



# CANADA'S DIPLOMACY POLICY REVIEW

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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This review of Canada's Diplomacy Policy is for the readership of the Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marta Morgan, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the department of Global Affairs Canada.

Following Canada's past and current diplomacy policy, this review identifies overarching issues that detriment Canada's diplomatic forces and strategies. First, Canada's lack of meaningful engagement with multilateral institutions results in its declining international influence. Despite the claim that "Canada's Back" after the 2015 federal election, the Trudeau government failed to demonstrate a true commitment to re-engage the world as a whole, opting rather to focus exclusively on bilateral issues.<sup>i</sup> Second, Canada's neglect of bilateral relations with non-like-minded states and regions contribute to its inability to position itself as a global leader. Third, Canada's failure to secure its national interests in the past when navigating its relationship with the US.<sup>ii</sup>

Trudeau's declaration to strengthen Canada's multilateral agenda has not been fulfilled to the degree intended at the start of his mandate in 2015. While some diplomatic missions have been established in recent years, other aspects of Canadian diplomacy policy have decreased, such as ODA contributions. Moreover, the foreign service has been politicized, while multilateral institutions have been deprioritized in favour of bilateral relations with specific entities like the US and the EU.

This policy review recommends that Canada strengthen relationships with key bilateral and multilateral partners, re-prioritizing its diplomatic engagement by expanding diplomatic commitments abroad to enhance relationships with key bilateral and regional partners. Opening missions in countries where Canada may have weaker relations will be conducive to creating new connections with different governments. Additionally, sending more resources or personnel to existing missions will strengthen Canada's presence and provide more opportunities to deepen existing bilateral relationships.



# ABBREVIATIONS

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**AUKUS** - Australia-United Kingdom-United States Agreement

**CBS** - Canada Based Staff

**DDI** - Digital Diplomacy Index

**DND** - Department of National Defence

**EU** - European Union

**FS** - Foreign Service

**FSO** - Foreign Service Officer(s)

**G7** - Group of Seven

**GAC** - Global Affairs Canada

**ICC** - International Criminal Court

**IRCC** - Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada

**LES** - Locally Engaged Staff

**NATO** - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**NDP** - New Democratic Party

**NGO** - Non-Governmental Organization

**ODA** - Official Development Assistance

**OECD** - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

**PS** - Public Safety Canada

**UN SDG** - United Nations Sustainable Development Goals

**UN** - United Nations

**UNGA** - United Nation General  
Assembly

**UNSC** - United Nations Security  
Council

**US** - United States


**WTO** - World Trade Organization

# BACKGROUND, HISTORY and POLICY PROCESS

## Problems Facing the Nation

### 1) Canada's lack of meaningful engagement with multilateral institutions contributes to its declining international influence.

Canada is failing to prioritize its diplomatic file in the realm of multilateral institutions, which contributes to Canada's global reputational downfall. This is evident through the failed bid for the non-permanent UNSC seat in 2020, and not being considered to participate in the AUKUS trade deal.<sup>iii</sup> Aside from the UN, Canada's engagement and maintenance of standards from other multilateral organizations also has room for improvement. For example, Canada's contribution level to NATO is far lower than both the organization guideline and median level from other NATO member states (see Figure 1).



**Figure 1:** 2020 estimates for defence expenditure as a share of GDP and equipment expenditure as a share of defence expenditure among NATO countries.<sup>iv</sup>

Additionally, as seen in Figure 2, Canada's performance regarding goals in building and maintaining constructive relationships decreased between 2018-19 and 2019-20. While part of this effect may be attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic, this re-emphasizes the need for a renewed focus on this area in order to bolster Canada's international reputation.

**Figure 2:** GAC planned results for international advocacy and diplomacy.

Departmental Result	Departmental results indicators	Target	Date to achieve target	2017-18 Actual Results	2018-19 Actual results	2019-20 Actual results
Canada builds and maintains constructive relationships that advance Canada's interests	Percentage of advocacy campaigns which met their stated objectives	75%	March 31, 2022	Not available New indicator	100%	80%
	Percentage of diplomatic activities which met their stated objectives	75%	March 31, 2022	Not available New indicator	87%	70%
	Number of international commitments through which Canada works with partners to address strategic peace and security challenges	Not applicable <sup>1</sup>		Not available New indicator	17	14

## 2) Canada's historic disregard of bilateral relations with "non-like minded" states and regions contribute to its inability to position itself as a global leader.

Canada's international engagement is biased, given its presence in specific regions while lacking in others (i.e., Africa and Central Asia).<sup>vi</sup> The decision to exclusively form and maintain diplomatic relations with 'like-minded' nations is ineffective and severely limits the extent to which Canada can influence world politics as a middle power. Canada's selection bias partly explains why the number of Canadian missions abroad is lower than similar OECD states.<sup>vii</sup>

**Figure 3:** Geographical locations of offices offering consular services to Canadians abroad, including Australian and Swedish offices around the world that provide consular services to Canadians.<sup>viii</sup>



## 3) The need to manage and strengthen relations with a "changed" US to secure Canadian interests.<sup>ix</sup>


The transition from the Trump to Biden administration holds potential for a Canada-US relationship that advances Canada's existing and future interests. Canada shares a unique relationship with the US that is characterized by common interests, similar values, shared geography, and integrated economic systems. Canada must prioritize its national interests in the short and long term above appealing to its southern neighbor. For example, the handing over of Omar Khar and Meng Wan Zhou to the US upon request without hesitancy.<sup>x</sup> Canada can also leverage its relationship with the US

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to mitigate rising tensions with China as China remains Canada's second largest trading partner and an emerging power.<sup>xi</sup>

## Past Policies and Trends

Past Canadian governments have succeeded in building and maintaining a positive international reputation for Canada. For instance, Canada has been successful in acquiring the UNSC non-permanent seat on six separate occasions, the last of which was from 1999-2000.<sup>xii</sup> When Stephen Harper won the federal election and became Canada's 22<sup>nd</sup> Prime Minister, a different, more prudent, approach to foreign policy was taken. During this time, cuts were made to the foreign policy portfolio in favour of certain bilateral relationships, mainly with the US and Israel.<sup>xiii</sup> These cuts include but are not limited to contributions to UN Peacekeeping (see Figure 4), ODA, and participation in multilateral conferences.



**Figure 4:** Canadian contributions to UN peacekeeping missions from 2005 to 2020.<sup>xiv</sup>

Since the 2015 federal election, the Trudeau government has been working to rehabilitate Canada's image, domestically and internationally. Despite a slight increase in the number of diplomatic missions opened in previous years (as seen in Figure 5), this number has remained stagnant, while other aspects of Canadian foreign policy have decreased, such as ODA contributions.<sup>xv</sup> Additionally, the foreign service has been minimized and multilateral institutions have been deprioritized in favour of bilateral relations with specific entities (i.e., the US and EU).<sup>xvi</sup>

**Figure 5:** Number of Canadian diplomatic missions abroad in recent years.<sup>xvii</sup>


	2016	2017	2017
Embassies/ High Commissions	96	97	96
Consulates/ Consulates General	34	36	36



Permanent Missions	9	10	10
Other Representation	2	2	2
<b>Total Posts</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>144</b>

As indicated in Figures 3 and 6, there are specific areas in which Canada is underrepresented. Most notable are Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Canada has bypassed the need for certain formal representation in these regions by electing to be represented by Australia and Sweden through special agreements.<sup>xvii</sup>

**Figure 6:** Map of GAC's global network as of January 1, 2019.<sup>xix</sup>



Another indicator of Canada's diplomatic growth is Digital Diplomacy. This budding form of diplomacy encompasses the online presence of Canada's main diplomatic actors, such as its leader, its foreign ministry, and its embassies.<sup>xx</sup> Within the past 10 years, Canadian mission mandates have emphasized the importance of maintaining high levels of engagement on Twitter, starting near the end of the Harper government, and continuing to the Trudeau government.<sup>xxi</sup> The COVID-19 pandemic has only further emphasized the need for enhanced engagement online, as many traditional pathways to diplomacy were disrupted by global lockdowns.

# Constraints

## 1) Economic Capacity

Funding an expansion of the Canadian diplomatic file, which includes the creation of more missions abroad and hiring of more personnel to operate said missions, is quite expensive. Allocation of said funding will be a barrier to this expansion.

## 2) Human Capacity

Expanding 'boots on the ground' operations require hiring more personnel and administration of training for those employees. This includes the hiring and training of Canada-based staff (CBS) as well as locally engaged staff (LES), some of which are foreign nationals hired by GAC.

## 3) Political Capacity

The expense of expanding the diplomatic file will be subject to scrutiny from major federal opposition parties. Given the context of a minority government, decisions made in the house of commons require support from more than just the government party.

**Figure 7:** GAC budgetary planning summary in dollars.<sup>xxii</sup>

Core responsibilities and Internal Services	2018–19 expenditures	2019–20 expenditures	2020–21 forecast spending	2021–22 budgetary spending (as indicated in Main Estimates)	2021–22 planned spending	2022–23 planned spending	2023–24 planned spending
1. International Advocacy and Diplomacy	965,987,674	942,662,171	1,009,440,617	929,029,444	929,029,444	927,622,270	922,729,114
2. Trade and Investment	320,245,224	350,954,383	372,936,370	376,719,582	376,719,582	372,759,661	349,153,321
3. Development, Peace and Security Programming	4,428,638,296	4,488,445,128	6,393,308,013	4,015,547,604	4,015,547,604	4,237,525,573	4,286,264,626
4. Help for Canadians Abroad	57,301,641	76,510,527	117,121,531	53,869,518	53,869,518	53,912,969	53,316,884
5. Support for Canada's Presence Abroad	1,037,339,902	1,049,692,086	1,100,474,101	1,071,320,167	1,071,320,167	1,092,279,669	1,067,031,984
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>6,809,512,737</b>	<b>6,908,264,295</b>	<b>8,993,280,632</b>	<b>6,446,486,315</b>	<b>6,446,486,315</b>	<b>6,684,100,142</b>	<b>6,678,495,929</b>
Internal Services	247,362,565	268,638,903	323,004,685	276,751,749	276,751,749	276,886,244	272,509,008
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,056,875,302</b>	<b>7,176,903,198</b>	<b>9,316,285,317</b>	<b>6,723,238,064</b>	<b>6,723,238,064</b>	<b>6,960,986,386</b>	<b>6,951,004,937</b>

## Critical and Decisive Moments

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- 2000:** Canada's last successful bid for a seat on the UNSC.
- 2001:** Canada forgoes attending the UN-sponsored Conference on Disarmament while North Korea holds the rotating presidency.
- 2010:** Canada loses its bid for a seat on the UNSC to Germany and Portugal.
- 2012:** Closure of the Canadian Embassy in Syria, after the deterioration of the situation in the country. The statement from the Foreign Affairs Minister announcing the closure wrote that "Assad must go".
- 2012:** Closure of the Canadian Embassy in Iran and expulsion of Iranian diplomats from Ottawa. This followed "Iran's non-compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding its nuclear program and Iran's regional policies".
- 2013:** Canada forgoes attending the UN-sponsored Conference on Disarmament while Iran holds the rotating presidency.
- 2015:** Justin Trudeau is elected Prime Minister of Canada, declaring that "Canada's Back".
- 2016:** Trudeau declares Canada's bid for a 2020 UNSC seat as part of his commitment to revitalizing Canadian multilateralism.
- 2018:** 73rd Session of the UNGA. Canada forgoes delivering its address to the UNGA after Trudeau and Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs, passed over the engagement.
- 2018:** Canada hosted the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in April, where ministers agreed to coordinate actions to build a more peaceful and secure world.
- 2018:** The 3rd Canada-China Annual Leaders Dialogue was held whereby Trudeau announced a strengthened partnership with China.
- 2018:** In December, Canada arrested Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou upon the US' request, resulting in rising tensions between Canada and China with China detaining Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig.
- 2019:** Temporary closure of the Canadian Embassy in Venezuela after the Maduro regime made it increasingly difficult to maintain diplomatic missions in the country.
- 2020:** Canada loses its bid for a seat on the UNSC to Ireland and Norway.

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**2020:** Joe Biden is elected as the 46th US President. Trudeau announces the Roadmap for a Renewed US-Canada Partnership which establishes a framework for a whole-of-government effort against the COVID-19 pandemic and support for mutual prosperity.

**2021:** Canada's closure of the Canadian Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.

**2021:** Release of the "two Michaels" promptly following the release of Meng Wanzhou on the same day in September.



# POLICY ANALYSIS

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## Goals and Objectives

*Contributing to a rules-based international system that advances Canadian interests*

- The 2021-22 GAC Departmental Plan pinpoints the continued advocacy for human rights, democracy, and international law as a focus in its goals for the coming year. GAC needs to work with relevant federal departments and Ministers to champion these values.
- Champion respect for international law and established norms of international behavior, foster cooperative multilateral action as a central component of finding solutions
- Avoid or mitigate the risks of situations of hostage diplomacy (i.e. Meng Wanzhou's arrest and the arbitrary detainment of Canada's two Michaels)

*Deepening Canada's global engagement by forming and strengthening bilateral/multilateral relations*

- Promote Canada to foreign states and actors through diplomacy and multilateralism (i.e. increased participating in international institutions).
- Further strengthen key bilateral relationships and engaging new (and historically less prioritized) partners to address emerging challenges (i.e., climate change, vaccine inequity, trade).
- Establish a robust global consular presence to support Canadians abroad while bolstering Canada's international presence through its network of missions

*Strengthening Canada's position in North America, particularly in its relationship with the US*

- The US is of particular significance following Biden's presidential win as it provides possibility for a renewed relationship between Canada and the US
- Trudeau and Biden have conferred methods to better closely align approaches to China including addressing any associated challenges presented to "our collective interest and to the international rules-based order" while also cooperating with China on areas that align with Canadian interests.
- GAC should collaborate with other government departments and other levels of government, in a whole-of-government approach to the two bilateral relationships (i.e., US and Mexico) and the trilateral relationship.

## Allies

### **Relevant Federal Departments (Ally)**

Certain federal departments (IRCC, PS, DND) will be affected by GAC policy shifts as these departments partner with GAC on several files. They should support these shifts as the deteriorating influence that Canada has on the international order also affects the effectiveness of their own international and domestic policies.

### **Canadian Public**

The expansion of diplomatic ties abroad would benefit citizens since an increase in Canadian influence abroad would offer more opportunities for Canadians abroad.

### **United States**

Depending on the administration in power, the US may either support an expansion of the Canadian diplomatic file, or they may opt for more isolationist, 'America-First' policies. Biden's administration specifically should be more supportive of Canada's internationalist policies.

### **Host of countries of current and future Canadian Diplomatic missions**

Generally speaking, the expansion of diplomatic relations between countries is to benefit both parties through several pathways, such as trade and treaties.

## Detractors

### **The New Democratic Party (Detractor)**

The NDP 2021 Electoral Platform mentions multilateralism as a key driver of Canadian interests. That being said, in the context of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, their foreign policy platform mainly concerns itself with China and its human rights abuses.

### **China (Detractor)**

Given the situation with the Two Michaels and Huawei, relations with China are tense. Until Canada can form an international presence separate from the US, the feud between China and the US will continue to impede on Canadian diplomatic relations with China and its sphere of influence.

## Mixed

### **The Canadian Conservative Party (Detractor)**

The 2021 Electoral Platform from Canada's Conservatives pinpoints re-engaging in multilateral relations as a goal, but severely emphasizes Canada's relationship with the US which may indicate where its main priorities reside.

### **Provinces and Territories (Mixed)**

Support or detraction from the P/Ts will depend on the internal politics and priorities of each entity. Those who seek to further implicate themselves in foreign affairs, such as Quebec, will be more willing to support the expansion of the diplomatic file, while others with fewer interests beyond our borders will prefer allocation of resources to remain focused on domestic issues.

## Programmatic Needs

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In order to establish itself as a global leader and maintain strong bilateral and multilateral relations, Canada must re-evaluate its internal functions. Past foreign policy reviews and diplomatic policy commentators identified a growing need for a meaningful recruitment process, including the selection of its senior management officials. Although the regular intake of new FSOs (in the form of meticulous testing and interviews) is in place again, new employees often secure roles in GAC through temporary positions first or department transfers. In the last decade, the top bureaucratic roles at GAC have not been held by those with diplomatic experience. The majority of the important heads of (larger) missions are political appointees. Canada needs to recall its priorities and align them with those who have the experience to bring about those objectives.

Secondary to GAC's recruitment process is a growing call for effective training for the department's specialists and employees. The department will need to train and cultivate internal experts on certain regions, especially those who are or will be posted. Geographic desks within GAC that provide research and policy for their respective regions may not be sufficient. It cannot rely solely on external experts from academia or think tanks to meet this need. In addition, general engagement skills, such as international negotiation and bargaining, digital literacy, networking, and cultural awareness skills will benefit all levels of GAC employees.

## COSTED OPTIONS

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### **Option 1: Expand Canadian diplomacy and leadership on global issues and in international organizations by seeking leadership opportunities for Canada and Canadians in multilateral institutions.**

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Canada has decreased involvement in the UN in recent years. A prime example of this is the 73rd session of the United Nations General Assembly, during which time, both Justin Trudeau and Chrystia Freeland were unable to address the UN General Assembly and the responsibility fell to the Canadian ambassador to the UN, Marc-André Blanchard after much confusion and uncertainty. The loss of the Security Council seat is just one sign that Canada needs to reprioritize its multilateral relationships through international organizations such as the UN. The way this goal can be achieved is by hosting more events and conferences in Canada and better managing representation sent to events abroad. Additionally, Canada should work towards meeting contribution guidelines for each multilateral institution in which Canada is a member, such as increasing NATO contributions as outlined in the 2021 Federal Government Budget.<sup>xxv</sup>

Pros	Cons
A public recommitment to multilateralism is in line with values regarding a rules-based international order.	Prioritization of certain institutions may weaken relationships elsewhere in the diplomatic file.
Demonstrates commitment to deepening our multilateral engagements which will work to restore Canada's international reputation.	Navigating the long bureaucratic processes of reinvesting engagement in multilateral institutions will take time and money and is not guaranteed to succeed.
Creates and strengthens relationships with other states and international institutions, which will facilitate future international cooperation.	The cost of hosting events will be subject to scrutiny from critics of this policy.

### **Option 2: Re-prioritize diplomatic engagement through expansion of diplomatic commitments abroad to strengthen relationships with key bilateral and regional partners.**

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Given that Canada's diplomatic engagement was ranked as eighteenth in the world in 2019 by the Lowy Institute, there is clear room for improvement in terms of "boots on the ground"



diplomacy.<sup>xxvi</sup> This can be accomplished through a mix of opening more missions abroad, sending more FSO overseas (which includes both CBS and LES), and allocating more authority<sup>xxvii</sup> and resources to existing missions will be a good start to re-emphasizing the importance of diplomatic relations and the Diplomacy and Foreign Policy portfolio as a whole in GAC.

Pros	Cons
Canadian recommitment to their diplomatic engagement abroad will strengthen bilateral relations and will facilitate the promotion of Canadian interests in those countries. Opening missions in countries where we may have weaker relations will be conducive to creating new connections with different governments.	Opening new missions and sending more FSO abroad is expensive, as they include acquisition and overhead costs (see Figure 8). Increasing said expenses may spark critique from opposition parties.
Sending more resources or personnel to existing missions will strengthen Canada's presence and provide more opportunity to deepen existing bilateral relationships.	Hiring staff (CBS and LES) for these missions will also take time as the process to join the FS is very long, and training FSO to engage with people on the ground will also take a substantial amount of time. Language needs will also need to be considered.
An increase in the number of missions will also benefit Canadians as they will have access to more resources and aid while abroad.	Certain areas where Canada should open new missions are currently flagged by GAC as places to avoid non-essential or all travel. <sup>xxviii</sup> Funding will need to be allocated to meet security risks where Canadian political, developmental, and economic interests lie.

### Option 3: Develop and implement a “Canada-first” relationship with the US to secure Canadian interests.

The history, geography, and some shared values between Canada and the US make it difficult for Canada to stray too far away from the US. However, Canada must not sacrifice its own diplomatic priorities to maintain relations with the US. Canada has repeatedly demonstrated through its actions and decision-making that its blind loyalty to the US has taken priority (at times) over its national interests. For example, the handing over of Omar Khar and Meng Wan Zhou to the US upon request without hesitancy.<sup>xxix</sup> Biden's presidential win granted and continues to provide Canada the opportunity to establish a “renewed”

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relationship with the US, based on common interests where Canada interests are placed at the forefront.

Pros	Cons
Can explore novel ways to reset Canada-US relations, identify opportunities for new leverage for Canada to advance its interests. This includes opportunities to leverage its relations with the US to address potential challenges with regards to China in the future.	Does not necessarily reduce Canadian dependence on the US – this has been a common narrative among Canadians as exemplified in the push to diversify trade and other areas.
Canada and the US are historically “strong” allies and have many common values/interests.	May inadvertently cause Canada to “drop the ball” on its multilateral agenda by focusing its efforts on a renewed relationship with the US (especially in light of Biden’s government now in power).
Resources can be targeted to pursuing this option. Canada is trying to do too many uncoordinated things with the US which takes up more resources so a more focused approach would reduce the administrative burden. This also provides greater clarity in what the priority is versus managing several missions/bilateral engagements at the same time.	US may react negatively to a “Canada-first” approach which can jeopardize Canada’s relationship with the US as a whole. Canada is more dependent on the US than the US is on Canada. In this case, Canada is likely to encounter such risks that may be difficult to mitigate.

## Recommendation

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It is recommended that Canada implement **Option 2**, as it will lay the foundations to effectively address the “Problems Facing the Nation” outlined above.

Strengthening existing bilateral relations and developing new relationships with other countries with whom Canada may not currently have ties will usher greater opportunities to effectively engage multilateral institutions and diversify the diplomatic portfolio. Currently, there are many countries in which Canada does not have diplomatic presence, but instead has accredited missions in neighbouring areas or regions. Opening missions in countries that Canada currently has no diplomatic presence, as well as interacting with countries in the context of both its feminist approach to foreign policy and Feminist International Assistance Policy, will enable Canada to invest in relationships that it may not have considered a priority in the past, such as within Sub Saharan Africa and Central Asia. This could also include a reconsideration of its severed diplomatic ties with Syria, Iran, and Venezuela, among others.

Aside from prioritizing new bilateral relations and diversifying the diplomatic file, Canada must continue to maintain its relations with existing world powers. As a middle power, it is in Canada's interest to have amicable relations with the world's most powerful states, particularly when interests align. For this reason, it is of the utmost importance within this option to mitigate existing tensions with China and aim to establish cordial diplomatic ties with China. As an emerging global power, China has an increasingly important role to play in the international system. Canada should take advantage of this opportunity to decouple from a primarily North American outlook and slowly deepen its engagement in the world.

While this recommendation is intended to help diversify Canada's diplomatic file regarding bilateral relationships, the Canada-US relationship remains important nonetheless (though it is certainly not the only important relationship). Canada's geopolitical ties with the US' position in world affairs incentivizes the maintenance and strengthening of relations between the two countries. Canada should remain conscious of a “Canada-first” approach in renewing its relations with the US.

Having a stronger foundation of bilateral relations will lead Canada to be in an advantaged position to be able to more effectively navigate multilateral institutions and be more successful when seeking leadership positions in said institutions.



## Timeline, Implementation and Expected Impact

Activity	Description	Expected Impact
<b>Phase I: Preparation and Development (1-2 years)</b>	<p>Set out priorities, action items, and strategies most effective to achieving these goals (e.g., digital diplomacy, cultural diplomacy). Identify regions with which Canada needs to engage more. A standardized method should be developed as part of the identification process.</p> <p>Canadian national interests are identified at the forefront in how to craft a renewed relationship that does not promote a blind Canadian loyalty to the US. This will likely require consultations across several federal partners regarding their international priorities (e.g., trade, climate change).</p>	<p>Countries or regions are clearly identified and if appropriate, ranked in order of priority in the establishment or renewal of bilateral relations.</p> <p>The necessary federal partners (i.e., departments that GAC need to collaborate with in specific areas) and agencies provide input on the countries/regions and policy objective.</p> <p>Aim to expand number of missions by 15-20%.</p>
<b>Phase II: Review and Approval (8-12 months)</b>	<p>Conduct a risk assessment of suggestions for establishing or re-establishing bilateral relations with particular countries and regions. This includes security risk assessments such as physical threats. Mechanisms for risk mitigation should be determined at this stage.</p> <p>Incorporate feedback from partners and make any necessary changes to the list of opportunities for engagement or the means to achieve the objective.</p>	<p>This may take in the form of country risk assessments as well as cost-benefit analysis - which will either reinforce or redirect the identified areas.</p> <p>Strategic Level Forums may be held with all relevant partners to align agendas and department mandates to brainstorm appropriate steps for the next phase.</p>

<b>Phase III: Application and Execution (1-2 years)</b>	<p>Heads of government (i.e., cabinet ministers) and appropriate senior decision-makers attend high-level events to serve as a steppingstone to form stronger diplomatic relations with other states.</p> <p>Accept speaking opportunities to address a global audience (illustrating Canadian interests and values) to exhibit Canada's international agenda.</p>	<p>The expansion and diversification of Canada's foreign policy will both strengthen its bilateral and multilateral relationships with other states and international organizations like the UN.</p>
<b>Phase IV : Establishment(1+ years)</b>	<p>Continue public education on Canadian work abroad, garnering greater domestic support.</p> <p>Invest in network building in other regions (particularly host countries of those with whom Canada has developed a strong bond with following multilateral events/activities).</p> <p>Host summits/ international events in Canada (annually or biannually), to demonstrate that Canada is a leader in such issues.</p>	<p>The expansion of diplomatic missions abroad will better be able to support Canadian foreign nationals by offering resources and aid while away from home.</p> <p>This overhaul of foreign policy objectives will signal a reprioritization of diplomatic relations to other nations, as this will help to bolster Canada's reputation in the international arena. Canada successfully secures an UNSC seat in the next election in June 2022.</p>

# Communication Strategy

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## **External Communications:**

This reprioritization of bilateral and multilateral relationships and the promotion of Canadian values will be reflected in a few different ways. First, states that we may want to target for new missions or other diplomatic commitments will be contacted regarding strengthening bilateral relationships, namely in the form of opening new missions, but also in regard to other foreign policy portfolios such as trade.

Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed some flaws in traditional diplomatic mechanisms and forced the adaptation to more virtual and distanced forms of communication. While Canada is slowly making the transition back to said traditional forms of engagement, certain aspects of COVID-19 response have actually led particular methods of diplomacy to be much more accessible. Thus, the external communication strategy must also include a new form of diplomacy: Digital Diplomacy. This includes some online events, as well as harnessing governmental social media platforms to send communications out to civil society as well as other entities of interest in our foreign policy.

## **Internal Communications:**

Internally, this shift in the approach to diplomacy will be reflected in the internal communications within GAC, to FSO and other staff. Aside from internal memos and updates in the mandates of FSO abroad, digital diplomacy will also play a role in informing the work done by GAC staff. FSO and missions abroad (new and existing) will also be informed as to what interests are of high priority to be promoted through their own external communications and through their interactions with their respective host countries. This expansion also will necessitate conducting more frequent FS competitions, in order to communicate the desire for more FSO and facilitate an increase in the diplomatic corps.

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