mandate for offensive cyber capabilities and foreign data harvesting.   |
| RCMP              | Empowered via the 2018 and 2019 budgets for advanced tracking of cyber-crimes, and creation of the National Cybercrime Coordination Unit.  |
| ISED              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aids SMEs via CyberSecure program.</li> <li>• Liaises with Universities on creating Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence.</li> </ul>      |
| PCO               | Strategic oversight of policy, coordination with the PMO and Cabinet VIA National Security and Intelligence Advisor.   |
| GAC               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Represents Canada at global policy and treaty conferences.</li> <li>• Coordinates cybersecurity initiatives with key allies.</li> </ul> |
| DND               | Maintenance of defensive capabilities and military cyber technology.   |
| DOJ               | Ensures policy compliance with both the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as international legal obligations.  |

| Key Non-Government Stakeholders | Interests and Relationship to Policy  |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Canadian SMEs                   | Protects financial and economic assets.   |
| Civil Society Groups            | The International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association are wary of infringements of civil liberties. |

| Key Allies                     | Interests and Relationship to Policy  |
|--------------------------------|---|
| NATO                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordination among all allies on common cybersecurity capabilities and goals.</li> <li>• Article V commitment to defend allies where we agree an armed attack has taken place.</li> <li>• Adherence to the Tallinn Manual as a basis for the application of international law to cybersecurity (<a href="#">See Annex D</a>).</li> </ul> |
| Five Eyes Alliance             | Coordination of threat detection and intelligence sharing ( <a href="#">See Annex B</a> ).  |
| European Union                 | Pursuit of a rules-based, regulated cyberspace which balances protection of personal data with strong defensive capabilities.   |
| Key Detractors                 | Interests and Relationship to Policy  |
| State Adversaries              | Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China have all conducted malicious cyber-attacks against either Canadian or allied computer systems.   |
| Criminal and Terrorist Threats | Criminal and terrorist organizations have a financial interest in weakened cybersecurity capabilities.  |
| Individual Threats             | Lone actors can conduct advanced, random attacks against individuals, businesses, or governments.   |

## PROGRAMMATIC NEEDS

Comprehensive cybersecurity policy requires cooperation with multiple departments.

**DOJ:** Will be responsible for drafting all legislation required for the implementation of new policy

**PSC:** should take charge on coordinating and communicating all changes in policy.

**CSIS, the CSE, and the RCMP:** Implement many of the new measures, especially those concerning privacy rights and rebuilding trust.

**GAC:** Work with allies and other states to establish an international cybersecurity legal framework.

**ISED:** Work with both universities and SMEs in furthering development of Canadian cybersecurity and 5G capabilities.

Most of the funding for innovative cybersecurity policy would go towards the development of new technology in Canada. Enabling Canada's largest telecommunications companies to switch from cheaper, foreign made technology, will be costly. Estimates range in upwards of \$1 billion each for Telus, Rogers, and Bell to replace existing 4G and 5G infrastructure.<sup>20</sup>

The burden of such costs will have to come in the form of budgetary expenditures. While these costs are far beyond the approximately \$348.2 million spent on cybersecurity initiatives in the 2019 Federal Budget, they would be necessary for ensuring Canada's future security and economic well-being.<sup>21</sup> The costs of Made in Canada 5G would be significant but would be far outweighed by the benefits.<sup>22</sup>

# ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## COSTED OPTIONS

There are a range of alternatives available to Canada to address cybersecurity challenges. Some alternatives involve changed governmental practice. Others are more expansive and involve retooling entire economic sectors. All are presented below with noted constraints and expected impacts.

| Option 1: Restore Trust   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| Policy  | Constraints  | Expected Impact  |
| Standardize record keeping practices among 17 SCISA institutions. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Standard practice must be determined first.</li> <li>• Leadership needed within Federal Government</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables Privacy Commissioner to evaluate disclosures between SCISA institutions.</li> <li>• Creates a common metric by which Canadians can discuss information retention practice.</li> </ul> |
| Legislate transparency in the private sector.                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Potential loss of business competitiveness.</li> <li>• Enforcement mechanism needed.</li> </ul>               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Affords citizens the right to opt out of services.</li> <li>• Democratizes cyberspace.</li> </ul>   |
| Foster cyber insurance market                                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Funding.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incentives resilience.</li> </ul>   |
| Mandate a ‘right to be forgotten’                                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Freedom of speech issues.</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables citizens to better manage their online personal data.</li> </ul>  |

| Option 2: Secure New Cybersecurity Technologies  |  |   |
|--|--|---|
| Policy   | Constraints  | Expected Impacts  |
| Create standards on cybersecurity on all cyber goods in Canada                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Funding.</li> <li>• Enforcement agency needed.</li> <li>• Negatively impacts SMEs.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Enhances security.</li> </ul>  |
| Review financing strategies to maintain security in SMEs                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Funding.</li> <li>• Trade issues.</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables security maintaining competition.</li> <li>• Makes it harder for hackers to focus on one specific target.</li> </ul> |
| Support ‘Made in Canada’ technologies, including in 5G (See <a href="#">Annex C</a> ). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Funding.</li> <li>• Worsens relations with China.</li> </ul>                                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appeases allies.</li> <li>• Gives Canada the capability to monitor and counter threats from various sources.</li> </ul>      |

### Option 3: Articulate and Entrench International Cybersecurity Law

| Alternatives  | Constraints   | Expected Impacts   |
|---|---|--|
| Articulate our views on the application of international law in cyberspace. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Funding.</li> <li>• Significant government attention.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables Canada to shape the international cyber law favourable to our interests.</li> <li>• Enhances Canada’s image as world leader ahead of UN Security Council vote.</li> </ul> |
| Denounce attempts to break Encryption.                                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Friction with allies, especially the US.</li> <li>• Loss of potentially useful security tool.</li> </ul> | Retain the integrity of encryption tools, which are key to cyber trust.  |

## RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of threat triage, material constraints and in the interests of fostering economic opportunity, we recommend the following priorities:

### 1. Restore Trust: Canada should standardize record-keeping practice among 17 SCISA Institutions.

The DOJ should develop SCISA information retention and sharing practices that better reflects the values of transparency and security. Without standardization, there is no baseline with which to even evaluate such practices. Personal information should be shared between government agencies and allies only when there is a demonstrable need to do so. To ensure this, Privacy Impact Statements should be mandated for every transfer of personal information.

### Recommendation 1: Standardize Record-Keeping

|                 |   |
|-----------------|---|
| <b>Costs</b>    | Entrenched bureaucratic inertia and practices will need to be overcome.   |
| <b>Benefits</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables Office of the Privacy Commissioner to evaluate whether SCISA disclosures are both keeping within the law and in-line with security best practices.</li> <li>• Establishes a common standard by which Canadians can discuss information collection practice.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Timeline</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Introduce in 2020 Federal Budget as part of a DOJ initiative/jurisdiction.</li> <li>• Ensure standardization by end of FY 2020.</li> </ul>   |

## 2. Secure New Technology

ISED should foster the development of a resilient IOT network, sustained by an ironclad 5G infrastructure. Canada should adopt a ‘Made in Canada’ approach to 5G infrastructure to monitor and counter threats from various sources, while also deepening our digital sovereignty and stimulating the domestic telecommunications sector.

| Option 2: Secure New Technology |  |
|---------------------------------|--|
| <b>Costs</b>                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Domestic or allied 5G technology will be more expensive than that offered by Huawei.</li> <li>• Bell, Telus, and SaskTel, are already heavily invested in Huawei technology. They are estimated to face over \$1 billion in costs if forced to retool their 5G basis.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Benefits</b>                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Using more secure domestic or allied technology will reassure our allies, fearful of foreign espionage.</li> <li>• Data security will be increasingly located in Canada, accountable to Canadians. Digital sovereignty will be assured.</li> <li>• State-backed Canadian telecommunications companies can be made internationally competitive.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Timeline</b>                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hold auction on 5G infrastructure construction in 2020.</li> <li>• Announce compensation plan to ease anti-Huawei 5G retooling in 2020.</li> </ul>  |

## 3. Articulate and Entrench International Cyber Law

Canada will either shape or be shaped by the emergent international legal and customary framework surrounding the international use of cyberspace. To create this framework in a way amenable to our interests, Canada should host an international conference on the application of international law to cyberspace. This could lay the foundation for a conference that annually sets standards in the constantly evolving world of technology.

| Option 3: Articulate and Entrench International Cyber Law |  |
|---|--|
| <b>Costs</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Initiating, planning, hosting, and completing a conference will consume political capital and dominate the agendas of GAC and PSC.</li> </ul>               |
| <b>Benefits</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Canada will be able shape the international cyber law in a way more amenable to the principles of cyber sovereignty, transparency, and security.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Timeline</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Introduce in 2020 budget as a GAC initiative.</li> <li>• Plan to host the conference in Waterloo in 2021.</li> </ul>  |

## KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS


| Key Performance Indicators |   |
|----------------------------|---|
| Standardizing SCISA        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved oversight by the Intelligence Commissioner, standardization by all SCISA parties by 2021.</li> <li>• Improved trust in government handling of citizens' data.</li> </ul>  |
| Made in Canada 5G          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Concrete decision to ban Huawei from government 5G bids, Bell and Telus disentangle themselves from Chinese technology entirely.</li> <li>• Opening up of government bidding process for 5G infrastructure by 2021.</li> </ul> |
| International Cyber Law    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Successful 2021 Waterloo Cybersecurity Conference, get other nations to agree to international legal framework for cyber interactions.</li> </ul>  |

## COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES

Communication should be jointly led by PSC, ISED and GAC.

| Communication Strategies            |                |   |  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|---|--|
| Target                              | Leading Agency | Message   | Method   |
| Canadian Public                     | PSC            | “Putting Canadian privacy first.”                               | Advertise across social media and other media.   |
| SMEs and Civil Society Institutions | ISED           | “Security, sovereignty, state-backed Innovation.”               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public announcement of ‘new vision of cyber sovereignty.’</li> <li>• Use established channels.</li> </ul> |
| International Community             | GAC            | “Bringing the rules-based international order into cyberspace.” | Minister of Foreign Affairs initiates diplomatic discussion.   |

## ANNEX A: TYPES OF IMPACTFUL CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS<sup>23</sup>



## ANNEX B: FIVE EYES COMMUNITY

The 5 Eyes are an Anglosphere intelligence sharing community comprising of the USA, Canada, UK, Australia, and New Zealand, each being a party to the multilateral UKUSA Agreement, a treaty for joint cooperation in signals intelligence. Following 9/11, the 5 Eyes expanded their security approach to encompass internet surveillance, surveillance of domestic citizens as well as foreign actors. Currently, the alliance is split on their approaches to Huawei's integration into their domestic 5G networks. Canada and the UK are currently committed to at least partial integration, with Canada making a more concrete decision in 2020. Australia, New Zealand and the USA are opposed to Huawei's integration in their 5G networks, and actively campaign for Canada to ban Huawei outright.

Canadian decisions need to take into account wider alliance agreements. Since the 5 Eyes are the very core of Canada's intelligence alliances, ensuring continuity and consistency across the alliance should be Canada's first priority. If Canada chooses to join the USA, Australia, and New Zealand in banning Huawei, trust within the alliance will be strengthened, and its continuity assured. Canada has a vested interest in remaining within America's security umbrella, and this extends to the cybersecurity realm as well. The continuation of 5 Eyes should be a priority for Canadian decision makers in a security environment increasingly dominated by cyber threats.

## ANNEX C: ALTERNATIVES TO HUAWEI

In banning Huawei from our 5G networks, Canada will have ground to make up for in terms of developing and implementing 5G technology. A 'Made in Canada' approach means that the technology attached to our most critical infrastructure will be produced, maintained, and controlled by Canadians. However, this policy does not preclude the possibility of integrating some more trustworthy foreign technology into our 5G networks. Foreign firms from allied and partner countries come with fewer security risks, and many foreign firms are much further along in the 5G development process than Canadian ones. To give examples, Finland's Nokia, Sweden's Ericsson, the US's Altiostar, Cisco Systems, Qualcomm, and Korea's Samsung all provide 5G capable equipment that is also reliably secure.

When the Canadian government opens up bidding processes for the installation of 5G networks in Canada, we should allow these firms to compete with Canadian ones to compete for contracts in order to boost innovation and competitiveness. An approach which mixes a bounded market competition, with space for government innovation support, will ensure a quicker 5G rollout in Canada, fairer prices for consumers, and better security for all.

## ANNEX D: NATO AND CONSIDERATIONS

NATO's Article V is not an automatic trigger but rather a political one wherein all parties must agree that an armed attack occurred. Given the potential damage cyberattacks can cause today, it is wholly conceivable that the alliance members could invoke Article V in the aftermath of an attack. The Talinn Manual is a non-binding study on how international law applies to cyber conflict and cyber warfare, written specifically for a NATO audience. As it stands, it's an excellent template to use as a base to further develop understanding of international law in cyberspace.

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# Feminist International Assistance Policy

By: Christopher Anthony and Andrea Korsch

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The problems that Canada currently faces in the wake of implementing a feminist policy are those of identity crisis and hypocrisy. Canadians are split in terms of whether or not they agree with feminist values due to our colonial past. While Canadians often hold the image of being an avid helper, we often fail to follow through. Given these problems facing the nation and the fact that Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) has received criticism of being nothing more than rhetoric, the policy drafters recommend to Global Affairs Canada (GAC) under the FAM's leadership, three policy options. Firstly, GAC can follow Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) approach to ensure a proven successful model for what Canada should be achieving. Secondly, GAC can re-brand FIAP as a gender and development policy while increasing implementation efforts through greater funding to ensure positive, incremental changes towards achieving global Gender Equality (GE). Thirdly, GAC can adopt Stonewall International's queer approach towards sustainable development and reposition FIAP to be feminist in implementation. These three policy options, in their own right, will attempt to address the problems facing Canada's nation. Following the analysis of these policy options, the policy drafters recommend GAC to implement policy option three. Despite the fact that the two other options are reasonable, this policy is more suitable, acceptable, and feasible in its implementation efforts to ensure that Canada's hypocrisy and identity problems can be rectified and that FIAP can have its greatest global impact.



# ABBREVIATIONS

| Acronym Used | Name   |
|--------------|--|
| CEDAW        | Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women |
| CIDP         | Canadian International Development Platform                                |
| CSO          | Civil Society Organization   |
| CUSMA        | Canada-United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement                           |
| FAM          | Foreign Affairs Minister   |
| FIAP         | Feminist International Assistance Policy                                   |
| FFP          | Feminist Foreign Policy  |
| GAC          | Global Affairs Canada  |
| GBA+         | Gender Based Analysis Plus   |
| GE           | Gender Equality  |
| GNI          | Gross National Income  |
| HRC          | Human Rights Campaign  |
| HRW          | Human Rights Watch   |
| IDRC         | International Development Research Centre                                  |
| KPIs         | Key Performance Indicators   |
| LGBTQI2      | Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Questioning, Intersex and Two-Spirit  |
| MMIWG        | Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls                            |
| NGOs         | Non-Governmental Organizations   |
| ODA          | Official Development Assistance  |
| OECD         | Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development                     |
| PM           | Prime Minister   |
| SDGs         | Sustainable Development Goals  |
| SGBV         | Sexual and Gender-Based Violence   |
| TRC          | Truth and Reconciliation Commission  |
| UN           | United Nations   |
| UNGA         | United Nations General Assembly  |
| UNSC         | United Nations Security Council  |
| US           | United States  |
| WPS          | Women, Peace and Security  |

# BACKGROUND, HISTORY, POLICY PROCESS

## PROBLEMS FACING THE NATION

When Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that “Canada is back,” he signaled a realignment of Canadian Priorities towards their ‘historic’ roots of peacekeeping, promoting human rights, and participation in the liberal international world order. In 2017, when Former Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland said Canada would adopt a feminist approach towards international assistance and foreign policy decision-making, Canada’s identity was refocused along side Liberal party values. Despite this inclusive approach and attempted implementation, Canada finds itself in the midst of an identity crisis which stems from its colonial history, wherein our laws, societies, and cultural norms were formed largely out of the British image.

The effects of British rule intrinsically and continually impacts all of Canadian society today, including indigenous and non-indigenous Canadians. Colonialism itself was a highly gendered process which sought the transformation of matriarchal indigenous communities into patriarchal ones.<sup>1</sup> As well, Indigenous women who married outside of their communities had their First Nations status revoked. Furthermore, one of the many negative impacts of the residential school system was the installation of homophobia in Indigenous communities as the schools’ religious teachings erased what was a traditionally supportive environment, and proud history for those with Two-Spirit identities.<sup>2</sup> Likewise, colonization’s emphasis on heterosexuality also impacts settler Canadians. For example, up until June 2019, s. 159 of Canada’s Criminal Code prohibited engagement in anal intercourse except between husband and wife or two persons both eighteen years of age and older. This law evolved from the English Buggery Act. In June 2019, the government voted to repeal this “crime” and by doing so, this led to improvements towards greater equality for sexual and gender minorities.<sup>3</sup>

Canada’s colonial roots impacted the development of our identity and our perceptions of our feminist values. Along-side the impact of our colonial past, and present, the Liberal government’s feminist approach shaped by our “shared” Canadian values is not universally accepted amongst Canadians, receiving backlash from religious and conservative groups.<sup>4</sup> Our society is divided on where Canada’s priorities lie, and should lie, which challenges the government to garner support towards this policy.

Canada is also facing accusations of hypocrisy.<sup>5</sup> While the government does promote international LGBTQI2 rights, there are cases wherein a feminist approach is lacking. Internationally, the government’s Saudi arms deal, with a state notorious for its human rights offences against women and LGBTQI2 people, question the Trudeau government’s “feminist” stance.<sup>6</sup> Canada also falls below the OECD voluntary commitment for states to provide 0.7% of their total GNI towards ODA.<sup>7</sup> Canada currently spends 0.28%, well below international commitments.<sup>8</sup> Domestically, Canada has a less than stellar track record with its Indigenous Community, specifically Indigenous Women and Girls. Indigenous Women and Girls are disproportionately victimized through various means in comparison to their non-Indigenous counterparts and the government has only just begun to address the TRC’s finding on MMIWG.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, although Canada prides itself on being a LGBTQI2 leader, according to the World Economic Forum, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and/or gender identity is not universally illegal in Canada, in comparison to many European states that adopt no-tolerance discrimination laws.<sup>10</sup>

LGBTQI2 Canadians face discrimination in the form of a blood donation ban, a continuation of AIDS stereotypes.<sup>11</sup> Canada preaching this ‘feminist approach’ abroad yet participating in seemingly anti-feminist practices/relations/laws gives pause and some validity claims of hypocrisy. However, noting Canada’s imperfections, Canada’s continued evolution in their policy and inclusive progression for LGBTQI2 rights gives the federal government a relatively strong position to encourage states to make serious, positive strides for LGBTQI2 rights.

Not unlike the states Canada seeks to assist, Canada struggles in reclaiming its colonial history especially as it relates to indigenous communities. Yet, it has made positive progress for LGBTQI2 Canadians and could be considered a leader in this field.<sup>12</sup> Canada’s resiliency in overcoming colonial law and homophobic discriminatory practices whilst recognizing the work still left to be done makes Canada a prime candidate to promote a true FFP approach. Canada is not in reality this perfect saviour. It has its weaknesses, but also its successes, and can pave the way for positive change through FIAP if implemented correctly. Recognizing accusations of hypocrisy against the federal government in several policy areas and the looming identity crises Canada faces, this FIAP review will administer a case study approach with LGBTQI2 minorities to show how Canada cannot only improve the lives of global gender minorities, but also show how it can do so in a way that it can lead by example. While applying this case study approach, it is critical to note that truly feminists and intersectional policy does not stop with equal rights for women of LGBTQI2 peoples.<sup>13</sup> This review proposed recommendations serve as a starting point for GAC to develop a truly intersectional FIAP approach, making group-specific recommendations to ensure FIAP does not becomes an “add women and stir,”<sup>14</sup> policy but puts all minorities on a truly equal playing field as they strive for equality.

### LGBT Discrimination




Figure 1

## PAST POLICIES AND CRITICAL DECISIVE MOMENTS

Canada's gender policies typically developed as part of the larger global framework:

| Abridged History of Global Framework |   |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| 1945                                 | UN Charter: Canada becomes a party to a legal regime that “[promotes] and [encourages] respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all.” <sup>15</sup>  |
| 1979                                 | CEDAW: An international women’s bill of rights, calling for an end to discrimination, stereotypes and trafficking as well as women’s rights as women in their communities.  |
| 1993                                 | Vienna Declaration and Program of Action: The declaration reaffirmed human rights, women’s rights and encourages states to develop national action plans to improve, promote and protect human rights.  |
| 1994                                 | International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo): A conference that discussed critical issue areas such as reproductive health, abortion, birth control, infant mortality and women’s Education.  |
| 1995                                 | Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action: A declaration that reaffirmed women’s rights as human rights, empowerment of women and equality.   |
| 2000                                 | UNSC Resolution 1325 (Women, Peace and Security): The first formal document requiring parties in conflict to prevent violations of women’s rights, support their participation in peace and negotiations and reconstruction and protection from SGBV. |
| 2015                                 | UN SDGs’ Inclusion of Gender Equality: The UN agreed on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including gender equality and empowerment of women and girls as a new goal, and has effectively driven Canada’s approach with FIAP.              |

## PREVIOUS DOMESTIC POLICIES

### Historic Canadian Approaches:

Canada’s positions are influenced by current international actions, but perhaps more importantly they are impacted by past decisive, domestic moments. The most notable was Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s 1967 speech, “there’s no place for the state in bedrooms of the nation,” a historical appeal for the decriminalization of private homosexual acts in Canada.<sup>16</sup> This began the historic shift in the government’s position towards the inclusion of sexual and gender minorities as fully-fledged Canadian citizens deserving of equal legal access to the rights and privileges for all. This announcement set the stage for the progress that was to come. Most notably, this includes the creation of sexual and gender minority protections in Section 15 of the Canadian Charter, and in 2005, the legalization of same-sex marriage. Former Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau’s speech catalyzed Canada’s inclusive position and shaped who we are as a nation today.

### Former Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s MNCH Policy:

More recently however, it is critical to examine Harper’s international policy approach to gender and sexual minorities (or lack thereof), as it most recently informs, and sets the context for, the realignment that took place under PM Justin Trudeau in 2015 and 2017. PM Harper’s international approach towards women’s issues is best evidenced through MNCH, announced in June 2010.<sup>17</sup> This policy was aimed towards health promotion of global mothers and infants to “save lives,” while restricting funding access for reproductive health and abortion-related services. The Harper government led a branding change with its policies; replacing “gender equality” with “equality between women and men,” and “women” with “mothers.” These wording changes reflected the party stance on women and sex and ignored ‘gender’ issues<sup>18</sup> and ergo, represented a heteronormative policy stance that placed female-identifying individuals as helpless victims rather than people to be empowered and supported.<sup>19</sup>

## DECISIVE MOMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

### Sweden:

In 2014, Sweden announced the world's first explicit FFP, which albeit originally met with international criticism and ridicule, led the way for others to take similar influence.<sup>20</sup> Canada's opportunity presented itself with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's electoral win, and Trudeau seized his chance, announcing himself as a feminist and taking several opportunities to improve women's voices in cabinet. Thanks to Deputy Swedish Prime Minister, Margot Wallström's leadership, Justin Trudeau repositioned government through his rhetoric to continue the advancement of women's rights.

### Donald Trump's Election and Presidency:

President Donald Trump's win was a decisive moment that gave Justin Trudeau's Government an opportunity to differentiate Canada from its neighbours. PM Trudeau had his first chance in January 2017 when President Trump reinstated the Mexico City Policy, which states that American aid cannot be awarded to NGOs that perform abortions or give women information about abortion services (a policy similar in fact to the one PM Harper instituted in MNCH).<sup>21</sup> In March 2017, PM Trudeau pledged \$650 million on sexual and reproductive health programs over three years.<sup>22</sup> Differentiating Canada's brand continued in June 2017 with Freeland's announcement outlining the government's foreign policy priorities and FIAP announcement, politely positioning Canada as a global alternative to an increasingly isolationist America, to uphold liberal internationalism and promote women's rights and human rights, a "matter of basic justice...and basic economics."<sup>23</sup> Former FAM Freeland stated, "We will be tireless in pursuing our national interest, tireless in upholding progressive Canadian values, tireless in working to create a rules-based international order for the 21st century."<sup>24</sup>

## TRENDS AND INDICATORS

### 1. UN SDGs:

SDGs were adopted by 193 UNGA countries as a shared call to action for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, a global blueprint for peace and prosperity, which recognized the interconnectedness and intersectionality of the problems facing our world's citizens.<sup>25</sup> When developing FIAP, the Federal Government linked its assistance approach towards meeting these global goals. FIAP's outlined indicators specifically reference the UN SDGs. For example, in the outlined interest of pursuing gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, FIAP's indicators include the "proportion of ever-partnered women and girls and 15 years and older subjected to physical, sexual or psychological violence by a current or former intimate partner in the previous 12 months, by form of violence and by age" and the "proportion of women aged 20-24 years who were married or in a union before age 15 and before age 18."<sup>26</sup> In turn, these indicators are supported by UN SDG 5.

### 2. Gender Based Analysis Plus (GBA +):

A tool that sets out that if Canada is not implementing change in education and skills development, economic participation and prosperity, leadership and democratic participation, ways to stop gender-based violence and increased accesses to justice, poverty reduction, health and well being, and GE around the world, then we are not promoting "good" gender policy. The GBA+ Action Plan, written in 2016, outlines, for example, that the Treasury Board submissions and Memoranda to Cabinet must contain a GBA+ based analysis in consideration for their future funding approval from the executive.<sup>27</sup>

### 3. Global Views on GE and LGBTQI2 Rights:

Canada's international stance towards GE and LGBTQI2 rights is informed by and reacts to the international climate towards these minorities.<sup>28</sup> More information on this is presented below under programmatic needs.

## CURRENT POLICIES AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government shifted FIAP towards promoting “gender equality,” however FIAP is not Canada’s only policy option. Policy alternatives include the policy approaches of other feminist states, such as Sweden and Finland, who have had evidence-based success implementing their respective FFPs. Sweden currently leads in promoting 75% of ODA towards GE with 16% of its aid specifically targeting gender.<sup>29</sup> The CIDP reports that the total amount of Sweden’s gender-focused aid has grown from \$24 billion (25%) of total bilateral sector allocable aid in 2010 to \$36 billion (34%) in 2016.<sup>30</sup> Canada could serve to examine Sweden’s policy successes and its approaches as feasible alternatives and strategies to executing meaningful and effective FFP. According to the OECD, Sweden has currently achieved 23 of 169 UN SDG targets, and is not far behind in achieving the rest of them, outperforming most of the world in its progress towards SDG 5.<sup>31</sup> Canada, on the other hand, has only achieved 14 of these targets and has a long way to go in meeting some 3% of these targets.<sup>32</sup> A Scandinavian FFP approach could lead to greater outcomes as it relates to GE. GAC must place greater emphasis on amending FIAP’s indicators to GE. GAC must place greater emphasis on amending FIAP’s indicators to reflect its priorities of achieving GE for all, not just women.

## POLICY ANALYSIS

### INTERESTS AND VALUES

FIAP seeks to build a more peaceful, inclusive and prosperous world, reflecting Canadian values of “human rights, feminism and the promotion of women and girls.”<sup>33</sup> This ethical interest for Canada’s government is reaffirmed by polls asking Canadians what they perceive to be Canadian “values.”<sup>34</sup> A 2016 NANOS poll surveying ~1000 Canadians indicates 46% of Canadians believe Canada’s rights and freedoms are one of Canada’s three top values.<sup>35</sup> 24% of Canadians believe Canada’s commitments to equality, equity and social justice are one of Canada’s top three values.<sup>36</sup> With these values in mind, FIAP’s interests centre around several issue areas as indicated by Figure 2.<sup>37</sup>

Beyond a human rights commitment, Canada has an economic interest in promoting FIAP. Promoting FIAP as a means of increasing women’s access to economic opportunities and resources, and promoting GE is supported by reports which indicate that achieving global GE can add \$12 trillion to global economic growth.<sup>38</sup> Canada has an economic interest because of the gains it can receive from new trading partners entering the market and the increased global profile for Canadian businesses as worthy trading partners. With these interests in mind, FIAP seeks to implement policies that are human-rights based and inclusive, strategic and focused, transformative and activist, and evidence-based and accountable.



Figure 2

Canada has an economic interest because of the gains it can receive from new trading partners entering the market and the increased global profile for Canadian businesses as worthy trading partners. With these interests in mind, FIAP seeks to implement policies that are human-rights based and inclusive, strategic and focused, transformative and activist, and evidence-based and accountable.

## GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

FIAP’s primary goal, from which subsidiary goals fall, is GE and the empowerment of women and girls. It is believed that GE can create a trickle-down effect for the establishment of other rights, freedoms and achievements for other minorities. This goal reflects the UN’s 2030 SDG Agenda’s inclusion of GE. To achieve this, FIAP has several objectives: championing innovative ways of amplifying women’s voices, and engaging men and boys to challenge traditions that reinforce gender inequality, and increasing women and girls’ participation in equal decision-making when it comes to sustainable development and peace. To do this, FIAP, called to ensure that by 2022, no less than 95% of Canadian bilateral international development assistance would target and integrate GE and women’s empowerment.<sup>39</sup> By doing so, Canada reflects Sweden’s leadership and applies it in a Canadian context.<sup>40</sup> Canada promised to donate \$150M over five years to support local women’s organizations,<sup>41</sup> and \$650M over three years to support positive health outcomes for women and girls.<sup>42</sup> These actions are just the cusp of FIAP, but they reflect a larger objective of ensuring GE as a gateway to inclusion for other groups.

## STAKEHOLDERS

| Stakeholders                             | Allies | Detractors | Reasoning   |
|--|--------|------------|---|
| Canadian Public                          | ✓      | ✓          | FIAP could enhance/affirm Canadian identity or detract and shift focus from domestic issues.*   |
| Global Community                         | ✓      | ✓          | Depending on one’s point of view, providing support to minorities discriminated against may be supported or protested.  |
| Global Gender & Sexual Minorities        | ✓      |            | Gender and sexual minorities would benefit from FIAP’s success as it would achieve equality and support to those without equality.*   |
| Feminist State Regions: i.e. Scandinavia | ✓      |            | “Feminist” state regions may share an ideological alignment in this policy pursuit, although there may be practical policy differences.   |
| Civil Society Organizations              | ✓      |            | Typically, CSOs will have similar objectives, but may pursue them through different means.  |
| NGOs                                     | ✓      |            | Like CSOs, many NGOs (such as HRW, HRC, and Amnesty International) advocate GE, but through non-governmental routes.  |
| US (Short-term)                          |        | ✓          | The US has lagged in terms of intersectional policy in the past—with a current president who claims he “likes to grab women by their ‘particulars’” the US Federal Branch is a current detractor to Canada’s FIAP objectives.** |
| US (Long-term)                           | ✓      | ✓          | Depending on the outcome of the 2020 US election, and what the American people values in candidate platforms, the US may continue to be a detractor or revert back towards ‘allyship.’**  |
| UN                                       | ✓      |            | Given that FIAP’s indicators largely reference the UN SDGs to achieve policy success, the UN is a broad ally in helping Canada achieve its goals.   |

\*Specifically labelling FIAP as a FFP may alienate certain groups and create missed opportunities for Canada as they operate more of a “feminist” policy than a GE policy.

\*\* One cannot generalize the US as a homogenous unit. Individual states do not always reflect the interests of the federal government, and as such, on a state level (for example California and New York), Canada may find allies outside of the executive branch that may support Canada’s feminist vision.

## PROGRAMMATIC NEEDS

FIAP's overarching goal is to "...support efforts to reduce [SGBV], strengthen women's organizations and movement that advance women's rights, improve governments' capacity to provide services to women and girls and to improve gender analysis."<sup>43</sup> This falls under the FAM's mandate. FIAP's initiatives of supporting women and girls reflect Canada's historic commitment under different policy names towards promoting GE. For example, GAC collaborated with other Canadian institutions to meet its goals in the past (i.e. IDRC in developing the Ebola vaccine, The Canadian Institute of Health Research and the Public Health Agency of Canada). The difference with FIAP addressing these issues is its adoption of a feminist framework, which means it should address more than just women and girls. In practice, when GAC addresses global inequalities, they must focus on women, men, all racial/ethnic groups, people with disabilities and LGBTQI2 minorities and the inherent systemic and institutional barriers that prevent them from achieving equality.

The restrictions facing FIAP are the legal and economic barriers faced by women and girls abroad (Figure 3). Over 150 countries legalize discrimination against women and in 100 of those countries women are "prevented from pursuing careers because of their gender."<sup>44</sup> What is needed is a means by which to overcome the legal and economic barriers which in turn always amounts to a need for greater funding and strong legal personnel to continue to push FIAP forward in all the areas in which their mandate concerns it.<sup>45</sup>

Currently, there is funding, personnel, a history of successful partnerships to tackle issues, and the GBA+ tool to access the effectiveness of policies for various minorities. However, greater funding is always needed and the GBA+ tool has been criticized for being a one-size-fits-all approach, box-ticking exercise and template to mainstream gender and diversity that misses the mark and fails to truly be intersectional.<sup>46</sup> More personnel to ensure follow-through of key action areas would be ideal and a reconstruction of FIAP with the recommendations made below will be necessary for success.

### Existing statutory and customary laws restrict women's access to assets




Figure 3

# ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## COSTED OPTIONS

### **Option 1: Adopt a Sweden FFP Approach:**

The accusations of hypocrisy looming over Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's government stem from the fact that many do not believe FIAP follows through on its rhetoric. To address this concern, GAC could examine the successes of Sweden's FFP, which has achieved effective and measurable policy outcomes and adapt this FFP to a Canadian perspective. A more effective model through Sweden will help to overcome the colonial biases Canadians still grapple with. For example, by seeing better FFP implemented abroad and the positive outcomes that follow, Canadians will be more united in implementing their feminist/inclusive policies. Sweden's FFP approach is grounded in three domains: foreign and security; development cooperation, and trade promotion policies.<sup>47</sup> It maintains an approach that has been praised as the "most comprehensive, extending to all domains of foreign policy and seeking to advance [GE] for its own sake as well as in service to other foreign policy approaches."<sup>48</sup> Sweden's approach ensures a consistent international image in promoting feminist, intersectional ideals and that its actions match its rhetoric. Like GBA+, Sweden's analytical tool, JämKAS, ensures a GE perspective in its proposals. The effects of this analytical tool have created concrete results. For example, in its WPS file, Sweden contributed towards women's participation in peace work in Afghanistan, Columbia and Syria promoted WPS issues within regional and multilateral organizations; and carried out extensive training for Swedish and international personnel taking part in peace initiatives.<sup>49</sup> Sweden's concrete results-reporting mechanisms and clear successes in achieving FFP goals act as a case study for Canada in how to follow through. If Canada adopted a Swedish approach, it could achieve clear feminist evidence-based policy outcomes, ensuring rhetoric is successfully implemented, and addressing the looming identity and hypocrisy problems it faces.

### **Option 2: Re-Brand FIAP as a Gender and Development Policy with Improved Implementation:**

Despite its strong mandate, FIAP's rhetoric suffers in its follow-through. The government fails to meet requisite aid funding expectations under the OECD's voluntary commitment of 0.7% GNI towards ODA with minimal additional funding provided towards promoting FIAP. This "lack of teeth" supports arguments that the government is hypocritical. Additionally, FIAP suffers from a branding problem, being labelled "feminist" while acting as a continuation of historic government initiatives. To promote the rights of women and girls is not truly "feminist," as feminism itself speaks to the intersectionality of one's identities and how discrimination intersects within these various identities beyond gender. Because FIAP's KPIs are primarily focused on women and girls, not encompassing gender and sexual minorities, FIAP should be rebranded as a "gender and development" policy. A policy rebrand along with increased funding would have a greater chance of addressing Canada's hypocrisy problems and ensure FIAP's results match its rhetoric. The government should increase its funding given to ODA and FIAP to the standard 0.7% GNI/ODA level. To meet this target, the government must increase its foreign aid budget by nearly double the amount from \$6.1 billion (28% GNI/ODA)<sup>50</sup> to \$11.753 billion (0.7% GNI/ODA). However, what source is this funding coming from and what other departments will lose funding towards this program? This issue would need to be reconciled with by the department and the Treasury Board when allocating funding. Amending FIAP's mandate along with increased funding may have a greater chance of policy-success and meeting UN SDG 5. Critics may argue this recommendation backtracks on Canada's progress and that to "go back" on its feminist approach would be a government-branding failure. However, by being realistic about the purposes of this policy and, a gender policy could be a positive stepping stone to Canada's progression of taking a more feminist approach in the future. Rebranding FIAP as a "gender and development" (women and girls) policy may appease both Canadians who feel being feminist does not reflect their identity and also states who disagree with the "feminist" movement. This approach presents a manageable political policy solution internationally. GE may be a more attainable goal if it is not labelled "feminist."

### Option 3: Reposition FIAP Towards Its Feminist Vision

FIAP’s labelling as feminist to appease segments of the domestic population, irreflexive of all Canadians, and its implementation as a policy geared towards women and girls, a hypocrisy issue, leaves GAC in a predicament where it can either remain status quo, rebrand, or commit and choose to move forward, ensuring that Canada implements a true feminist policy reflective of other minority groups seeking full equality. Being feminist is far more than being supportive towards women and girls, feminism seeks to bring everyone onto a more equal playing field with equal opportunities. GAC’s third policy option is to reposition FIAP towards a feminist policy, placing greater value on the voices of men and boys to ensure that they, as stakeholders, can be engaged with and become activists. GAC should re-examine FIAP and Canada’s priorities to place LGBTQI2 minorities, women, girls, men and boys on the same level, ensuring feminist international assistance is “intersectional,” geared towards not only aiding women’s organizations but organizations supporting equality, human rights and opportunities to access for all.<sup>51</sup>

| <b>Analysis of Costed Options</b> |  |   |  |
|-----------------------------------|--|---|--|
|                                   | <b>Cost</b>  | <b>Benefit</b>  | <b>Outcome</b>   |
| <b>Option 1</b>                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Swedish approaches may have greater difficulty being translated into a Canadian setting due to the inherent political-cultural differences between the two states.</li> <li>• Sweden is more ethnically homogenous than Canada and may have greater political will amongst its population to pursue a feminist-facing foreign policy.</li> </ul>                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sweden’s FFP has successful policy deliverables.</li> <li>• Sweden is the Federal Government’s theoretical ideal in implementing a FFP, and following their lead reflects the fact that Sweden was one of the 65 countries GAC referenced when drafting FIAP.</li> </ul>                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If Canada implemented a Sweden-centric FFP, it would create an intangible policy alliance with Sweden and lead to greater global feminist results.</li> <li>• However, aligning ourselves more with Sweden and away from the US may hinder current bilateral relations with the US.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Option 2</b>                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Regression” may create domestic and international image implications for Canada’s brand.</li> <li>• Increases to spending through ODA have considerable political and economic costs, the least of which include less funding for other government programming.</li> <li>• Domestic issue of redirection of funds abroad when they could be spent domestically.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• De-labelling FIAP as feminist policy may lead to positive, incremental changes for international governments that disagree with the feminist movement.</li> <li>• Would meet voluntary OECD Aid Targets.</li> <li>• Improves international standing for complying with these standards.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Potential political opposition from liberal base, other politicians who criticize the Prime Minister for being all talk and no action.</li> <li>• May lead to greater progress towards achieving SDG 5.</li> <li>• May correlate with greater achievable policy outcomes. However, there is a risk that greater funding does not necessarily lead to improved policy outcomes.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Option 3</b>                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May be more divisive than uniting, given feminism’s global subjectivity.</li> <li>• True “feminist” policy may never be as nuanced as desired. Consultations may be unreflective of all positions when shaping policy actions.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intersectionality of FIAP’s benefactors.</li> <li>• Following through on feminist policy may start conversations on feminism and its movement; a clarifying opportunity for those with anti-feminist prejudice.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May lead to greater equality for groups around the world, not just women and girls.</li> <li>• Taking and adhering to a feminist stance internationally may mandate to the Canadian government to address its own domestic controversies and be accountable to rectifying them.</li> </ul>  |

## RECOMMENDATION

After analyzing the costed options, the drafters recommend GAC implement option number three. This option is recommended due to the drawbacks of implementing the other policy options. Firstly, although Sweden’s FFP policy is comprehensive, representing a whole-of-government approach, Canada cannot implement Sweden’s feminist approach to the same effect. In practice, Sweden’s approach has promoted an enhanced GE perspective in trade policy negotiations through its work on EU Free Trade Agreements with third-party countries.<sup>52</sup> Canada however, has been challenged to do the same as evidenced with CUSMA where the federal government attempted to include provisions that would specifically address protections for LGBTQI2 workers. This attempt was met with Republican party opposition, who claimed that US sovereignty on civil rights jurisdiction should be allowed for the protections, however President Trump administered a footnote to the Article which said it would not be impacted by free trade provisions.<sup>53</sup> Article 23.9 of CUSMA has been tentatively signed and relieved the Americans’ of any obligation to change the federal law to prevent LGBTQI2 discrimination.<sup>54</sup> Although Sweden’s approach is Canada’s theoretical ideal, Canada’s feminist approach cannot be an exact carbon copy (nor should it) because the two states themselves are not the same and therefore their feminist priorities and interests must be cognizant of their respective cultural individualities. Canada must adopt a “Made-in-Canada” approach that builds upon and references other state approaches, but does not copy-and-paste them, given Canada’s distinctiveness. Secondly, since Canada is facing an identity crisis amongst its citizenry on where we stand on gender rights, option two’s attempt to make changes to the current policy without substantive intersectional restructuring will not solve this identity crisis. If FIAP does not follow through, it will only reinforce criticisms of hypocrisy. To scale-back on feminist rhetoric (in spite of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau government’s “success” in implementing this rhetoric) would be a blow to the brand that Canada developed as well as, more importantly, the LGBTQI2 global rights movement.

Given the limitations of these policy recommendations therefore, option three is GAC’s best path forward. Repositioning FIAP towards feminist policy includes placing greater value on the voices of men and boys to ensure that they as stakeholders can be engaged and become activists. Men are not just perpetrators of upholding gender inequality and discrimination, they are victims as well and feminist assistance must include their voices. LGBTQI2 minorities must have a seat at the table. GAC should re-examine FIAP and Canada’s priorities to place LGBTQI2 minorities, women, girls, men and boys on the same level, ensuring feminist international assistance is “intersectional,” geared towards not only aiding women’s organizations, but also organizations supporting equality, human rights, and opportunities to access for all. Repositioning FIAP towards intersectionality with a LGBTQI2 focus will address the hypocrisy critique given our leadership in LGBTQI2 rights following our colonial rule and the homophobic practices/legal traditions that we adopted from our colonizers. Acknowledging our problematic history but also how we have evolved and progressed over time as a LGBTQI2 leader can serve as an example of Canada’s imperfections but, more importantly, its willingness to grow and evolve. Taking a more feminist approach, making necessary amendments to FIAP will ensure Canada can be held accountable to adapt, evolve, and follow through on domestic change. Including these voices will begin a critical path forward for Canada and GAC to ensure that intersectional case study analyses and recommendations can be made for other marginalized groups and that the identity and hypocrisy crises facing Canada can be addressed with the seriousness with which they deserve.

## COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

| Target                                  | Message   | Method   |
|---|---|--|
| Canadian Public                         | “Feminist Assistance that Follows Through.”   | Advertise across social media platforms, and promote through government town halls.  |
| Relevant International Community Actors | “Moving beyond Gender and Development—Looking Ahead to the Next Phase: Feminist Development.” | Minister of Foreign Affairs through diplomatic channels such as multilateral institutions, bilateral discussions and negotiations. |

## KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND TIMELINE


FIAP currently utilizes the UN SDGs as part of their KPIs. Given that FIAP's KPIs, which specifically reference the UN'S SDGs do not mention the key issues facing international LGBTQI2 peoples, external strategies were consulted to determine KPIs for sexual and gender minorities. As an aside, given the fact that FIAP's indicators place significant value on achieving the UN SDGs, one should ponder whether or not Canadian identity is based solely on these UN norms as it relates to international gendered human rights. Stonewall International is an organization that adapted and put a queer focus on the UN SDGs. For ease of access, Stonewall International's Queer-Focused Action Items for the UN SDGs were amended to a Canada focused approach, which can be consulted below.

| FIAP Interests and Values      | Related UNDP's SDGs   | Related Stonewall Suggestions  |
|--------------------------------|---|--|
| Human Dignity                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SDG 2: Zero Hunger.</li> <li>• SDG 3: Good Health and Well-Being.</li> <li>• SDG 4: Quality Education.</li> <li>• SDG 5: Gender Equality.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Goal 3: Ensure healthcare services include LGBTQI2 people.</li> <li>• Goal 4: Promote an educational culture of non-discrimination and acceptance ensuring LGBTQI2 rights are human rights.</li> </ul>  |
| Growth that Works for Everyone | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SDG 2: Zero Hunger.</li> <li>• SDG 5: Gender Equality.</li> <li>• SDG 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure.</li> </ul>                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Goal 5: Expand 'gender' definition to become transgender, non binary and two-spirit inclusive.</li> <li>• Ensure funding grants prioritize organizations led by LBTQI2 women.</li> </ul>  |
| Environment and Climate Action | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SDG 13: Climate Action.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Goal 13: Include LGBRQI2 voices and peoples in climate change discussions, noting the impact that climate change has on impoverished LGBTQI2 minorities.</li> </ul>   |
| Inclusive Government           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SDG 5: Gender Equality.</li> <li>• SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions.</li> <li>• SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals.</li> </ul>         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Goal 16: Ensure programs working on policing, criminal justice and civil society address LGBTQI2 hate crimes and discrimination.</li> <li>• Build police and LGBTQI2 organization capacity to document instances of hate crimes against LGBTQI2 peoples.</li> </ul> |
| Peace and Security             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SDG 5: Gender Equality.</li> <li>• SDG 17: Partnership for the Goals.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Goal 5: Create programs challenging harmful gender norms (ex. impact of norms on male, non-binary peoples and the wider population).</li> </ul>   |


### IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE

|               |  |
|---------------|--|
| 2020-2021     | Make requisite changes within the FIAP framework to better account for sexual and gender minorities. This will include consultation with Stonewall International's queer approach towards UN SDGs and adaptation to a Canadian context. Reconstructing and developing FIAP beyond women and girls to account for a truly feminist policy will begin the process of improving the lives of global sexual and gender minorities. |
| 2022-2024     | Following the redevelopment of FIAP to reflect a sexual and gender minority approach, GAC should consult with and refer to other marginalized groups and their various organizations to ensure a greater intersectional approach to FIAP (i.e. persons with disabilities, racial and ethnic minorities, Indigenous minorities, etc.).  |
| December 2025 | Reevaluate policy to address policy success, new concerns, while noting and encompassing the evolution of feminist theory and contemporary issues in feminist discourse and larger sociocultural communities.  |

# ANNEX A: LEGALITY OF HOMOSEXUAL ACTIVITY<sup>55</sup>



# ANNEX B: LGBT DISCRIMINATION<sup>56</sup>



## ANNEX C: UN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS <sup>57</sup>

# SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS



## ANNEX D: SWEDEN'S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACHIEVING UN SDG TARGETS <sup>58</sup>

### Goals

- 1: Eradicate poverty
- 2: Food
- 3: Health
- 4: Education
- 5: Gender equality
- 6: Water
- 7: Energy
- 8: Economy
- 9: Infrastructure
- 10: Reduce inequality
- 11: Cities
- 12: Sustainable production
- 13: Climate
- 14: Oceans
- 15: Biodiversity
- 16: Institutions
- 17: Implementation



— Levels of achievement to be attained by 2030

# ANNEX E: CANADA'S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACHIEVING UN SDG TARGETS <sup>58</sup>

## Goals

-  1: Eradicate poverty
-  2: Food
-  3: Health
-  4: Education
-  5: Gender equality
-  6: Water
-  7: Energy
-  8: Economy
-  9: Infrastructure
-  10: Reduce inequality
-  11: Cities
-  12: Sustainable production
-  13: Climate
-  14: Oceans
-  15: Biodiversity
-  16: Institutions
-  17: Implementation

--- Levels of achievement to be attained by 2030



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- <sup>3</sup> "Government Bill (House of Commons) C-75 (42-1) - Royal Assent - An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and Other Acts and to Make Consequential Amendments to Other Acts - Parliament of Canada." Government Bill (House of Commons) C-75 (42-1) - Royal Assent - An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to other Acts - Parliament of Canada. Accessed January 27, 2020. <https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-75/royal-assent>.
- <sup>4</sup> This backlash from religious and conservative groups is most evident with the recent case example of the backlash the Liberal government received in regards to the 2018 Canada Summer Jobs programme application, which required organizations to declare express support from reproductive rights and LGBTQ Canadians to receive funding. See: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/liberals-summer-jobs-program-changes-1.4934674>
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- <sup>6</sup> Ibid
- <sup>7</sup> The 0.7% ODA/GNI Target - A History." *Organization For Economic Co-Operation And Development*. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/the07odagnitarget-ahistory.htm>
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# REFUGEE POLICY

By: Monica Sourial, Sajra Trto and Zachary Poste

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 1869, Canada has implemented and updated immigration and refugee policies to address the increasing number of refugee submissions. Until now, the policies have been drastically revised, but there is still room for improvement. We recommend temporarily suspending the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA), to allow a greater number of asylum seekers to make refugee claims at Canadian borders. With this, comes an increasing need for providing safe and affordable housing. It is proposed that the federal government must allocate funding to expand shelter space available for asylum seekers.

The number of irregular asylum crossings into Canada has increased in recent years, causing a shift in the immigration process. This increase in asylum seekers has overwhelmed the refugee system and Canada has not been able to provide asylum seekers with effective and timely hearings. This in turn has instilled fear within the Canadian population leading to a minority of Canadians believing that Canada should not be such a welcoming country to immigrants and refugees and that it should control its borders.

The world is witnessing the highest levels of displaced persons on record, millions have been fleeing in fear of persecution and human rights violations. If these trends continue in the future, attempts must be made to monitor and evaluate outcomes to allow refugee policy to adapt in a changing world.

### INFORM 2017 RISK INDEX




Figure 1<sup>1</sup>

# GLOSSARY OF TERMS

| Key Term                           | Definition  |
|------------------------------------|---|
| <b>Refugee</b>                     | Any person who is required to leave their country due to persecution. These refugees are determined to be refugees before they enter the country.   |
| <b>Convention Refugee</b>          | Any person who meets the criteria under the UN Convention. To meet the definition, “(a) by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, (i) is outside the country of the person’s nationality and is unable, or by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or (ii) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of the person’s former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, is unwilling to return to that country”. |
| <b>Asylum Seeker</b>               | Any person in refuge; however, they cannot be defined as refugees. But they can apply as a refugee claimant, which is a person who has made a claim for protection as a refugee.  |
| <b>Resettled Refugee</b>           | Any refugee who is offered a permanent home in a country that is not their own.   |
| <b>Protected Person</b>            | Any person determined to be:<br>(a) a Convention Refugee or<br>(b) a person in need of protection<br>(i.e. a person who may not meet the Convention definition but is in a refugee-like situation defined in Canadian law as deserving of protection, for example because they are in danger of being tortured).  |
| <b>Internally Displaced Person</b> | Any person who has been forcibly displaced but is still within the borders of their home country.   |
| <b>Stateless Person</b>            | Any person who is not recognized as a citizen by any state. Some refugees may be stateless but not all are, and similarly, not all stateless people are refugees.   |
| <b>1976 Immigration Act</b>        | Fulfil Canada’s international legal obligations with respect to refugees and to uphold its humanitarian tradition with respect to displaced and persecuted persons.   |



# ABBREVIATIONS

| Acronym Used | Definition   |
|--------------|--|
| BARRA        | Balanced Refugee Act   |
| CBSA         | Canadian Border Service Agency                               |
| CIC          | Citizenship and Immigration Canada                           |
| CIM          | Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism                |
| CS           | Community Sponsors   |
| CSIS         | Canadian Security Intelligence Service                       |
| DOJ          | Department of Justice  |
| GAC          | Global Affairs Canada  |
| GAR          | Government Assisted Refugees                                 |
| G5           | Group of 5   |
| IRB          | Immigration and Refugee Board                                |
| IRBC         | Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada                      |
| IRPA         | Immigration and Refugee Protection Act                       |
| IRCC         | Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada                  |
| LGBTQI2      | Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Questioning, Intersex and Two-Spirit |
| PCISA        | Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act                   |
| PM           | Prime Minister   |
| PSR          | Private Sponsored Refugee                                    |
| RAB          | Refugees Affairs Branch                                      |
| RAD          | Refugee Appeal Division                                      |
| RAH          | Refugee Agreement Holder                                     |
| RCMP         | Royal Canadian Mounted Police                                |
| STCA         | Safe Third Country Agreement                                 |
| UN           | United Nations   |
| UNHCR        | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees                |
| US           | United States  |
| VOR          | Visa Office Referred   |

# BACKGROUND, HISTORY, POLICY PROCESS

## PROBLEMS FACING THE NATION

Due to the changing political situation in the US and a flaw in the STCA, Canada has seen an increase in the number of irregular border crossings. This increase has overwhelmed the IRB, and by the end of 2016 there were approximately 34 thousand backlogged cases.

This increased number of both asylum seekers and refugees entering Canada are creating a burden on unprepared cities. Montreal and Toronto are just two of those cities that are facing major problems with the capacity to withstand such a large influx.

## PAST POLICIES AND CRITICAL DECISIVE MOMENTS




Figure 2

In 1976, the Canada implemented a new Immigration Act that could assist refugees defining them as a distinct group. This distinct status gave refugees legal recognition and status according to the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees as overseen by the UNHCR. The act came into force in 1978 beginning to fulfil a process of Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees, to uphold its humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced and persecuted.

In 2001, Canada replaced the 1976 Immigration Act with the new IRPA, extending the family class to include same-sex and common-law relationships. The new act gave the government more power to detain and deport immigrants suspected of being a security threat. In 2002, Canada entered an agreement with the US, the STCA, where migrants are prevented from entering one of the countries on a travel visa and claim refugee status at the border of the other.

On March 30, 2010, Former Minister of CIM, Jason Kenney, introduced long overdue reform to the refugee determination process in Canada. The new proposals labelled the BRRA aimed to conclude refugee determination within sixty days.

Under the former Harper government, the number of immigrants and refugees allowed to enter Canada was limited. Only 2,000 refugees and immigrants were accepted. In 2016, Canada accepted 25,000 Syrian refugees within a three-month period, which is a much higher number than Canada is used especially to especially in such a short time frame. This not only exposed weaknesses within the system but also created new obstacles.

## TRENDS AND INDICATORS

The past ten years has seen a substantial increase in the number of forcibly displaced persons and refugees worldwide to about seventy million including 3.5 million asylum seekers and 25.9 million refugees (See Annex A).<sup>2</sup> This increase is driven by places such as Syria, and in Canada, Syrians made up the majority of resettled refugees in 2016 (See Annex B).<sup>3</sup> There is a significant and growing gap between refugees in need of resettlement and resettlement spaces available worldwide (See Annex D).<sup>4</sup>

Canada has also experienced a significant increase in the number of asylum seekers in the past couple of years (See Annex E).<sup>5</sup> However these levels are comparable to early 2000s numbers. As of October 2019, there have been 13,702 interceptions of irregular border crossings compared to 17,161 during the same period in 2018.<sup>6</sup> This may indicate that the trend is beginning to reverse. A majority (60%) of Canadians supported or somewhat supported the government's decision to resettle 26,000 Syrian refugees, but a significant minority (37%) either opposed or somewhat opposed that decision (See Annex F).<sup>7</sup>

The number of refugees utilizing non-refugee designated shelters has increased from 1000 to 2000 over two years.<sup>8</sup> In Toronto, the share of refugees in the shelter system has increased from 11% in 2016 to 45% in June 2018.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, wait times of an IRB hearing were on average twenty months for the 2017-2018 cohort of asylum seekers. The numbers increased to 36 months by 2019-2020.<sup>10</sup>

## CURRENT POLICIES

Canada currently has an active refugee system with two major streams of entry. The first is resettlement of UNHCR recognized refugees through both government and private sponsorship. Of the refugees resettled in Canada in 2017, 62% were PSRs, 33% were GARs and 5% were supported through a mixed blended visa system.<sup>11</sup>

RAHs work with the IRCC to sponsor refugees and in turn, are the only type of private sponsors that receive a cap for the amount of applications that can be submitted each year. This cap was set at 10,500 refugees for 2019.<sup>12</sup> The ROD establishes the limit based on the annual RAH global cap set by the RAB. The ROD also manages a reserve pool for the RAHs, which acts as a space trading system between SAHs.<sup>13</sup> SAHs have a secretariat that is in charge of ensuring appropriate cap spaces, while also managing the reserve pool. The set cap, along with the secretariat managing the allocation of refugees, RAHs are the only type of PSR that have an effective sponsoring system set in place.<sup>14</sup>

Canada currently has a target to resettle between 8-12% of the world's refugees and achieved a level of 15% of all refugees resettled in the world in 2016, largely due to the Syrian Refugee Program.<sup>15</sup> Canada provided more refugee resettlements than any other country in 2018 at 28,500.<sup>16</sup>

The second stream for refugees is in-country asylum claimants. Under current policy, anyone can make a refugee claim and have their case evaluated by the IRB. This number has increased in recent years due to a large amount of irregular border crossing from the US. Since 2004, Canada and the US have been party to the STCA, which stipulate that asylum seekers must make their claim in the first country they arrive in, so asylum seekers who arrive in the US must make their claim there, and will be turned away at the Canadian border if they attempt to make the same claim in Canada. However, this agreement applies only to official border crossings, giving rise to the irregular crossings at the US-Canada border.<sup>17</sup> Canada has also passed legislation to bar people from applying for asylum if they already applied in the US or another country that Canada shares this agreement with.<sup>18</sup> A target of 51,700 refugees per year was set for 2021 with additional focus on vulnerable women and girls, survivors of Daesh, and LGBTQI2 refugees. The government has also committed \$173.2 million in funding to cope with the impact of irregular refugees.

## ALTERNATIVE POLICIES

Some have suggested that Canada needs to do more to meet international responsibility in the resettlement of refugees as the UN identifies more than 1.3 million refugees in need of resettlement. Despite Canada providing the greatest number of resettlements at 28,100, only 81,300 refugees were resettled world-wide in 2018.<sup>19</sup>

In response to the increase of irregular border crossings, some have called for an elimination of the STCA based on the fact that the US is no longer a 'safe' country for refugees due to inadequate treatment of refugees under current policy.<sup>20</sup> Others have instead argued for a closing of loopholes and encourage the turning away of asylum seekers at the border if they are arriving via the US.<sup>21</sup>

# POLICY ANALYSIS

## INTERESTS AND VALUES

Canada's immigration and refugee policy is guided by two priorities: economic prosperity and humanitarianism. The refugee program is a significant way that Canada promotes itself as a humanitarian nation, and a contributor to the international rules-based order. Canada's system provides protection to vulnerable displaced people around the world.

Canada relies on its immigration and refugee system to develop and maintain economic prosperity. Since Canada faces demographic challenges of an aging population and a low birth rate, it must counter these trends through immigration to grow economically. In 2018, 80% of new population growth in Canada came from immigration.<sup>22</sup> Additionally, the median age of resettled refugees between 2015 and 2016 was 21 years old, much lower than at 31.7 years old and even younger than the Canadian population's median of 40.8 years old.<sup>23</sup> Although intake of refugees carries some costs, these costs are offset by age advantage and the taxes they will pay while working in Canada.

## GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

**GOAL:** To provide humanitarian assistance through refugee resettlement and grant refugee status to asylum seekers facing persecution.

**OBJECTIVE 1:** To be a leading country in refugee resettlement by numbers.

**OBJECTIVE 2:** Ensure asylum seekers are provided fair, timely and impartial trials.

**TRADE OFF:** Increasing the amount of refugees fulfills humanitarian goals but creates increased demand for resources.

## STAKEHOLDERS

| Key Players/<br>Stakeholders     | Ally or<br>Detractor | Interests/Role in Refugee Screening, Settling and Support  |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|--|
| <b>Canadian Public</b>           | Both                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Segments of the population have become hostile toward refugees because of the perception that refugees take up resources or irregular asylum seekers are ‘skipping the line’.</li> <li>• Canadian support for refugee program is contingent on the understanding of the different programs and knowledge that Canada has enough resources to properly screen, settle and support refugees.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Refugees</b>                  | N/A                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refugees have a vested interest in an equitable efficient and timely systems. Refugees require an appropriate amount of support to adapt to and settle in Canada. Particular areas of concern are housing, health and language training.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Asylum seekers</b>            | N/A                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asylum seekers want a fair, equitable and timely trial.</li> <li>• Seekers who cannot make claims at official border crossings face significant risks and dangers to health in crossing the Canadian border at unofficial crossings.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>GAC/DOJ</b>                   | Ally                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• These departments are affected in modifying treaties and diplomacy with the US.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>CSIS</b>                      | Ally                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides intelligence resources for initial CBSA screening of asylum seekers.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>IRB</b>                       | Ally                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires appropriate amount of human and financial resources to process asylum claims in an efficient and timely manner.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>UNHCR</b>                     | Ally                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNHCR will continue to refer refugees to Canada for resettlement and work to close resettlement gap.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Private refugee sponsors</b>  | Ally                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Private sponsors are eager to support refugees and already work with the government to provide support to refugees.</li> <li>• Long processing times complicate the sponsorship process and creates an increased burden on sponsors.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Provinces and Territories</b> | Detractor            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refugee immigration can be a contentious issue depending on the jurisdiction; Quebec especially has received the brunt of unofficial border crossings and has called for more support from the Government of Canada.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>US</b>                        | Detractor            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Current policy in the US has attempted to curb the number of asylum seekers arriving in the United States as well reduce the total number of refugees.</li> <li>• Any change in policy that would result in more asylum seekers being diverted to the US would likely result in significant pushback from the current administration.</li> </ul>  |

## PROGRAMMATIC NEEDS

The increase in irregular asylum seekers creates demand for additional resources to handle the increased number of claims, particularly in the IRB. Reducing wait-times for trials for asylum requires continued investment of both funds and human resources. Longer wait times means that asylum seekers have time to set down roots in Canada, which can be used to claim that they should be allowed to stay further down the line.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, it is crucial that wait times are reduced to prevent the circumvention of the refugee system. CBSA, IRCC and the RCMP also require financial, human and intelligence resources to properly screen asylum seekers at ports of entry into Canada.

# ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATION

## COSTED OPTIONS

### Option 1: Reduce Processing Time and Increase Efficiency for PSRs

Canada should expand the capping system of the RAHs to all types of private sponsor programs. This will include setting a cap on the amount of refugees that can be sponsored, adding a secretariat to the system, as well as implementing a reserve pool for applications.

#### Benefits:

- 1) Set a limit on yearly refugee submissions, reducing potential of over admission.
- 2) Allows government to access spacing for refugees in advance, rather on a case-by-case basis.
- 3) A pooled system allows for reallocation of refugees between private sponsors if needed.
- 4) A secretariat will help ensure appropriate spaces are used and manage the reserve pool and trading.

#### Costs:

- 1) Increases the burden on government, as they need to identify cap numbers and keep track of applications and pools.
- 2) Setting a cap on all private sponsorships could lead to potential negative feedback from the Canadian public, including refugees.
- 3) Costly to implement a year-round system for managing application counts.
- 4) Private sponsors must track their own applications and assess if they are reaching their set limit.

#### Expected Outcomes:

- 1) Establishing a set maximum on refugee applications for private sponsors will reduce over approval of submissions. The government will perform an analysis and set the maximum number of refugees it can accept, early on.
- 2) The new system will reduce wait times as the sponsors ability to support the refugees will be pre-assessed, rather than assessed on a case-by-case basis.
- 3) The system will allow for increased efficiency in both application capacity and clear allocation of refugees between all types of private sponsors.

### Option 2: Suspend STCA

Canada should suspend the STCA with the US and allow asylum seekers who have not already made a claim in another country to make a claim at official points of entry along the Canada-US Border.

#### Benefits:

- 1) Legalized the arrival of asylum seekers from the US, reduces the number of detentions occurring at the border.
- 2) Helps to eliminate the risks faces by asylum seekers attempting unofficial border crossings in rural areas.
- 3) Relieves burden of specific communities and jurisdiction receiving irregular asylum seekers.
- 4) Reduces the perception of ‘illegal border crossers’ which generates hostility towards the refugees.
- 5) Refugees earning on average of \$30,000, 15 years after settling, meaning they eventually will pay more in taxes than their initial cost to government.<sup>25</sup>

#### Costs:

- 1) Estimated average cost for 2019-2020 is \$16,666 per migrants.<sup>26</sup>
- 2) Concerned agencies would need further funding and resources to manage asylum seeker cases.
- 3) US Government may respond negatively to the decision to rescind ‘Safe’ country status and may retaliate.
- 4) May invoke anti-refugee sentiment among the public if perceptions are not carefully managed.

#### Expected Outcomes:

- 1) The suspension of the STCA will greatly reduce the number of asylum seekers attempting unofficial border crossings.
- 2) These asylum seekers will be diverted to official borders where they can make a claim if they have not already made a claim in the US or another country Canada shares immigration information with.
- 3) Canada further values and image as a safe country for asylum seekers.
- 4) Although not currently working as intended, suspension leaves the door open to possible renegotiation of STCA in the future reassessment of the American situation.

### Option 3: Manage the Capacity Issue that Many Cities are Facing

The Federal Government should provide the Provincial Governments funding to develop affordable housing and increase the number of refugee shelters. In addition, balancing the number of refugees across Canada and setting a cap for each city to lower the burden.

#### Benefits:

- 1) Decrease the number of refugees accessing mainstream homeless shelters.
- 2) More shelters will mean refugees can have access to more resources and targeted support to improve their changes of resettling quickly.
- 3) Increasing the number of affordable housing units will help refugees and asylum seekers transition quickly; hence, opening up space for Canada to welcome more refugees.
- 4) Relieves burden off specific communities and jurisdictions that are welcoming many refugees.

#### Costs:

- 1) This can be costly to implement in the short-term due to the increased funding allocated for refugees.
- 2) Refugees resettled in rural cities might find it difficult to adjust in those communities as they in many cases will find themselves isolated and excluded which in turn can lead to poorer health and social outcomes.

#### Expected Outcomes:

- 1) In the long-term, this can greatly benefit Canada’s refugee population as it will allow them to transfer from a refugee shelter to affordable housing in a shorter amount of time.
- 2) Canada will improve its immigration system immensely and continue on the path of welcoming many more refugees in a time of uncertainty.

## RECOMMENDATION

Our final recommendation is that the Minister of IRCCC proposes to cabinet to suspend the STCA for a period of one year. Asylum seekers will be able to apply for refugee status at an official border crossing. In conjunction with our proposed recommendation, we suggest that the Federal Government supports the Provinces in allocating funds in order to build more refugee shelters, to reduce the burden on emergency shelters. We also recommend that the government increase funding to the IRB and affected agencies to keep wait times from increasing substantially.

Asylum seekers will benefit greatly from this policy as the policy will result in a substantial reduction in irregular border crossings. We also would consider the policy a success if it does not cause a substantial increase in asylum seekers at the border relative to global trends. By providing asylum seekers with a safe, legal option for making a claim at the border, we can focus our resources on processing claims rather than on detaining refugees at irregular crossings. In 2018, the Federal Government allocated \$10 million in additional funding to the RCMP to help intercept migrants at the border, we believe these funds could better be used as funding for refugee shelters, or in opening new IRB branches to process claims.<sup>27</sup> The asylum seekers who risk irregular crossing were not deterred by the STCA, and this has caused many negative external costs and budget restraints, and polarized the Canadian population.

Our strategy is that the STCA should be suspended solely for the reason that the agreement is not functioning as intended, and we need to provide a legal point of entry for asylum seekers until the agreement can be reassessed and potentially renegotiated. While there is significant reason for concern for the treatment of refugees south of the border, a year will give time for the U.S. political and legal systems to confront the problem. The current US administration will also face election in 2020, so the next administration's policy will be taken into consideration at that time. If there is a continuation of policies hostile to refugees, the STCA may have to remain suspended.

Looking towards renegotiations, we recommend that the new deal focuses on closing the loophole, while also proposing a new system to fairly share the asylum seeker burden with the US according to our respective capacities. Avoiding the risks and costs associated with irregular border crossing by providing a legitimate means of asylum claim for asylum seekers should be our top priority in a new deal. The current laws which prevent asylum seekers from making a claim if they have already made it in another country should be preserved to prevent illegitimate 'asylum shopping'. At this time, the current administration would likely not be in favour in diverting further refugees to the US but proposing a better system for sharing the refugee burden would hopefully create some goodwill towards working out a new deal with the US.

## COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

This change in policy should be communicated openly to the public. There should also be a public relations campaign engaging with media and public to ensure Canadians that this is not an 'open' borders policy and this is intended to reduce the amount of irregular border crossings, and that security and health screenings of asylum seekers will still be stringently conducted.

## KPIs AND TIMELINE

The IRCC's annual report to parliament on immigration can be used as a KPI. Our final recommendation is a two-part approach. The report gives statistics on the number of refugee applications approved within the year, as well as, the total number of refugees admitted into each province. An additional section can be added to the report here, outlining the additional number of shelter space provided in each province. From the IRCC's report, the increased number of refugees admitted into each province must be cross-referenced with the amount of shelters provided. This will give an accurate representation of the viability of the recommendations.

| Recommendation Timeline |   |   |
|-------------------------|---|---|
| Timeline                | Actions Taken   | KPIs  |
| <b>December 2019</b>    | Announce suspension of STCA with the US   |   |
| <b>Budget 2020</b>      | Allocate funds to provinces to provide additional support for refugees.   |   |
| <b>June 2020</b>        | Mid-year review effects of policy: number of asylum seekers arriving from the US, irregular crossings and housing outcomes of recent refugees.  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refugee use of homeless shelter.</li> <li>• Number of irregular asylum seekers.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>November 2020</b>    | Comprehensive review of the effects of the suspension, in particular, the total number of asylum seekers arriving from the US relative to global trends, number of irregular border crossings by asylum seekers, as well as housing outcomes. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Substantial reduction in the number of irregular crossings.</li> <li>• Monitor the number of refugees shelter spaces created.</li> </ul> |
| <b>December 2020</b>    | The Minister for IRCC and cabinet will decide on whether to renew the suspension of the STCA for another year and begin renegotiations with the US.   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Open dialogue with the US towards a more comprehensive STCA deal.</li> </ul>   |

## ANNEX A: BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

The 1951 UNHCR made it illegal to deport or return refugees to their country of origin if they might be subject to persecution on the basis of religion, nationality, race, or political belief; principle referred to as non-refoulement. At that time of the act's implementation, there were 2 new groups introduced in the refugee process; GAR and PSRPs. More complicated cases that are not clearly defined in the act were recommended through the private programs, which became crucial as the crisis in Indochina became prominent.

Since the 1970's, more and more people tried to jump the queue of regular immigrant applicants by going to the Canadian ports without first being processed by Canadian immigration officers. This led to the reform of policies.


In 1980, five classes of immigrants were defined; "Independent (people applying on their own); Humanitarian (refugees and other persecuted or displaced people); Family (having immediate family already living in Canada); Assisted Relatives (distant relatives, sponsored by a family member in Canada); and Economic (people with highly desirable employment skills, or those willing to open a business or invest significantly in the Canadian economy)."<sup>28</sup>

The Government's "backgrounder" on the reforms stated that "individuals who are determined to be eligible to make an asylum claim would meet with a public servant at the IRB within eight days of being referred to the IRB. During this information-gathering interview, information on the claim would be collected, forms properly completed and a hearing scheduled before another public servant at the IRB within 60 days."<sup>29</sup>

As currently organized, the IRB is not in a position to meet these time standards. In the IRB's Department Results Report 2016-17, meeting regulatory time limits is identified as the Board's "Key Risk" due to increased intake and limited capacity. It only has field offices in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. While the bulk of refugee claimants are in those three cities, for the period from January 2017 to October 2017, over 2,500 claimants were living outside of Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia. These claimants are not treated in the same way as claimants where the IRB has offices as they will either have to travel to an IRB office, at their own expense, or make their all-important claim by video conference.


## ANNEX B: GLOBAL FORCED DISPLACEMENT <sup>30</sup>

Figure 1 | Global forced displacement | 2009-2018



## ANNEX C: TOP FIVE ORIGIN COUNTRIES OF REFUGEES ADMITTED TO CANADA <sup>31</sup>


Top five origin countries of refugees admitted to Canada in 2016




**Sources**  
CTV Television Network; UNHCR  
© Statista 2019

**Additional Information:**  
Canada; CTV Television Network; UNHCR; 2016


## ANNEX D: GAP BETWEEN RESETTLEMENT NEEDS AND UNHCR RESETTLEMENT SUBMISSIONS<sup>32</sup>



## ANNEX E: NUMBER OF REFUGEE CLAIMANTS IN CANADA (2000-2017)<sup>33</sup>



## ANNEX F: SUPPORT AMONG CANADIANS FOR RESETTLING SYRIAN REFUGEES <sup>34</sup>



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# HUMAN RIGHTS:

## CHILD SOLDIERS

By: Sarah D'Aversa and Zach Melanson

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Historically, Canada has been defined as a middle power, a role that involves “an ability to stand a certain distance from direct involvement in major conflicts, a sufficient degree of autonomy in relation to major powers, a commitment to orderliness and security in interstate relations and to the facilitation of orderly change in the world system.”<sup>1</sup>

To upkeep this status, policies promoting the espoused beliefs and strengths of Canada are needed. Beliefs like liberalism, multilateralism, equality and human rights can be kept through Canada’s engagement in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Such missions reinforce Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s promise to lead “an international effort to improve and expand peace operations” by “providing well-trained personnel to international initiatives that can be quickly deployed, such as mission commanders, staff officers, and headquarters.”<sup>2</sup>

Canada has historically been linked to a number of human rights projects, including its fight to protect children worldwide. As of today, Canada’s agenda is based on the Grave Violations identified by the UNSC and reinforced through the Vancouver Principles (2017).

If Canada is to maintain its status as a middle power, it is important that it focuses on a specific region and issue. We recommend for Canada to focus on Grave Violation number 2 and base it’s categorization of child soldier on the UN definition.<sup>3</sup>

While this problem is absolutely one global in nature, Canada should narrow its focus to within the continent of Africa to be more effective in its policy implementation. Key stakeholders, players, allies, and detractors must be proactive through the entire process for Canada to accomplish a number of goals, including:

- 1) Investing in advocacy, in conjunction with the Romeo Dallaire Institute.
- 2) Having a direct presence – either through the UN, AU—on the ground with Canadian Forces lending training and support to local actors.
- 3) Investing in local economies and local initiatives.

Two policy recommendations to guide Canada in this regard are:

- 1) Promote Canadian values abroad.
- 2) Build Canada’s soft power in a developing region, thus, further entrenching Canada’s middle power status in a rapidly-shifting world order.

# ABBREVIATIONS

| Acronym Used | Definition  |
|--------------|---|
| ATT          | Arms Trade Treaty   |
| AU           | African Union   |
| CAF          | Canadian Armed Forces   |
| CJOC         | Canadian Joint Operations Command   |
| DND          | Department of National Defence  |
| DRC          | Democratic Republic of the Congo  |
| EIPA         | Export and Import Permits Act   |
| EU           | European Union  |
| FIAP         | Feminist International Assistance Policy  |
| GAC          | Global Affairs Canada   |
| G7           | Group of Seven  |
| IBTS         | Individual Battle Task Standards  |
| JDN          | Joint Doctrine Note   |
| KP           | Kimberly Process  |
| MRM          | Monitoring and Report Mechanism   |
| NATO         | North Atlantic Treaty Organization  |
| OPAC         | Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict |
| RDCSI        | Romeo Dallaire Child Soldier Initiative   |
| RDI          | Romeo Dallaire Institute  |
| SSD          | Safe School Declaration   |
| UN           | United Nations  |
| UNCRC        | United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child  |
| UNGA         | United Nations General Assembly   |
| UNSC         | United Nations Security Council   |
| UK           | United Kingdom  |
| US           | United States of America  |

# BACKGROUND, HISTORY, POLICY PROCESS

## PROBLEMS FACING THE NATION

Canada's inability to take the lead in prominent international agendas (i.e. human rights) has historically hindered Canada's foreign policy. While Canada does not face a direct threat of a sudden insurgency that is going to employ child soldiers, this issue does impact Canada's security file as child soldiers often offer a direct advantage to competing actors.

Hence, it is crucial that Canada establish concrete policies designed to combat the use and recruitment of child soldiers. Such policies would strengthen Canada's security goals, while also reinforcing Canada's ability to play a more prominent role in Africa and globally.

## PAST POLICIES AND CRITICAL DECISIVE MOMENTS

While Canada has no domestic policies regarding child soldiers, it has taken on a leading stance against the issue (**See Annex A**). Canada presented the first thematic debate on children soldiers and hosted the first International Conference on War-Affected Children in 2000.<sup>4</sup> Canada is advocating for a multilateral approach focused on cooperation in combating the use of child soldiers, as illustrated through its establishment of the UN Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict and its funding the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Office.

The Canadian Government has also joined forces with the RDI in establishing the RDCSI and the CAF JDN to ensure that CAF is trained in facing and preventing the use of child soldiers. Such efforts coincide with the government's encouragement of a policy approach that emphasizes accountability, prevention of recruitment, and reintegration of former child soldiers into their communities, as exemplified by the Vancouver Principles and the ATT. The Paris Commitments and Paris Principles provide detailed guidance for states who are implementing policies against child soldiers.<sup>5</sup> These principles were endorsed by 100 states including Canada.

OPAC was created in 2000. OPAC is a multilateral treaty ratified by 170 states, that prohibits non-state armed groups from recruiting anyone under the age of 18 for any purpose, forbids conscription into the military for anyone under the age of 18, and prevents recruits aged 16 or 17 from taking a direct role in hostilities.<sup>6</sup>

Canada took on a major stance in protecting children abroad through its launch of the Vancouver Principles in 2017.<sup>7</sup> The Vancouver Principles take a more assertive stance on preventing child recruitment through early warning mechanisms and active prevention of recruitment. More than 85 countries have endorsed the Vancouver Principles with some groups like the EU even shifting their own policies. For example, countries like Sweden are now utilizing psycho-social support and education to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers and to reintegrate former child soldiers into families or alternative care.



168 out of 197 UN Member States have ratified OPAC.

46 States still recruit children under the age of 18 into their armed forces.

Since 2016, there has been 18 conflict situations in which children have participated in hostilities.

## POLICY ALTERNATIVES

There are a variety of initiatives Canada can undertake to strengthen its bid for a seat on the UNSC. However, there are not many realms in which there is a shallower history and precedent compared to children in armed conflict. It is a grave moral problem that Africa faces, and it allows Canada the opportunity to take initiative and build a more independent case relative to other initiatives at its disposal.

Yet, to take this initiative, the Canadian Government must reconsider its priorities in regards to human rights and arms trade. Currently, Canada sells arms to countries recruiting and using child soldiers. This notion suggests that Canada is indirectly placing weapons in the hands of children. Thus, it is essential that Canada considers its international humanitarian priorities abroad.

## POLICY ANALYSIS

### INTERESTS AND VALUES

A significant interest of the Canadian government in advocating for the discontinuity of children as soldiers is to promote itself as a humanitarian nation determined to defend human rights at home and abroad. This interest correlates with the values of democracy, tolerance, and liberalism nested in Canada's national and international identity and branding. Yet, it may be difficult for Canada to promote this interest while also maintaining its revenues from selling arms internationally. Therefore, the Government of Canada must reconsider its values and priorities, and whether it prioritizes economic profit or human rights standards.

The interest of terminating the use of child soldiers by Justin Trudeau's government is also linked to the party's focus on gender equality as girl soldiers are often recruited as both soldiers and sex slaves. This notion was emphasized by former Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, Chrystia Freeland's commitment to invest \$3.8 billion investment in education for women and girls in conflict situations. Hence, it is in Canada's best interest to support initiatives aimed at assisting child soldiers as it improves Canada's image as a human rights leader (See Annex A).

## GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Currently, the recruitment and use of child soldiers are not going to plague Canada domestically, yet there are many reasons why Canada should pursue an agenda focused on mitigating this issue abroad.

First, Canada is pursuing a seat on the UNSC in 2021. Building the case for such a pursuit is an integral part of the process and to “trailblaze” it in a largely undeveloped field of international human rights policy would lend a strong reason for Canada to be selected for such a responsibility. Furthermore, considering the security implications of child soldiers (the unfair advantages, practically speaking), Canada advocating as a proponent for increased international engagement with this issue gives it more of a unique position to push for a seat on the UNSC.

The entrenched values of Canada that espoused both domestically and internationally naturally line-up with an agenda designed around preventing the recruitment of child soldiers and Canada can use this agenda to further develop soft power and influence in African nations.

## INSTITUTIONS

### UN:

The UN is the backbone of international law and protocol regarding human rights as well as the legitimizing institution of a series of international agreements focused on tackling the use and recruitment of child soldiers, such as the Paris Principles, the Vancouver Principles, and OPAC. Such agreements are significant as they establish an international consensus on combatting the issue.

### UNSC:

Furthermore, the UNSC has played a key role in identifying the Six Grave Violations against children in conflict situations that are used as a standard in challenging child soldiers. They also introduced the MRM and an annual report to track and respond to atrocities relating to child soldiers, thus, setting in place a system of accountability on the matter.<sup>14</sup>

### UNICEF:

UNICEF is responsible for the reintegration of former child soldiers into civilian life through education and psycho-social assistance. Such reintegration programs include “Children, Not Soldiers”, a campaign designed to bring about a global consensus that children should not be used as soldiers. This campaign’s stakeholders included the UN, the UNSC, UN Member States (Canada donated \$2 million to the initiative), NGO partners, regional organizations, and the general public.

### RDI:

The RDI, a Canadian NGO, teaches troops and security personnel how to handle children at war by setting up early warning indicators and providing proper training and tools for clear operational guidance to better protect children and peacekeepers. The NGO, as its annual reports indicate, organized roundtables with representatives from DND to introduce these training tools and also advise DND on how to address children’s participation in diverse types of operations.

## STAKEHOLDERS

As the agenda surrounding child soldiers is largely incomplete on the domestic side, it's important that we distinguish it amongst Canadian initiatives abroad. As such, there are a couple of key players that we can identify as being integral to this agenda.

### Allies

#### RDI:

Perhaps the strongest and most active key player, this Canadian NGO is one of the largest international actors involved in the research, prevention, and advocacy for the mitigation of child soldier recruitment. Furthermore, other NGOs such as War Child can be consulted to take full advantage of existing networks.

#### AU/Local Actors:

The AU maintains a couple of initiatives designed to prevent child soldier recruitment and works closely with like-minded entities such as the RDI to achieve tangible results in the prevention of recruitment.

#### UN:

Through the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the UN maintains a presence in this realm as well. Particularly, by creating action plans for specific parties designed to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers in stated regions.

### Detractors

#### US:

The US, a powerful ally to Canada, still has not ratified the UNCRC, thus, making it difficult for Canada to take a strong stance on the issue of child soldiers. The US has, however, ratified two optional protocols within the convention, so they are not a true detractor, but nonetheless cannot be considered fully-fledged allies in this regard.

#### State Armies Employing Children:

The world's three most populous countries (China, India, and the US) all rely on children under the age of 18 to aid in staffing their armed forces, as well as many G7 countries such as the UK and Canada. Canada needs to discourage under-18 registration to its armed forces if its ambition is to be a human rights leader. Furthermore, countries that indirectly recruit children such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates need to be held accountable.<sup>15</sup>

#### Arms Suppliers:

It has been suggested that the global sale of light arms facilitates the inclusion of children into armed forces because such weapons can be wielded by children efficiently.<sup>16</sup> Canada's ratification of the ATT in 2019 is a good step in stopping the sale of light arms as we can draw links to the export of such weapons to increases in recruitment.

#### Non-State Actors:

Many African countries such as the Central African Republic, Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia house paramilitary groups such as guerilla movements, militias, terrorist organizations, and armed liberation fronts that rely on child soldiers and hence, make such groups detractors.

## PROGRAMMATIC NEEDS

An important programmatic need for Canada to address the issue of child soldiers is the continued cooperation between GAC and DND. To tackle the six Grave Violations identified by the UNSC and to adhere to the Vancouver Principles, GAC and DND must work together to equip peacekeepers to take effective preventative and on-the-ground action in their peacekeeping operations, while also understanding the pathways to child recruitment. One area could be pre-deployment training instructions, as illustrated by DND's CJOC and the IBTS.

Another case is the SSD. This declaration, which recognizes the prioritization of education by Canada in addressing the recruitment of child soldiers, demonstrates the programmatic need of GAC informing the planning and conduct of the CAF during armed conflict and the cooperation of DND in accepting these recommendations.

This cooperation is possible with the help of the RDI, which has advocated for the integration of core principles of international law in tackling the recruitment of child soldiers into the standard operating procedures of the CAF. This contribution allowed Canada to no longer merely have an ad hoc policy on engagement with child soldiers but, to be the first NATO member with a doctrinal document on the issue.<sup>17</sup> To maintain this status, it is crucial for continued programmatic consensus between the RDI and DND on a doctrinal fragment whose objective is to provide operational and tactical considerations in different sectors and types of operations.

For Canada to properly tackle the issue of child soldiers in Africa, it is important that it doesn't indirectly sell arms to groups recruiting and using child soldiers.

# ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATION

## COSTED OPTIONS

### **Option 1: Advocacy**

The first option presented is Canada taking an increased role in advocacy in conjunction with NGOs like the RDI. Canada has already engaged such a path to a degree with the implementation and endorsement of the Vancouver Principles, but we suggest bringing efforts further. By preparing peacekeepers for a role in education and training, local actors can be better engaged and afforded the necessary skills for large scale and long-term prevention efforts.

The downside of this approach is that it may reinforce the perception of human rights efforts not being hands-on and direct enough. This policy option, however, brings Canada deeper into the fray of this issue by putting Canadian resources towards the advocacy and support of international actors such as RDI.

### **Option 2: Engaging Local Actors**

The second option presented is one that involves more direct engagement with local actors, through a body like the AU. The AU maintains a variety of missions and initiatives designed to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers. By lending assistance through training, education, and support through policy designed initiatives, Canada can take a more active and direct role in cooperation with local actors. For example, the Peace & Security Council of the AU has linked many proposed initiatives with those of the UN. These are the initiatives Canada support logistically.

This option's largest advantage is that it ties well with Canada's security ambitions. By engaging with local actors, CAF has immediate access to existing strategies and networks to help confront child soldiers directly. These local actors – or at least local NGOs or active NGOs – will provide unrivalled aid in experience, in return for logistical assistance.

### **Option 3: Investing in Local Economies**

Often, the recruitment and use of children soldiers stems from the destabilizing conditions of a region, therefore, permitting children to be an inexpensive source of labour. Thus, an option for the Canadian government would be to encourage education through the maintenance of safe schools and teacher assistance as well as creating initiatives to sponsor a region's economic prosperity like job training.

For instance, the government could work with the KP in establishing workshops designed to train individuals in Africa to mine diamonds in a secure way. A partnership with the KP would improve Canada's bid for a seat on the UNSC as the UNGA strongly supports the KP and its Certification Scheme.

Yet, while such partnerships could yield positive outcomes, it would take a while for economic and social change to occur, especially in conflict zones. Therefore, signalling the 'burden-sharing' or mass investment of resources and time by the Canadian government into initiatives that may not fully eradicate the recruitment of child soldiers.

### **Option 4: Reintegrating Child Soldiers Through Psycho-Social Assistance:**

Another possible approach is to work with UNICEF in reintegrating former child soldiers into their communities through psycho-social assistance. As observed by academics like Michael Wessells, former child soldiers "often experience hypervigilance, a heightened state of arousal that correlates with very poor self-regulation and...heightened aggressiveness, drug abuse, depression, and other problems."<sup>18</sup>

Hence, to help former child soldiers reintegrate into civilian life, it is important to establish a cohesive support system for them. This support system could be provided by Canada and UNICEF through counselling, peer-group discussions, and programs designed to give former child soldiers a feeling of purpose.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that Canada pursue a policy path that builds on the second option, but contains elements of all four. Engaging local actors is likely to be the most cost-effective and diplomatically-friendly way of approaching this issue, while also the most likely to achieve tangible results immediately. The timeline of achieving results is critical if Canada wants to gain a seat in the UNSC and increase its influence in Africa.

This approach also relates to the interests of key stakeholders and is within the realm of immediate steps Canada can take to actively prevent child soldiers through CAF, by deploying troops aimed at training and engaging locals. Working in conjunction with the RDI to facilitate the educative component of training local actors and working with them directly, Canada can take part in shared AU/UN initiatives to position itself strongly moving forward.

## **COMMUNICATION STRATEGY**

As Canada values its standing as a peacekeeping nation, it would be in its best interest to promote its work in relation to child soldiers to the public. Similar to the promotion of FIAP, this communication strategy would include branding the issue as one premised on creating a more peaceful world that considers all forms of discrimination.

The branding of the issue would focus on the vulnerabilities of children while also promoting Canada's defence policy slogan of 'Strong, Secure, Engaged.' Such branding would reinforce the work already done by the Canadian government, while also likely gaining public support on the issue by tapping into the shared values of the Canadian public. This branding would also likely gain support from the UNGA and strengthen Canada's chances of gaining a seat on the UNSC.

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# DIPLOMACY AND MEDIATION

By: Christian Gabriel and Marissa Frey

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2019, Canadian diplomacy is at a crossroads. An ever-increasing dynamism in international relations has given rise to political uncertainty. Canada has witnessed uncertainty plague its friends, counterparts, and adversaries alike.<sup>1</sup> This plague has predisposed Canada to engage with like-minded countries, being those who subscribe to the same liberal democratic values, in order to maintain its democratic integrity.<sup>2</sup> Canadian efforts of this sort aim to consolidate the liberal democratic voice, all while condemning those who do not comprise it, within the international system.

Under the current government, Canadian diplomacy is characterized by grit, tact, and targeted efforts within specific regions of the world.<sup>3</sup> PM Justin Trudeau underlined to former FM, Chrystia Freeland, that: “Canada will support mediation, conflict-prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts” in 2017.<sup>4</sup> However, preventive diplomacy and mediation efforts have not occurred, as Canada’s approach to international relations has served to single out nations that abuse human rights, disrespect territorial integrity, and fail to uphold the rule of law.<sup>5</sup> The breadth of these effects can be seen in the Middle East, Latin America, North-Asia Pacific, and Eastern Europe.<sup>6</sup> In some instances, Canada’s friends and partners have neglected to stand in solidarity when Canada stands up for the international rules-based order. Subsequently, Canada is sometimes forced to act unilaterally in the face of geopolitical and bilateral complexities in Venezuela and Ukraine, and therefore should return to mediating efforts in these regions

By analyzing Canada’s diplomatic past alongside contemporaneous events, this policy brief aims to provide an objective assessment of Canadian diplomacy, namely with respect to where it might be improved in mediating fragile, and conflict affected states. Specifically, it will be asked how might mediation from Canada revitalize its overall involvement in world affairs, and ultimately shift back towards being an honest broker? Canada’s traditional role as an observer has quickly been supplanted by the Trudeau government and replaced by a reactive actor on the international stage. Canada is now quick to respond when crises occur, and it strongly condemns those that would undermine democratic principles.<sup>7</sup> This constitutes the core driver of modern Canadian diplomacy.

In order to resolve problems through the context of dialogue and preventive diplomacy, the objective of this policy brief is to focus on areas of opportunity for Canada to advance mediation efforts on the international stage.

Additionally, it will strive to highlight areas of strategic interest and value. The first recommendation we propose is that Canada host peace-talks between itself, Ukraine, and Russia to bring peace and stability to Eastern Europe. Hosting peace-talks would further reinforce Canada’s role as an honest broker. This policy would demonstrate a concerted effort to reconcile differences between two conflicting states to find common ground through mediation and preventive diplomacy. If Canada can bring Russia and Ukraine – two countries deeply connected through language, culture, and history – Canada can demonstrate to the international community that it can mediate any conflict in the world. More importantly, this course of action will reinforce and effectively reinstate the international rules-based order.

# ABBREVIATIONS

| Acronym Used | Definition   |
|--------------|--|
| CAF          | Canadian Armed Forces                                  |
| CETA         | Canada-E.U. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement |
| DNR          | Donetsk People’s Republic                              |
| EU           | European Union   |
| FM           | Foreign Affairs Minister                               |
| GoC          | Government of Canada                                   |
| G7           | Group of 7   |
| G8           | Group of 8   |
| G20          | Group of 20  |
| GAC          | Global Affairs Canada                                  |
| JVCFORA      | Magnitsky Act  |
| KPI          | Key Performance Indicator                              |
| LNR          | Luhansk Peoples’ Republic                              |
| NATO         | North Atlantic Treaty Organization                     |
| NGO          | Non-Governmental Organization                          |
| OAS          | Organization of American States                        |
| OSCE         | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe    |
| PSOP         | Peace and Stabilization Operations Program             |
| SEMA         | Special Economic Measures Act                          |
| UCC          | Ukrainian Canadian Council                             |
| UK           | United Kingdom   |
| UN           | United Nations   |
| UNSC         | United Nations Security Council                        |
| URC          | Ukraine Reform Conference                              |
| U.S.         | United States  |

# BACKGROUND, HISTORY, POLICY PROCESS

## PROBLEMS FACING THE NATION

### COUNTRIES VIOLATING THE INTERNATIONAL RULES-BASED ORDER

Human rights violations in China, Russia's militarization in Ukraine, and the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela have made it challenging for Canada to engage in diplomacy and living up to the international rules-based order.<sup>8</sup> There is no clear pattern as to why these states are violating these rules and the only indicator is discontent with aspects of the international system led by the West. Canada's current strategy for dealing with violators has not produced meaningful results as it has added more friction, rather compromise. For example, former FM Freeland has released dozens of ministerial statements regarding the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela without a diplomatic solution.<sup>9</sup> In Ukraine, Canada reiterates its steadfast support to Ukraine's sovereignty without a solution going forward.<sup>10</sup> In China, Canada has released statements that call on the Chinese government to uphold human rights for everyone, but without a plan.<sup>11</sup> Canada is faced with challenging times to establish dialogue and diplomacy in the conduct of international affairs with states it disagrees with. Canada should consider a new method to bring stakeholders together and discuss how it can revitalize the international rules based order through traditionally face-to-face mediation and preventive diplomacy.

### UNRELIABLE PARTNERS

Canada relies on its like-minded allies such as the U.S. and EU to implement its foreign policy objectives.<sup>12</sup> However, Canada is struggling to gain diplomatic support from international partners on Russia. Canada-U.S. relations have been linked through deep cooperation, values, and as such remains a strategic partner for its prosperity. Yet, uncertainty under the Trump administration has, at times, constrained relations over areas of disagreement in economic and trade linkages, security and defence cooperation, as well as climate change initiatives. For example, the U.S.'s proposal to reinstate Russia back into the G7 and the resignation of the Paris Accords challenges bilateralism and multilateralism, as well as Canada's position in the world because Canada has taken a strong approach against Russia's actions in or near Ukraine.<sup>13</sup> Canada's mediation efforts also impose risks with the U.S. as American foreign policy is based on security and defence relations, instead of negotiations and peace-building.<sup>14</sup> This has caused Canada and the U.S. not to work collectively when addressing the rules-based international order due to its different foreign policies on Russia.

Within the EU, Canada has steadfast relations with its European friends; however, it lacks diplomatic support when it releases a political statement that conflicts with the EU's economic interests, in particular, Saudi Arabia. In 2018, Canada released a tweet to express its grave concerns over the arrest of human rights activists - which resulted in Saudi Arabia pulling out 15,000 exchange students and freezing trade and investment deals with Canada. At the end of the twitter crisis, Canada's like-minded partners from the EU did not comment on the dispute nor come to Canada's aid. The diplomatic spat did not gain or resolve anything; but rather, forced Canada to deal with backlash without support from its allies. Canadian officials should have flown to Saudi Arabia to quickly establish common ground over the twitter dispute in order to move forward.

## PAST POLICIES AND CRITICAL DECISIVE MOMENTS

### Mediation

Canada has previously led five mediation efforts. Regardless of the method chosen by previous governments, one common theme that Canada uses preventive diplomacy through either unilateral, international or regional mediation. For more information on where Canada has led in mediation efforts, review the table below. For a full table on every mediation effort that Canada has led or supported, refer to [Annex A](#).

| Mediation Process                                | Date | Purpose of Mediation  |
|--|------|---|
| <b>Rwanda-Zaire talks on Return of Refugees</b>  | 1996 | Assess Rwandan refugees in the region and to make recommendations to the UNSC   |
| <b>OAS Mediation in Peru</b>                     | 2000 | Bring together the Fujimori government and the main opposition parties          |
| <b>Israel, Palestine Post-Intifada Mediation</b> | 2000 | Help the Israelis and Palestinians find a way to stop the conflict              |
| <b>Afghanistan-Pakistan Cooperation Process</b>  | 2007 | Improve border management between Pakistan and Afghanistan                      |
| <b>Niger Peace Process</b>                       | 2008 | Consolidate peace efforts to bring the government of Niger and Toaureg together |

### History of Canadian Bilateralism and Multilateralism

Canada needs strong bilateral and multilateral relations with like-minded allies and adversaries to achieve their mediation goals. Historically, Canada has had strong bilateral relations with the U.S. due to geographic proximity and economic integration between the two nations. Canada has been able to achieve strong bilateral relations with Embassies, Consulates and High Commissions located in over 130 countries. For more information about Canada's Embassies and High Commissions abroad please refer to [Annex B](#). However, Canada does not have either an Embassy or Consulate in 62 countries. For more information, please refer to [Annex C](#). From our personal analysis, we observed that many of these countries either have an extremely small population (under 5 million people) or Canada has a history of bilateral tension with a country. For example, Canada closed its embassy in Belarus after their flawed elections in 2016. While Canada does have Consular sharing agreements with Australia and the UK and has embassies appointed to engage bilaterally with these countries, a lack of physical presence can make it challenging for Canada to participate in mediation efforts. Canada is a member of 18 multilateral institutions. Within these institutions, mediation occurs through a number of mechanisms. For more information on multilateral institutions, please refer to [Annex D](#).

## TRENDS AND INDICATORS

When analyzing annex A, one trend that appears is that Canada has not taken a leadership role in mediation since the Niger Peace Process in 2008. What contributes to Canada's limited role as the mediator is that Canadian mediator personnel are often hired on an ad-hoc basis. Former mediation personnel have stressed there are limited resources for mediators. Another contributing factor is that the lead mediators are often based regionally. For example, during the Minsk Protocol between Russia and Ukraine, the lead mediators were Germany and France due to its geopolitical landscape as the conflict in Ukraine is in Europe's backyard. In this regard, if Canada decides to take on a mediation role, they will need well trained staff and regional partners to support its effort.

Additionally, Canadian NGOs and individuals have been actively involved in track II mediations. In 2005, three Canadians led track II diplomacy talks in Turkey over Jerusalem. Participants came together to discuss points that could be used for further negotiations. The results of these negotiations were the creation of "New Directions for Deliberations and Dialogue." Due to disagreements over the Arab-Israeli conflict, freedom of movement, and living a cohesive environment, talks were halted. This trend indicates that in very contentious issues, senior officials may not be equipped to handle it because internal and external politics and personal agendas may impede a diplomatic resolution.

However, while track II mediation occurs, the Canadian government has not fully embraced this form of mediation because there is skepticism amongst senior officials over the effectiveness of track II diplomacy. For example, PM Harper's government considered track II diplomacy to be just a "talk shop." It was considered this because there were doubts that track II diplomacy would be useful. This lack of attention is also shown through funding received. From 1990-2005, the annual funding for all Asia-Pacific track II activities were approximately a million dollars per year. This indicates that the Government of Canada prioritizes track I diplomacy.

## POLICIES AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES

The Trudeau government has not taken a leading role in mediating nor offered to provide conflict support. For example, former FM Freeland did not commit to any mediation efforts in the Kashmir dispute and instead released a statement asking both sides to "maintain peace and stability." Also, Canada committed troops to Mali; however, the mission only lasted a year, and Canadian officials were unable to provide examples of positive impact. The Trudeau government is more likely to handle an international dispute with a public statement by the FM because it does not have the reputation or capacity to solve these disputes with alternatives. Canada is more comfortable to watch the Americans and Europeans make a decision in international affairs, first, and follow the same policy if Canada does not have a large presence in the region. To this note, under the Trudeau government, the current policy is to not act unilaterally; but rather, monitor what our strategic partners do first, then follow the pursuit to stand in solidarity.

One policy alternative to mediation and preventive diplomacy that Canada currently uses is sanctions. Canada employs sanctions when a country is in violation of Canada's principles and values, such as violating sovereignty or abusing human rights and fundamental freedoms because it will not engage with such countries, diplomatically, if it abuses its own people. Canada currently has imposed sanctions on 20 countries under the UNSC, SEMA, and JVCFOA, which target corruption, human rights violations or the use of force. For more information on current sanctions, please refer to [Annex E](#).

# POLICY ANALYSIS

## INTERESTS AND VALUES

Canada's contribution to international diplomacy is to voice its political, economic, and security policies alongside areas of geopolitical interests. Canada's end-goal is to advocate for gender equality, the international rules-based order, human rights, international law, accountable governance, defense of governance, and progressive trade through multilateral channels that represents openness and inclusivity. Canada also stands for the promotion and protection of NATO – a Euro-Atlantic security group designed to prevent global warfare, terrorism, and proliferation by everyone. However, Canada remains a middle power nonetheless, and at times punches above its weight in these areas noted above. Its interests in Latin America and Eastern Europe are reflected by quickly reacting to events as they unfold, including human rights violations in Venezuela and Russian aggression in Ukraine.

## GOAL AND OBJECTIVES

**Goal:** To increase Canada's mediation, conflict-prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

### **Objectives:**

- Advance Canada's standing as the honest broker between fragile and conflict affected states.
- Focuses on cross-culture sensitivity and interpersonal relations.
- Hone on listening, understanding, accepting and respecting the perspectives of the other side.
- Suggest areas of compromise that have not been discussed in pre-existing peace processes.

## PROGRAMMATIC NEEDS

- 1) Increase negotiating and mediation training to Foreign Service Officers in order to be well- prepared for Canada offering mediation clinics in conflict affected areas.
- 2) Greater collaboration with civil society who have knowledge of particular countries/regions and can work with GAC to share information and implement programs.
- 3) Increase resources for GAC to host annual stakeholder engagement meetings with foreign embassies in Ottawa. This would result in team-to-team meetings.

## STAKEHOLDERS

| Stakeholder                           | Ally/<br>Detractor | Interest/Role in Mediation  |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------|---|
| <b>GAC</b>                            | Ally               | GAC will be responsible for coordinating Canada's role in any international mediation effort.   |
| <b>Department of National Defence</b> | Ally               | DND will work with GAC and international organizations to help protect state sovereignty by implementing defence and security reforms for peace and stability.  |
| <b>EU</b>                             | Ally               | The EU is in unequivocal support of Canada. Its relations are underpinned by democracy, the rule of law, and the international rules-based order. The EU and Canada signed CETA in 2016 to expand its economic markets.   |
| <b>UK</b>                             | Ally               | The UK remains a close friend to Canada. In August 2019, the Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab visited Canada and underlined trade, security co-operation, and human rights need to be approached in multilateral channels. <sup>li</sup> The UK also welcomes Canada's efforts in NATO, the G7, the G20, the Commonwealth, and the Five Eyes intelligence alliance.   |
| <b>NATO</b>                           | Ally               | The NATO alliance and Canada are founding members since 1947. In July 2019, NATO's Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg praised Canada for its security support to Ukrainian security forces, as well as conflict prevention efforts. NATO also acknowledges Canada for its military and security presence in Latvia to prevent the risk of external aggression.      |
| <b>OSCE</b>                           | Ally               | The OSCE welcomes Canada's efforts to promote the international rules based order, free and fair election monitoring, and freedom of media. However, the OSCE's Secretary General Thomas Greminger and Chairperson-in-Office Miroslav Lajčák call on all 57 members, including Canada, for more diplomatic engagement and mediation efforts to security challenges. |
| <b>OAS</b>                            | Ally               | The OAS welcomes Canada's efforts towards democratization in the Americas. At present, Canada is working on the Canada Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC), to ensure democracy is practiced in good faith. Canada is also establishing a dialogue with members of the OAS to prevent crime and violence in Latin America.                       |
| <b>UN</b>                             | Ally               | Canada and the UN work together to bring global peace and stability. Canada held a non-permanent seat at the UNSC 6 times. At present, Canada is campaigning for a seat on the 2012-2022 UNSC by advocating for the international rules-based order, economic security, gender equality and climate resilience.   |
| <b>U.S.</b>                           | Mixed              | The U.S. stress the importance of Canada-US relations by tackling issues through multilateralism. They also share mutual commitments through NATO and the OSCE. However, the U.S. has distanced itself from Ukraine over the Trump-Biden scandal, which resulted in former U.S. representative to Ukraine, Kurt Volker, to resign.                                  |
| <b>RUSSIA</b>                         | Detractor          | Russia expresses its disappointment with Canada over unilateral sanctions on its diplomats, companies and state officials' However, on a positive note, Russia encourages Canada to work on like-minded areas, such as climate change and the Arctic.   |
| <b>VENEZUELA</b>                      | Detractor          | Venezuela calls on Canada to not follow U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. Venezuela is disappointed in Canada's interventionist policy by creating the Lima Group. Venezuela condemns Canada working with the U.S. on threatening its sovereignty.  |

# ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATION

## COSTED OPTIONS

The first option is for Canada to move away from conflict resolution and invest in its public diplomacy. Canada would focus on engaging with individuals and/or organizations that are not allies to Canada through public outreach. Public outreach will include stakeholder meetings, organizing public events, diaspora groups, and partnering with local organizations to deliver a program. The advantage to this option is that it will build strong people-to-people ties through engagement. This engagement can help Canada build its presence internationally. However, the disadvantage is that it is unlikely to help revitalize Canada as a mediator and protect the international rules-based order since it does not tackle macro issues; but rather, micro issues. In short, this program does not target other governments directly, and therefore, public diplomacy efforts are unlikely to address the problem noted above.

| Option 1: Reinvestment into Public Diplomacy Programs |  |  |  |
|---|--|--|--|
|   | Suitability  | Acceptability  | Feasibility  |
| Pros  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fosters strong people-to-people ties between Canada and other countries.</li> <li>• Increases tourism and economic growth.</li> <li>• Potential to have long-term positive effects on Canada's position in the world</li> <li>• Canada has a history of providing many public diplomacy programs</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote Canada's brand to visitors and others wanting to learn about Canada.</li> <li>• Demonstrate Canada's openness to pre-existing partners and new friends.</li> <li>• It gives external stakeholders the chance to learn about Canada as a whole, instead of a central Ontario perspective.</li> </ul>             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relatively inexpensive programs in comparison to a peacekeeping mission.</li> <li>• The government can partner with non-profit organizations to implement the programs which can ease some of the administrative burdens.</li> <li>• Programs can be scalable.</li> </ul> |
| Cons  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It will take years to find out the results/effectiveness of the programs.</li> <li>• No guarantees that there will be participants</li> <li>• If these public diplomacy programs focus on the Euro- Atlantic, Canada will not be creating new connections</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Budget constraints and the allocation of resources might be focused elsewhere.</li> <li>• Foreign visitors, who could be sponsored by their governments, could be a threat to Canada's security.</li> <li>• Non-NATO countries could gather intelligence on Canada's political and economic infrastructures.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• These programs will require parliamentary approval.</li> <li>• It will be a time-consuming process to implement.</li> <li>• Will require many partners outside of GAC to implement, which will take time to find.</li> </ul>  |

The second option would be for Canada to create a multilateral organization, particularly on the crisis in Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, and Venezuela. As political and economic turmoil continues to develop, efforts to provide preventive diplomacy is needed to prevent the risk of armed conflict in Latin America. Canada's is already a party to the OAS and Lima Group, and the current political landscape could be a window of opportunity for it to offer a peaceful political transition to the opposition governments in Latin America.

The advantage of this option is that Canada's promotion of human rights and democracy will be publicly visible. Canada is making an effort to find common ground between the current governments in Latin America and agreeing on a peaceful transition for the people of Latin America. This would bring Canada positive media coverage and a leadership role on the international stage by understanding the other side and working on a compromise. The disadvantage, however, to this solution is that there are other multilateral organizations such as the UN, OAS, and the Lima group that work on preventive diplomacy. Therefore, it may be hard to get support from like-minded allies to create a brand-new organization.

| <b>Option 2: Create a Multilateral Organization Dedicated to Preventive Diplomacy in Latin America (Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, and Venezuela)</b> |  |  |   |
|--|--|--|---|
|  | <b>Suitability</b>   | <b>Acceptability</b>   | <b>Feasibility</b>  |
| <b>Pros</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Canada's promotion of human rights and democracy will be publicly visible.</li> <li>• Public nature of a conference will give Canada positive publicity.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Canada has had international mediation and negotiations experience.</li> <li>• People of Bolivia and Chile would support Canada's effort to mediate tension.</li> <li>• The OAS would welcome Canada's knowledge of the issue.</li> </ul>                                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A multilateral organization encourages countries to solve problems through dialogue instead of violence.</li> <li>• Multilateral organizations encourage collaboration and dialogue.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Cons</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Multiple conferences may be required to discuss and find solutions.</li> <li>• There are many other multilateral organizations that discuss this issue and have an infrastructure in place. Thus, a brand-new organization may not be the best venue for discussion.</li> <li>• Will need a lot of countries to agree to be a part of this organization.</li> <li>• Will be hard to get violating countries to comply with what the organization wants as they will have no international legal authority.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Challenging to get domestic support for this initiative as it is not a top priority for many Canadians.</li> <li>• No guarantee that any like-minded ally will join Canada.</li> <li>• Venezuela Governments may view Canada as impeding on their sovereignty.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High costs to run/manage the organization.</li> <li>• Time-consuming process to set up organizations and find members.</li> <li>• Bureaucracy will make it hard for the organization to make a quick decision. When a country is violating rules, a quick ruling is necessary to resolve the conflict.</li> <li>• The Venezuelan government has constantly defied the international rules-based order despite numerous attempts to solve the crisis. Therefore, it will be challenging to get them to comply.</li> </ul> |

## RECOMMENDATION

**Strategy:** Canada should offer to mediate a peaceful resolution between Russia and Ukraine on the margins of the Minsk Agreements. Canada would include additional policies to the peace-talks in order to focus on a compromise: Russia offering citizenship to residents in the Donbas region; the economic embargo on Donbas; self-governance; and energy security; as well as minority rights and language rights. Canada would emphasize that listening to the other side and compromise is needed to strike a deal after six years of conflict. The advantage of this proposal is the incentives for Russia. If Russia agrees to a deal, Canada, by obligations, will lift all sanctions imposed on Russian officials and industries. To this note, as an honest broker, Canada could foster warmer relations with Moscow by making an effort to address all issues collectively, instead of through bilateral consultations. By acting as the lead mediator, Canada's reputation in the international stage would increase by engaging with Russia instead of making political statements to express its concerns.

**Rationale:** Canada has already hosted the URC in July 2019, which demonstrated to the international community that Canada managed to bring Ukraine's friends and allies together to support Ukraine's path to becoming a secure, fully sovereign, and democratic state. Canada's recent achievements in Canada-Ukraine relations, such as: signing a free trade agreement, extending operation UNIFIER, and hosting 1.4 million Ukrainian-Canadians, as well as its unequivocal support, would be welcomed by Ukrainian counterparts, amongst others, to host a new summit based on the positive feedback the international community gave. Canada and Ukraine have delivered on other political and economic policies in the past, but diplomatic talks remain open for discussion.

**Risk:** Canada hosting peace-talks between Russia and Ukraine might stir controversy. On the one hand, Canada might not get a response from Russia due to its bilateral irritants, such as 435 Russian individuals and entities that are not welcomed in Canada. On the other hand, Canada's diaspora groups from both Russian and Ukrainian origin may have mixed feelings with Canada's engagement due to its pre-existing stance on the situation. The diaspora groups may stress their disappointment in Canada trying to compromise. However, this gives an opportunity for Canada to normalize relations with Russia by understanding both Russia and Ukraine's behavior in eastern Ukraine.

| Recommendation: Peace Talks between Canada, Russia and Ukraine  |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| Initiative  | Impact   | Evaluation   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Host an ad-hoc peace summit in Canada.</li> <li>• Continue the momentum Canada- Ukraine shared after hosting the URC in July 2019.</li> <li>• Ukraine's DFM visited Ottawa in November 2019 to consult on peacekeeping.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Help negotiate cease-fire lines, reintegration of IDPs, release all prisoners of war, and create demilitarized zones between Russia, Ukraine.</li> <li>• Focus on minority rights, border control, Russian language rights.</li> <li>• Stronger relations with Russia.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Attendance of all relevant parties to the summit.</li> <li>• Ability to form dialogue and cooperation over sensitive issues with Russia and Ukraine.</li> <li>• The number of communiqués agreed to by Ukraine and Russia.</li> </ul> |

## COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

The internal communication strategy for the mediation will be to remain impartial and keep all stakeholders aware of the status of the mediation. All relevant departments within GAC will participate in weekly meetings and emails will be sent immediately regarding any significant updates. To remain impartial, GAC's internal communication strategy needs to emphasize that their goal is to find a peaceful solution. This will be achieved through training sessions on the mediation process that all staff will be required to attend. GAC team members will communicate with representatives from the embassies of Russia and Ukraine, and there will be one consistent message without political bias.

If the mediation is successful, Canada should promote the importance of mediation through public outreach. Within this public outreach, Canada should design a marketing campaign that emphasizes its success in having Ukraine and Russia reach an agreement and the importance of mediation in revitalizing the international rules-based order. This campaign should occur on the GAC website and GAC social media accounts. If the mediation is not successful, GAC should have a news release that highlight what concessions were made during the mediation, and emphasize that Canada looks forward to continuing to future talks. There should be no marketing campaign as it will appear insensitive and disingenuous.

## TIMELINE

Canada's ad-hoc peace summit will take place in Halifax, Nova Scotia, for July 2020. GAC team will create a task force called the Ukrainian Mediation Task Force (UMTF), which will be assembled by January 2020 and act as liaison with respected embassies and internal stakeholders at GAC to commence the planning process. The UMTF team will consist of the PM, FM, and Canada's ambassadors to Russia and Ukraine as part of the Canadian delegation, amongst others Canadian officials with regional expertise. After that, UTF will focus on coordinating the summit, drafting invitations and consulting with respected guests to address the peace summit. GAC will invite the U.S., UK, Germany, France, Russia, with liaison to Russia's special representative of the DNR and LNR, and Ukraine through formal consultation meeting between GAC and the embassies in Canada. Next, GAC will develop discussion points to be addressed during the peace summit by including sensitive talking points for Russia and Ukraine to compromise on. This will highlight the Minsk Agreements and energy security, as well as Russia's latest decision to grant Russian citizenship to residents in the Donbas.

| BEFORE THE CONFERENCE  | DURING THE CONFERENCE  | AFTER THE CONFERENCE   |
|--|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Have PM Trudeau personally invite President Zelenskyy and President Vladimir Putin, to the ad-hoc peace summit.</li> <li>2. Canada will create an agenda for the summit that all parties are made aware of.</li> <li>3. Have officials from each country work together prior to the summit to draft resolutions and negotiate in private.</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Invite media to event to document the progress.</li> <li>2. During the negotiation/ summit section, have a closed-door event where media is not allowed. This will give all attendees the ability to state their opinions without fear of it being shown on the news.</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. If significant process has been made, have a press conference with all three leaders detailing the agreement that was reached.</li> <li>2. If little progress was made, the three leaders can sign a joint statement pledging to work together .</li> <li>3. Depending on the communiqués signed, a follow-up meeting will take place 5 months after.</li> </ol> |

## ANNEX A: HISTORY OF MEDIATION

| Mediation Process  | Role Canada Played | Date | Goal   |
|--|--------------------|------|--|
| <b>UN Peace Process for Mozambique</b>                             | Contributed        | 1992 | Track-two diplomacy effort by the community of Sant'Egidio between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO guerillas.                |
| <b>Friends of Nicaragua</b>  | Contributed        | 1993 | Resolve the constitutional crisis in Nicaragua.  |
| <b>Burundi Peace Talks</b>   | Contributed        | 1995 | Produce a peace accord between fighting Burundian parties.   |
| <b>Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina</b> | Contributed        | 1995 | Bosnia and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. |
| <b>Rwanda-Zaire talks on return of refugees</b>                    | Leading            | 1996 | Assess Rwandan refugees in the region and to make recommendations to the UNSC.   |
| <b>Northern Ireland</b>  | Contributed        | 1998 | Bilateral discussions between Ireland and UK Government.   |
| <b>Colombian-FARC Peace Negotiations</b>                           | Contributed        | 1999 | Negotiations between FARC and the Colombian government.  |
| <b>OAS Mediation in Peru</b>                                       | Leading            | 2000 | Bring together the Fujimori government and the main opposition parties.  |

## ANNEX B: LOCATIONS OF CANADIAN EMBASSIES



## ANNEX C: COUNTRIES WITH NO CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE



## ANNEX D: CANADA'S PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS

| Multilateral Institutions                                |  |
|--|--|
| Arctic Council   | Order of Malta   |
| Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation                        | Organization of American States                                  |
| Association of Southeast Asian Nations                   | Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development           |
| La Francophonie  | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe              |
| G7   | Pacific Alliance   |
| G20  | United Nations   |
| International Civil Aviation Organization                | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network | World Trade Organization   |
| North Atlantic Treaty Organization                       |  |
| Open Government Partnership                              |  |

## ANNEX E: SANCTIONS CURRENTLY IMPOSED BY THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

| Countries Sanctioned by Canada               |                            |
|--|----------------------------|
| Central Africa Republic (2014-Present)       | Myanmar (2012-Present)     |
| Democratic Republic of Congo (2004- Present) | Nicaragua (2019-Present)   |
| Eritrea (2010-Present)                       | North Korea (2006-Present) |
| Iran (2013-Present)                          | Russia (2014-Present)      |
| Iraq (2004-Present)                          | Somalia (2009-Present)     |
| Lebanon (2007-Present)                       | South Sudan (2014-Present) |
| Libya (2013-Present)                         | Sudan (2004-Present)       |
| Mali (2018-Present)                          | Syria (2017-Present)       |

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