As U.S. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth made abundantly clear in his announcement of February 13th, America’s commitments to supporting Ukraine’s proxy war against Russia will soon come to an end. The U.S. is now engaging Russia directly and on a bilateral basis, by “shortening the chain.” This means excluding parties with veto power – namely Ukraine and the EU from preliminary negotiations.
Following initial meetings between Russia and the U.S., the negotiation process will need to be broadened to include other stakeholders in order to achieve carefully sequenced, objectives. Putin has already attained many of the outcomes expected under a Trump presidency short of lifting sanctions: a weakened Ukraine that will not join NATO, reduced Western aid, and a divided West. However, for a lasting peace, beyond ending the violence, political compromise from all sides is essential.
Initial steps must include an agreement to establish a ceasefire zone. A ceasefire would mean a withdrawal of forces, an increase in the number of crossing points across buffer zones and lines of contact, eliminating land mines and returning people to their homelands. A comprehensive recovery plan should therefore address war-induced population displacement, ensuring the reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees into Ukrainian and Russian society.
A second step on the agenda must be negotiating the status of territories currently under Russian control, including Donbas and Crimea. Disputed claims over these regions should include resolutions about shared commercial interests and the security of the Russian fleet at Sevastopol.
A third step is to maintain secure and free access throughout the Black Sea and Baltic Seas, unimpeded by mines, blockades and embargoes. Both sides must be prepared to agree on the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, where minority rights are respected and enforced.
The credibility and success of settlement depends on how strongly external guarantors commit to providing security for both sides. Without security guarantees for Russia, the war will not end. In that regard, any peacekeepers that are deployed will not be the guarantors of the agreement but symbolic representations of it.
For example, the UK’s idea of unilaterally deploying a well-armed interposition force, that cannot effectively prevent renewed violence, makes little sense. Credible third-party security guarantees must be jointly designed and institutionalized before deploying observers, responsible for monitoring compliance.
Over the long term, Ukraine’s path to European integration must be solidified with a clear timeline and structural commitments. By 2030, Ukraine is expected to join the European Union, marking a significant shift in the geopolitical balance of Europe. This accession could be accompanied by a robust EU commitment to post-war reconstruction, ensuring that Ukraine receives the necessary economic, institutional, and security support to stabilize and rebuild.
Additionally, Ukraine can maintain a capable military force, with ongoing support for modernization and training. While Ukraine can renounce military attempts to reclaim occupied territories through force, it is unlikely to recognize Russian sovereignty over them. This arrangement mirrors other unresolved territorial disputes globally, where political and economic frameworks take precedence over immediate territorial resolutions. Ukraine’s military posture can remain defensive, ensuring deterrence against future aggression while avoiding direct military escalation.
To achieve these objectives, a structured timeline for peace talks is essential to maintain momentum and prevent deadlock. Initial high-level meetings between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin—whether trilateral or separate bilateral meetings—are an important next step with the EU as an active participant.
Unfortunately, EU leaders like Ursula von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas show little interest in such an approach despite the fact that Europe, is struggling with energy shortages, demographic decline, and deindustrialization.
The continent needs a shift in focus—from military confrontation to addressing its internal economic and political challenges. This transformation is best achieved by recognizing that Russia is part of Europe, that coexistence is necessary, interdependence is desirable, and shared institutions are possible.
