



CANADA'S SECURITY POLICY REVIEW

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Given that counterterrorism and counter-radicalization are shared responsibilities, our end users are Rob Stewart (Deputy Minister, Public Safety), David Vigneault (Director, CSIS), and Brenda Lucki (Commissioner, RCMP).

Counterterrorism has been a linchpin of the Canadian security establishment's mandate for decades; however, the current socio-political and technological landscapes have fundamentally altered both the nature of terrorist threats as well as the global reach of threat actors. The advent of the internet, social media, and web encryption has allowed threat actors to disseminate propaganda and radicalize, inspire, enable, and direct like-minded actors worldwide.¹ Furthermore, COVID-19 has created a political landscape ripe for radicalization: in the face of heightened anxiety, Canadians, who were already disproportionately active, have increased their online participation in extremist forums.² These forums disseminate disinformation and sow distrust in existing institutions. Canada has witnessed real life ramifications of this online rhetoric: a significant increase in hate crimes, the addition of far-right extremist groups (i.e., The Proud Boys, Atomwaffen Division, The Base, and Russian Imperial Movement) to the *Criminal Code* list of terrorist entities, and lone wolf attacks³ aimed at soft targets⁴.

From a security establishment perspective, one practical problem predominates: online radicalization and lone wolf attacks have created a "borderless" problem which implicitly undercuts the effective allocation of limited resources to counter a non-geographically specific threat. Thinking more conceptually, a second problem looms large: understanding why certain individuals and groups are susceptible to radicalization and implementing an effective counter-radicalization strategy.

This review conceptualizes terrorism, or violent extremism, as a symptom of a deeper and more pervasive problem: radicalization. As such, an effective counterterrorism strategy must seek to counter both violent extremism (the symptom) and radicalization (the disease). The proposed solution is a combination of three reinforcing costed options. The first, a novel cross-agency intelligence body will target those individuals who are actively disseminating violent extremist ideologies and poised to take violent action. More specifically, it will facilitate the creation of a threat assessment map based on online activity, criminal history, and group affiliation. This spatial threat assessment will ground our "borderless" problem. It will also allow security officials to pre-empt violent extremist attacks and efficiently allocate resources.

The resultant threat assessment map from Option 1 will then be leveraged to facilitate the expansion of the Canada Centre's purview and to direct GBA+ research into the underlying causes of radicalization. The newly reinforced Canada Centre will now act as

the central coordinator for a Canada-wide counter-radicalization program, which will be standardized by federal government oversight, but administered by local civil society actors. Finally, the Canada Centre will also specifically fund research into female participation in extremist organizations, online forums, and radicalization efforts. Research is relatively nascent, however, understanding female involvement would situate radicalization into a broader social context; instead of framing lone wolf attacks as statistical anomalies the security establishment could preeminent violent action by countering radicalization.

ABBREVIATIONS

Canada Centre – Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence

CISC – Criminal Intelligence Service Canada

CRF – Community Resilience Fund

CSC – Correctional Service Canada

CSE – Canadian Security Establishment

CSIS – Canadian Security Intelligence Service

FARC – The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

FLQ – *Front de Libération du Québec*

GBA+ - Gender-Based Analysis Plus

G8 – Group of Eight

IMVE - Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism

ISIS - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

KPI - Key Performance Indicator

LA CLEAR - Los Angeles Regional Criminal Information Clearinghouse

LAPD – Los Angeles Police Department

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDP – New Democratic Party

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

PMVE – Politically Motivated Violent Extremism

PSCF – Public Safety Canada

RCMP – Royal Canadian Mounted Police

RMVE – Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism

BACKGROUND, HISTORY & POLICY PROCESS

Problems Facing the Nation

The current socio-political and technological landscapes have fundamentally altered both the nature of terrorist threats as well as the global reach of threat actors. The advent of the internet, social media, and web encryption has allowed threat actors to disseminate propaganda and radicalize, inspire, enable, and direct like-minded actors worldwide.⁵ Furthermore, COVID-19 has created a political landscape ripe for radicalization: Canadians have increased their online participation in extremist forums which disseminate disinformation and sow distrust in existing institutions.⁶ Canadians are particularly active on online far-right extremist channels⁷, and the heightened anxiety stemming from COVID-19 has triggered the propagation of conspiracy theories and a significant increase in hate crimes, particularly against Asians (Please see Appendix A for hate crime statistics).

This review asserts that terrorism should be conceptualized as a staircase of escalating radical belief systems and justification of violence (please see Appendix B, Fathali M. Moghaddam's *Staircase to Terrorism* model).⁸ At the apex of this metaphorical staircase is violent extremism, characterized by the deployment of violent force to achieve ideological, religious, or political goals; at the base of this staircase is radicalization, characterized by the adoption of extreme ideologies.⁹ The intervening steps and landings are a complex ascent into radicalization to violence during which individuals and groups foster feelings of injustice, scapegoating, and rationalizing violence as "necessary."¹⁰

In relation to violent extremism, two problems dominate: 1) the internet and social media have created a "borderless" problem characterized by trans-national extremist communities, often only loosely connected via the internet rather than organized into a concrete hierarchical structure; 2) recent terrorist attacks (across the spectrum of motivation, please see Appendix C¹¹) have been characterized by lone wolf, low-resource, (potentially) high-impact events against soft targets (please see Appendix D for list of terrorist attacks). These problems present a predominant challenge for the security establishment: the efficient allocation of limited resources to counter a threat that is not geographically specific. That said, this review asserts that violent extremism must be framed as a symptom of a deeper and more pervasive disease: radicalization. In relation to radicalization, three problems dominate:

- 1) there are deep-rooted, cultural and socio-economic disparities, both domestically and globally, which have fostered susceptibility to radicalization; that said,
- 2) there remains significant uncertainty about which personal or societal factors make certain Canadians susceptible to radicalization;

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- 3) the security establishment has overfocused on violent extremism (which is largely perpetrated by male actors), leading to institutional blindness vis-à-vis potential female participation in extremist ideologies and radicalization.¹²

Past Policies and Decisive Moments

Counterterrorism has been a linchpin of the Canadian security establishment's mandate for decades. Broadly speaking, prior to 9/11, politically motivated violent extremism (PMVE) (ex: the FLQ, Babbar Khalsa, etc.) dominated headlines and motivated policy; this fundamentally changed post-9/11 when focus decisively shifted to countering religiously motivated extremism (RMVE) (Al Qaeda, ISIS, etc.).¹³ Recent trends in both Canada and the broader western world, however, have demonstrated that ideologically motivated extremism (IMVE)¹⁴ is a growing threat to national security.¹⁵

In response to perceived security lapses stemming from 9/11, Public Safety Canada was created in 2003 via the *Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act*, and published Canada's first Counter-terrorism Strategy called *Building Resilience Against Terrorism* in 2012. This document laid the foundation for subsequent counterterrorism strategy. Notably, the report outlines the six principles (please see Appendix E) underpinning Canada's counterterrorism response into the present day. Significantly, the report highlights a series of "strategic drivers" which it categorizes as factors that terrorists may seek to exploit in the future. These include globalization, an evolving cyber environment, rapid technological change (including emerging telecommunication technologies), an increasingly networked society, and "the accelerated flow of people, resources and ideas around the world."¹⁶

All of that said, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism* (2012) identified Sunni Islamist extremists, including homegrown terrorists, and groups such as Hamas and FARC as being the predominant threat to Canadian national security.¹⁷ Since 2013, however, each public report on the terrorist threat to Canada has become progressively more alarmed by the risks posed by domestic IMVEs. The 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack in France resulted in a dramatic pivot in Canadian counter terrorism with the passing of *The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015*. Dubbed "Canada's Patriot Act," the new legislation broadened the scope of counter terrorism and enhanced law enforcement capabilities by amending the *Criminal Code* and enhancing CSIS jurisdiction via an amendment of the *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act*.¹⁸

Beginning in 2014, Canada and other western allies experienced a significant uptick in domestic terrorist attacks (please see Appendix F). This led, in June 2015, to the controversial Bill C-24 coming into effect, thus giving the federal government the ability to revoke citizenship from dual citizens who were convicted of terrorism, high treason, and other serious offenses.¹⁹ Regarded as being in line with Western security establishments' focus on the contemporaneous perceived threat of so-called Islamic extremism, during

the 2015 federal election campaign, the Harper Government pledged funds for a “barbaric cultural practices” tip line (ostensibly targeted at certain subsets of Canada’s Muslim population).²⁰ Due to the Liberal victory in the 2015 federal election, this policy was not enacted.

In 2016, the new Trudeau government recognized the importance of counter-radicalization by announcing the allocation of CAD35 million over a five-year period (in addition to a CAD10 million per year operating budget) for a new counter-radicalization coordination centre under the auspices of Public Safety: The Canada Centre (launched in 2017). Through its Community Resilience Fund (CRF), the Canada Centre finances research and initiatives that aim to prevent radicalization. Since its creation, the CRF has provided more than CAD33 million in funding for over 47 projects.^{21 22} In 2018, the Canada Centre published its *National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence* which is intended to be a flexible framework to guide prevention-based initiatives towards countering radicalization and violence.²³

Finally, the 2019 *CSIS Public Report* marked a shift in terminology with the service’s pivot toward the terms: RMVE, IMVE and PMVE.²⁴ While the terms “terrorism” and “violent extremism” are used interchangeably by CSIS, PSC, and RCMP, the shift in labelling, in concert with our Five Eye partners, does indicate a shift in the conceptualization of threats and a broader re-framing to include violence originating from within Canada. The term “violent extremism” denotes violence stemming from underlying ideology.²⁵ Another notable shift was the addition of four IMVE organizations²⁶ to the *Criminal Code* list of terrorist entities, in reaction to the US Capital riot (January 2021).²⁷ CSIS’ most recent public report (2021) identifies IMVE as the deadliest strain of extremism since 2014; it further suggests that the pandemic, and individuals spending more time online, will exacerbate the problem.²⁸

POLICY ANALYSIS

Interests and Values

The problems facing the nation are reflective of interests and values that align with a desire for a rules-based international system in the face of a complex and changing global order. Further, Canada maintains the significance of multilateral cooperation and collaboration in achieving its goals and objectives in security.

Goals and Objectives

The overarching goal for PSC is the protection of Canada, Canadians, and Canadian interests. Canada's counter-terrorism strategy²⁹, identifies its goal as combatting domestic and international terrorism. Subsequently, the *National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence* aims to ensure that national security threats are understood and reduced.³⁰ From both strategies, several key objectives are identified to facilitate these goals:

1. **Prevent, Detect, Deny, Respond:** counter-terrorism efforts strive to prevent individuals from engaging in terrorism, detect activities of individuals and groups who may pose a threat, deny perpetrators the means and opportunity to carry out activities, and mitigate effects of attacks.³¹
2. **Knowledge and Capacity Building:** countering radicalization to violence involves the building and sharing of knowledge on indicators of radicalization to violence, as well as sustained support for local intervention initiatives.³²
3. **International Coordination and Collaboration:** there is a need to engage with international allies and in multilateral fora in addressing the "borderless" issue to ensure the protection of Canadian interests.

Stakeholders

Outside of the major players such as PSC, RCMP, and CSIS, most stakeholders are designated as either "detractors" or "mixed". This is largely due the complexity of the issue, predicated on an inherent trade off between security and civil liberties. Additionally, certain stakeholders may support some actions, while opposing others. Finally, stakeholder "allies" may have the same general goals, however, they may enact these goals through different methods (e.g., United Kingdom vis-à-vis 'Jihadi Jack'), leading to their designation as "mixed".

Please see the Table A below for a detailed breakdown of stakeholders, including justification for their designation.

Table A:

“Mixed” stakeholders are those that may be supportive of some policy elements and critical of others.

Stakeholder	Description	Ally/ Detractor
Allied Liberal Democracies	States allied with Canada, which uphold liberal values (i.e., democratic elections, freedom of speech, etc.).	<p>Mixed- Terrorism and online radicalization pose problems for allied liberal democracies on both a domestic level and an international level. In this vein, Canada has worked with like-minded nations both militarily (i.e., The War on Terror), politically, and through the coordination of security mechanisms.</p> <p>In contrast, as is evidenced by the “Jihadi Jack” diplomatic incident, liberal democracies can also be detractors to Canadian counterterrorism efforts in a variety of ways.ⁱ</p>
Certain Non-Liberal, Non-Democratic, or Non-Allied Nations	States which seek to undermine the existing liberal world order (i.e., rules-based system)	Detractor- Certain non-allied nations have been evidenced to support terrorist activity (either politically, financially, militarily, or via disinformation campaigns which bolster radicalization) in an attempt to undermine democratic processes, sow discord amongst allies, and undermine the rules-based system.
Social Media & Internet Companies	Online platforms which allow users to post and share information in a public forum.	Mixed (though predominantly Detractor)- While certain social media companies have taken steps to regulate disinformation and certain hate speech from their platforms, on a whole these companies have used freedom of speech as justification for allowing disinformation to continue unchecked.

Canadian Legal System	The multi-level court system predicated on Common and Civil Law which asserts that all accused persons are innocent until proven guilty, that incriminating evidence must meet very high standards, and that the law's jurisdiction is limited by precedent and the Constitution.	<p>Mixed- The Canadian legal system, due to high standards of evidence, can act as both ally and detractor to counterterrorism mechanisms.</p> <p>From an investigative perspective, the legal system places a heavy burden of proof to justify investigation or prosecution.</p> <p>In contrast, from a prosecutorial perspective, the legal system reinforces the laws of Canada, including anti-terror laws.</p>
The Canadian Civil Liberties Association and other Civil Liberties organizations	Organizations which promote Canadian civil liberties, including freedom of expression.	Detractor- The Canadian security establishment is often at odds with civil liberty organizations vis-à-vis counterterrorism. There is an inherent trade-off between stricter security measures and civil liberties.
The Canadian Public	The target of counter-radicalization campaigns, counterterrorism measures and terrorist attacks, which have legal, social, and political implications	Mixed- Some Canadians may be willing to sacrifice certain civil liberties for greater security, while others may oppose governmental restrictions on freedom of expression, etc.
Canadian Federal Political Parties	The collection of federal political parties which currently hold seats in the House of Commons.	<p>Mixed- Support or detraction would largely depend on the nature of the government's proposed policy and the specific federal political party.</p> <p>Broadly speaking, the NDP have been unwilling in the past to sacrifice civil liberties for the sake of security. However, in their 2021 election platform, <i>Ready for Better</i>, the NDP affirmed its commitment to countering "white supremacy, terrorism and the growing threat of hate crimes." It further asserted its intention, if elected, to ensure that all major cities have dedicated hate crime units within local police forces,</p>

		<p>and to create a national working group to counter online hate.⁸</p> <p>In contrast, the Conservative Party, when in power, suggested harsh policies (i.e., the “Barbaric Cultural Practices Hotline”¹⁰) which would have sacrificed certain civil liberties in the name of security. In its 2021 election platform, <i>Canada’s Recovery Plan</i>, the Conservative Party emphasized the need to counter online radicalization and hate speech by criminalizing statements that “encourage violence against other people or identifiable groups... [and will] protect forms of speech, criticism, and argument that do not encourage violence.” They also emphasized their commitment to combating hate crimes by doubling funding for the Security Infrastructure Program.¹¹</p>
Certain Religious, Political or Diaspora groups within Canada	Groups of individuals that are envisioned, or envision themselves, to be a distinct subset of the Canadian population based on religious, ethnic, racial, political, or ideological terms.	<p>Mixed- Status would be contingent on the nature of the government’s policy and the views of group leadership.</p> <p>As an example, the Muslim population within Canada has been occasionally painted as a detractor by media sources (or previous governmental policy) or cast as an ally (regarding outreach programs facilitated by law enforcement).</p>

Programmatic Needs

The 2018 Public Report on the Terrorism Threat to Canada determines that the National Terrorism Threat Level remained at 'Medium', unchanged since 2014.³³ The PSC's planned spending summary shows that spending in national security and community safety shifts from \$28 million and \$314 million, respectively, in 2020-21 to \$24 million and \$417 million, respectively in 2021-22.³⁴ Spending for subsequent years is forecasted to remain stable until 2022-23, with a 20.5% decrease in 2023-24.³⁵ As the terrorist threat is dynamic,³⁶ and in consideration of the volatility of the internet, fluctuations in resources must be considered in the pursuit of the identified goals and objectives.

An evaluation of Canada Centre activities since its 2017 inception through to 2019 recommended an expanded coordinating role for the Canada Centre in relation to established programs.³⁷ Public consultations³⁸ and ongoing stakeholder outreach³⁹ identified the need for sustained resources to support its outreach initiatives. Operating budgets increased from \$2.59 million to \$3.04. million in 2018-19⁴⁰, and Budget 2021 committed to \$8.2 million over the next three years to support its initiatives.⁴¹ Further, \$6.5 million in funds will be available through the CRF in 2022-23.⁴² As a result, there is room to address the identified gaps and recommendations. Finally, Canada's domestic efforts must be complimented by international coordination.

COSTED OPTIONS

Option 1: Creation of a cross-agency intelligence body, based on the LA CLEAR model

Implemented in 1997, the Los Angeles Regional Criminal Information Clearinghouse (LA CLEAR) is an independent, cross-agency body which provides intelligence, tactical, and investigative support to legal and law enforcement agencies in southern California.⁴³ The founding purpose of LA CLEAR is to counter gang violence and facilitate the recovery of gang-infested communities.⁴⁴ Led by sworn law enforcement executives, LA CLEAR allows for a consolidated approach to collecting, storing, mapping, and analyzing information related to gang violence.⁴⁵ Through the integration of the LAPD, Los Angeles County Probation Department, Los Angeles District Attorney, and the California Department of Corrections (and in consultation with a total of 255 municipal, state, and federal law enforcement entities), LA CLEAR allows for a streamlined approach to countering gang violence.⁴⁶

Specifically, using cell phone transmission data, police case files, and a community-based program⁴⁷ which monitors individuals who commit petty crimes, LA CLEAR creates maps of individual crimes, locations of known and suspected criminals, and related criminal activity (please see Appendix H).⁴⁸ This cartographic representation of crime and geolocation of individuals is used by the affiliated network of law enforcement agencies to identify suspects, apprehend criminals, and dismantle gang networks. The program has proven to be very effective. As an indicator, in 2016 the LAPD adopted extensive measures to counter gang violence resulting, in 2017-2018, in an overall reduction in city-wide crime of 2.2%; however, in jurisdictions utilizing LA CLEAR violent crime decreased by 6.5%.⁴⁹

There is a growing body of scholarly literature which asserts that gangs can be used as a framing device to understand extremist groups and terrorism (please see Appendix I).⁵⁰ As such, using LA CLEAR as a framework, Option 1 proposes the creation of a Canadian cross-agency intelligence body that would streamline investigations of extremist groups, map extremist networks (using cell phone data, online activity, and community profiling to identify radicalized individuals), and intelligence sharing with international allies to counter online radicalization and dismantle transnational extremist networks. In addition to the RCMP, CSIS, PSC, CSE, CSC, CISC, provincial/ municipal police forces, and all levels of the Canadian legal system, a new cross-agency extremist monitoring body must also include consultation with social media companies to track and trace extremists online. Collaboration with key international allies is also crucial due to the “borderless” nature of online radicalization and the consequent transnational composition of many extremist groups. A consolidation of records from these departments, agencies, international allies, and media companies would allow the federal government to create

a map of extremist groups, communities with high levels of radicalization, and individuals who are perhaps susceptible to radicalization. This map would then allow federal and provincial law enforcement agencies to better allocate their policing resources to neutralizing the threat of violence.

The key “cost” of this cross-agency body would be a trade-off between security and civil liberties. The high level of integration of Canadian law enforcement entities, social media mining, and tracking would potentially infringe on individual rights and run the risk of targeting individuals partaking in their constitutional right to freedom of expression and assembly. It also runs the risk of flagging individuals based on their social contacts alone (as is the case in the LA CLEAR model). Additionally, while this option has the potential to identify and apprehend individuals who are radicalized and prepared to use violent means (both in terms of coordinated and lone wolf attacks), it risks overfocusing on the “symptoms” of radicalization and not treating the root cause of the problem (i.e., perceived social injustice). Finally, media companies may not be willing partners and would need to be convinced (or coerced) into participation.

Expected outcome and KPIs: The establishment of the cross-agency intelligence body; the construction of the geolocated threat assessment map.

Option 2: Establishment of a nationally directed but locally administered education and civic engagement program

Existing programs directed at addressing radicalization, including those of Canada’s allies, vary in administration, scope, and scale (please see Appendix G). Common among these programs are elements of education and civic engagement. In Canada, the Canada Centre acts as the coordinating body for existing local initiatives funded through the CRF (please see Appendix G). The Canada Centre however does not advise, manage, nor obtain information about the individual cases these programs handle. As a result, these programs essentially operate in silos. An option then for Canada is to expand the oversight of the Canada Centre by establishing a nationally directed but locally administered (via civil society actors) model for streamlining approaches and processes to countering radicalization to violence. The proposed model would provide a standardized toolkit, such as that of a resource hub with research produced by the Canada Centre on radicalization. These will then be targeted at, and tailored for, specific age groups of youth and members of civil society, which existing programs can use in their outreach and day-to-day operations. This expands the role of Canada Centre as a coordinator and information source and will unify the multimodal approaches of existing efforts, while maintaining the communal and local nuances which make these programs unique and effective.

Further, expanding the oversight of the Canada Centre and implementing the standardization model enables uniform data collection based on standardized metrics but also with community-specific indicators through which each local program can be systematically monitored and evaluated. A cost to this proposed program is the loss of credibility to certain religious, political, or diaspora groups. Indeed, the merit of locally led initiatives is trust rooted within the community it serves and working in tandem with the government may undercut this credibility. Another cost is budgetary and labour resources, which runs the risk of tension among the Canadian public.

Expected outcome and KPIs: Drafting of national directive on deradicalization programs; coordination with international allies to standardize deradicalization educational approach; civil society actors identified, and national network created.

Option 3: Fund specialized GBA+ research into the “perceived injustices” fuelling radicalization

Based on psychological research, radicalization appears to be contingent on several deep-rooted issues including isolation, discrimination, socioeconomic struggles, personal upheaval, and disillusionment. These issues manifest as grievances predicated on perceived societal injustice.⁵¹ Option 3 contends that violent extremism should be conceptualized as a symptom of a deeper, more pervasive problem: radicalization; therefore, understanding the specific socioeconomic and social contexts that foster individual or group radicalization is paramount.

Additionally, this research should specially employ a GBA+ analysis. While lone wolf attacks are predominated by men, Option 3 conceptualizes these attacks as simply an indicator of the deeper societal issue of radicalization. Studies indicate that most male members of extremist groups (with the notable exception of the Incel movement) are married, and hence part of traditional, heteronormative social networks.⁵² Thus, the clear question is: where are the women and what role(s) do they play in forming and perpetuating these ideologies? Research is relatively nascent, however, understanding female involvement would situate radicalization into a broader social context, instead of framing lone wolf attacks as statistical anomalies.⁵³

Expected Outcome and KPIs: Instituting grants for targeted, intersectional research; quarterly progress reports.

Recommendation

Our recommendation is predicated on psychologist Fathali M. Moghaddam's concept of the "Staircase to Terrorism" (please see Annex A).⁵⁴ With this spectrum in mind, any effective counterterrorism strategy must address individuals at all stages of radicalization.

As such, a combination of all three reinforcing options is necessary. The creation of a cross-agency intelligence body would target those who are actively disseminating violent extremist ideologies and posed to take violent action. More specifically, it will facilitate the creation of a threat assessment map; this spatial threat assessment will ground the "borderless" problem. It will also allow security officials to pre-empt violent extremist attacks and efficiently allocate resources.

The Canada Centre's purview will be expanded to coordinate a Canada-wide counter-radicalization program, which will be standardized by federal government oversight, but administered by local civil society actors. Resources will be allocated based on the threat assessment map from Option 1 and community-based information will be passed from this counter-radicalization program back to the cross-agency intelligence body.

Finally, Option 3's proposal of funded GBA+ research should be implemented to identify the root causes and societal breadth of "deep grievances". This would capture individuals at the early stages of radicalization and help build future anti-radicalization programming to target susceptible populations. This research would also help to bolster the threat assessment map from Option 1.

Timeline and Implementation

Table B:

Activity	Timeline & Description	Impacts, Outcomes & KPIs
Project overview	Prior to start: determine purpose, scope, and objectives of the project	Drafting of national directive on cross-agency intelligence body; deradicalization programs; research funding
Project preparation	1-2 years: preliminary consultations with key stakeholders* to gather insight into feasibility, capacities, and resource acquisition	Coordination with (international) allies to standardize deradicalization educational approach; civil society actors identified; and national network created
Project consolidation	1-2 years: allocation of budget/resources, agenda setting, and establishing expectations	Instituting grants for targeted, intersectional research; assignment of roles among stakeholders
Project operationalization	2+ years: begin output on project objectives and deliverables	The establishment of the cross-agency intelligence body; the construction of the geolocated threat assessment map
Project evaluation	2+ years: continuous data collection to inform key performance indicators	Yearly progress reports

*Key stakeholders: provincial and local law enforcement, the entirety of the Canadian legal system, relevant governmental agencies (RCMP, CSIS, PSC, CSE, and CSC), international allies, social media companies, key experts, and civil society


Communication Strategy

The message of the creation of a cross-agency intelligence body will be delivered through internal newsletters to relevant government agencies, such as PSC; collaboration will be stressed through bilateral communication with allied states; and formal press releases/ social media campaigns will be utilized to unveil the new strategy and to engage the Canadian public. Furthermore, it will be noted that government involvement in the education programs will not be strongly publicized for fear of alienating disenfranchised participants. All material will emphasize that the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* will always be respected.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Hate Crime Statistics & Trends⁵⁵

Chart 1
Number of police-reported hate crimes, Canada, 2009 to 2019



Note: Information in this chart reflects data reported by police services covering 99.7% of the population of Canada.
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice and Community Safety Statistics, Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting Survey.

Source: Greg Moreau, “Police-reported hate crime in Canada, 2019,” Canadian Centre for Justice and

Community Safety Statistics, Statistics Canada (March 29, 2021),
<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2021001/article/00002-eng.htm>

“During the pandemic, various issues related to safety and discrimination were exposed and exacerbated in Canada, including hate crime. According to a crowdsourcing initiative conducted by Statistics Canada, in the early months of the pandemic, the proportion of participants designated as visible minorities who perceived an increase in race-based harassment or attacks was three times larger than the proportion among the rest of the population (18% versus 6%) (Statistics Canada 2020d). This difference was most pronounced among Chinese (30%), Korean (27%), and Southeast Asian (19%) participants.”

-Statistics Canada (2021)

Chart 2: Hate Crime by Motivation, 2018-2020

Detailed motivation	2018		2019		2020	
	number	percent	number	percent	number	percent
Race or ethnicity	793	44	884	46	1,594	62
Black	295	16	345	18	663	26
East or Southeast Asian	60	3	67	4	269	11
South Asian	84	5	81	4	119	5
Arab or West Asian	93	5	125	7	123	5
Indigenous (First Nations, Métis or Inuit)	39	2	29	2	73	3
White	42	2	48	3	81	3
Other race or ethnicity ¹	163	9	150	8	193	8
Race or ethnicity not specified	17	1	39	2	73	3
Religion	657	37	613	32	515	20
Jewish	372	21	306	16	321	13
Muslim	166	9	182	10	82	3
Catholic	44	2	51	3	42	2
Other religion ²	52	3	57	3	41	2
Religion not specified	23	1	17	1	29	1
Sexual orientation	186	10	265	14	259	10
Other motivation ³	159	9	150	8	189	7
Motivation unknown	22	...	39	...	112	...
Total	1,817	100	1,951	100	2,669	100
... not applicable						
¹ Includes motivations based upon race or ethnicity not otherwise stated (e.g., Latin American, South American) as well as hate crimes which target more than one race or ethnic group.						
² Includes motivations based upon religion not otherwise stated (e.g., Sikh, Hindu, Buddhist).						
³ Includes mental or physical disability, language, sex or gender, age and other similar factors (e.g., occupation or political beliefs).						
Note: Information in this table reflects data reported by police services covering 99.7% of the population of Canada. Percentages have been calculated excluding hate crimes where the motivation was unknown. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.						
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice and Community Safety Statistics, Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting Survey.						

Source: Greg Moreau, "Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2020," Statistics Canada (July

27, 2021), <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2021001/article/00013-eng.htm>

Appendix B: Fathali M. Moghaddam's *Staircase to Terrorism Model* (2005)⁵⁶

Fifth Floor: Certain individuals use violence (i.e., terrorist attacks; lone wolf attacks) to "right" perceived injustices

Fourth Floor: Individuals join extremist organizations and become entrenched in the "us-against-them" principle


Third Floor: Individuals come to sympathize with the ideologies of extremist organizations and rationalize their violent methods as "necessary"

Second Floor: Individuals who perceive "grave injustice" and experience anger and frustration. If directed by ideologically likeminded leaders they are encouraged to scapegoat and displace anger onto a perceived "enemy"

First Floor: Having felt "relatively deprived" individuals seek ways to improve their situation and achieve justice. If reconciliation is not achieved, individuals will climb.

Ground Floor: Individuals who feel "relatively deprived" for a variety of reasons, but take no further action

Appendix C: CSIS' Comprehensive Terminology vis-à-vis the Extremist Terrorist Threat Landscape



Reference: CSIS, "CSIS Public Report 2019," Government of Canada (2019), <file:///C:/Users/katie/Downloads/CSIS%20Report%202019.pdf>: 11.

Appendix D:

<u>GTD ID</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>PERPETRATOR GROUP</u>	<u>FATALITIES</u>	<u>INJURED</u>	<u>TARGET TYPE</u>
<u>201910280017</u>	2019-10-28	Canada	Six Nations of the Grand River	Unknown	0	0	Journalists & Media
<u>201906030029</u>	2019-06-03	Canada	Greater Sudbury	Incel extremists	0	3	Private Citizens & Property
<u>201905110039</u>	2019-05-11	Canada	Edson	Neo-Nazi extremists	0	0	Government (General)
<u>201904040022</u>	2019-04-04	Canada	Toronto	Unknown	0	0	Government (General)
<u>201903130030</u>	2019-03-13	Canada	Toronto	Unknown	0	1	Government (General)
<u>201810220003</u>	2018-10-22	Canada	Montreal	Unknown	0	0	Police
<u>201810020030</u>	2018-10-02	Canada	Toronto	Unknown	0	0	Private Citizens & Property
<u>201807220001</u>	2018-07-22	Canada	Toronto	Jihadi-inspired extremists	3	13	Business
<u>201806160015</u>	2018-06-16	Canada	Edson	Unknown	0	0	Religious Figures/Institutions
<u>201805240007</u>	2018-05-24	Canada	Mississauga	Unknown	0	15	Business

<u>GTD ID</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>PERPETRATOR GROUP</u>	<u>FATALITIES</u>	<u>INJURED</u>	<u>TARGET TYPE</u>
<u>201804230012</u>	2018-04-23	Canada	Toronto	Incel extremists	10	15	Private Citizens & Property, Private Citizens & Property, Private Citizens & Property
<u>201804010037</u>	2018-04-01	Canada	Greater Sudbury	White supremacists/nationalists	0	2	Transportation
<u>201711070055</u>	2017-11-07	Canada	Montreal	Anarchists	0	0	Business
<u>201709300013</u>	2017-09-30	Canada	Edmonton	Jihadi-inspired extremists	0	4	Private Citizens & Property
<u>201709300012</u>	2017-09-30	Canada	Edmonton	Jihadi-inspired extremists	0	1	Police
<u>201709190029</u>	2017-09-19	Canada	Calgary	Neo-Nazi extremists	0	0	Private Citizens & Property
<u>201708270061</u>	2017-08-27	Canada	Montreal	Anti-Fascist Activists	0	3	Private Citizens & Property
<u>201708160034</u>	2017-08-16	Canada	Burlington	Jihadi-inspired extremists (suspected)	0	0	Religious Figures/Institutions
<u>201708060054</u>	2017-08-06	Canada	Montreal	Anarchists (suspected)	0	1	Private Citizens & Property

<u>GTD ID</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>PERPETRATOR GROUP</u>	<u>FATALITIES</u>	<u>INJURED</u>	<u>TARGET TYPE</u>
<u>201708060034</u>	2017-08-06	Canada	Quebec	Anti-Muslim extremists (suspected)	0	0	Religious Figures/Institutions

Reference: Global Terrorism Database, “Canada,” University of Maryland (2009-2021),
<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=canada&sa.x=45&sa.y=18>

Appendix E: Public Safety Canada, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism* (2012)⁵⁷

Six principles underpinning Canada’s counterterrorism strategy:

1. **Building resilience** (i.e., Inoculating Canadians against violent extremist ideologies)
2. **Terrorism is a crime and will be prosecuted** (i.e., Prosecuting terrorism within a domestic sphere, but also fostering partnerships with other states to build legal capacity and assist in foreign prosecutions.)
3. **Adherence to the rule of law** (i.e., Counterterrorism activities will follow the established rule of law; however, security is a human right and therefore terrorism must be countered in order to protect the fundamental freedoms of thought, expression and association, and the right to life, liberty and security of the person.)
4. **Cooperation and partnerships** (Domestic coordination of security agencies, as well as outreach to civil society organizations and NGOS; fostering international security partnerships, specifically through NATO, the UN, the (then) G8, and the Financial Action Task Force).
5. **Proportionate and measured response** (Counterterrorism response must be proportionate to the threat and balance the right to security with civil liberties)
6. **A flexible and forward-looking approach** (The strategy must be adaptable, particularly in relation to preventing and addressing factors that make Canadians susceptible to violent extremist ideologies)

Appendix F: Domestic and International Terrorist Attacks (targeting western democracies)

Domestic Extremist Attacks, 2014-2021

Attack (Date)	Motivation	Summary
Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu ramming attack (2014)	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none">Islamic extremism	Two Canadian Forces members were hit; Warrant officer Patrice Vincent died of his injuries
Parliament Hill shooting (2014)	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none">Islamic extremism	Michael Zehaf-Bibeau fatally shot Corporal Nathan Cirillo at the National War Memorial, and then forced his way into Parliament where he engaged in a shootout with parliament security personnel.
Taxi explosion Strathroy, ON	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none">Islamic extremismISIS	Aaron Driver was killed in a confrontation with police after detonating an explosive in the back seat of a taxi. The confrontation followed a tip from the FBI that Driver had made a "martyrdom video" and was planning an attack.
Quebec City Mosque Attack (2017)	IMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none">Extreme right wingIslamophobia	Alexandre Bissonnette shot killed 6 people and injured 19 inside the Islamic Cultural Centre in Quebec City. Bissonnette was inspired by extreme right-wing views on Muslims, refugees, and feminists, which he shared online.
Edmonton Attack (2017)	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none">Islamic extremism	Abdulahi Sharif stabbed Edmonton police constable Mike Chernyk and then hit four pedestrians with a rental truck
Toronto Van Attack (2018)	IMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none">IncelAnti-feminist	Alek Minassian, driving a rental truck, targeted pedestrians killing 11 and injuring 15, some critically.

Toronto Danforth Shooting (2018)	Unknown	Faisal Hussain killed 2 and injured 13 on Toronto's Danforth Avenue.
Toronto hammer attack (2020)	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Islamic extremism ISIS 	Saad Akhtar killed a 64-year-old woman with a hammer in Toronto. The victim was chosen at random. Akhtar left a note on the victim's body, expressing support for ISIS.
Toronto Spa Attack (2020)	IMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incel 	<p>A 17-year-old boy stabbed a female spa worker to death at a sensual massage parlour in Toronto.</p> <p>On May 19, the Toronto Police Service said the attack was attributed to the incel ideology and was being considered an act of terrorism.</p> <p>This led Canadian authorities to become the first country to pursue terrorism charges for right-wing ideologically motivated violence.⁵⁸</p>
London Truck Attack (2021)	IMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Islamophobia 	<p>A man driving a pickup truck struck a family of five, killing four and seriously injuring the fifth. The family is alleged to have been targeted because they were visibly Muslim.</p> <p>in response the government quickly responded by reaffirming their intent to combat far-right extremist groups.⁵⁹</p>

Major International Extremist Attacks (against western democracies), 2001-2021:

Attack (Date)	Motivation	Summary
9/11 Attacks (2001)	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Islamic extremism 	Al Qaeda and subsequent Canadian-supported invasion of Afghanistan and the War on Terror (2001-present)
Madrid train bombings (2004)	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Islamic extremism 	A series of bombings on the commuter train system days before the general election, killing 93 and injuring more than 2,000.
7 July London bombings (2005)	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Islamic extremism 	Four coordinated suicide bombings in London's public transport system, killing 52 and injuring more than 700.
Charlie Hebdo attack, Paris (2015)	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Islamic extremism 	Armed with weapons, Saïd and Chérif Kouachi forcibly entered the Charlie Hebdo, killing 12 and injuring 11.
Paris Attacks (2015)	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Islamic extremism ISIL 	A series of coordinated attacks by armed suicide bombers: one group struck outside of the Stade de France, another group shot at crowded establishments, and a hostage-taking and shooting in the Bataclan theatre, where a concert was held. 137 were killed and 368 wounded.
San Bernadino attack (2015)	IMVE	A mass shooting and attempted bombing by a married couple, killing 18 and wounding 22. FBI referred to them as "homegrown violent extremists".
Brussels bombing (2015)	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Islamic extremism ISIL 	Three coordinated suicide bombings, two at the Brussels Airport and one on the Brussels metro, killing 32 civilians, 3 perpetrators, injuring 300.
Orlando nightclub shooting (2016)	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Islamic extremism ISIL 	Omar Mateen killed 49 and wounded 53 in a mass shooting in a gay night club. He called 911 prior to shooting and swore

		allegiance to ISIL Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Nice Bastille Day attack (2016)	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Islamic extremism 	A truck was weaponized, resulting in the deaths of 86 and the wounding of 458 others. The Islamic State later claimed responsibility for the attack.
Berlin truck attack (2016)	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Islamic extremism ISIL 	A truck was driven into a Christmas market in Berlin, killing 12 and injuring 56. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attacks and released footage of the perpetrator pledging allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Westminster Bridge attack, London (2017)	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Islamic extremism 	Khalid Mansood drove a car into pedestrians, killing 4 and injuring 50. He also stabbed an unarmed police officer and was killed shortly after.
London Bridge attack (2017)	RMVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Islamic extremism ISIS 	A van was deliberately driven into pedestrians and crashed shortly at the south bank of Thames. Van occupants fled to the Borough Market and opened fire, killing 8 and injuring 48. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack.

Appendix G: Programs

International Programs	
Prevention Pyramid (Denmark) ⁶⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> capacity building of youth, prevention through intervention, de-radicalization
Prevent (UK) ⁶¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> offers support and practical help to vulnerable people by linking them with local authorities, the education system, mental health agencies, and job support to help them get back on track police are informed but the security services do not become involved unless someone is assessed as a terrorism risk and referred to the Channel Program
Channel (UK) ⁶²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> government-led program that focuses on providing support to individuals identified as vulnerable to violent extremism.
RADISKAN (Norway) ⁶³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> puts emphasis on the role of municipalities and local communities when facing radicalization and violent extremism
Aarhus Model (Denmark) ⁶⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> capacity building, casework support, advising critical aftercare centres at the municipal level
World Organization for Resource Development and Education (USA) ⁶⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> non-profit organization that works with communities to address risk factors that may lead to radicalization.
Boston Framework (USA) ⁶⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> purposed for both anti and counter radicalization, puts emphasis on a collaborative effort from governmental, non-governmental, and academic stakeholders
Exit USA ⁶⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> program founded by former (mostly) far-right extremists committed to helping individuals leave the violent far-right movement.
Local Programs ⁶⁸ (all funded by the Canada Centre)	
ReDirect (Calgary)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> program that aims to prevent radicalization to violence through community education and awareness, with the goal of keeping individuals out of the formal justice system by treating the underlying causes.
Evolve (Edmonton)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> works independently from law enforcement and government, aims to help disconnect individuals from extremist movements staffed by a forensic psychologist, social workers, former members of the far-right movement, and an Islamic scholar
MERIT (Ottawa)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> enables local agencies with different mandates, to mobilize and respond when individuals have complex health and social problems, including cases of radicalization to violence

FOCUS (Toronto)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • collaboration between the Toronto Police Service, the City of Toronto, and the United Way, who are partnering with local community organizations to reduce crime and improve community resilience
Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPN-PREV) ⁶⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a consortium funded by Public Safety Canada which, among its other initiatives, provides psychological, theoretical, and practical training for the broader community.

LA CLEAR Spatial Mapping:

Highlights

- ArcGIS extension specializes in the display of movements and events through time and space.
- With GIS and temporal tracking software, LA CLEAR maps cell towers to assimilate and comprehend complex cell datasets.
- The district attorney's office can now demonstrate both time and space for its court presentations.

Catching criminals and enforcing the law can be arduous and time-consuming. It's a piece-by-piece, evidence-based process. And it doesn't stop at apprehension. Arming prosecutors with the evidence they need to get a conviction is just as vital.

For years, tracking cell phone usage and location information has helped law enforcement put offenders behind bars by establishing motive, placing suspects at the scene of a crime, reconstructing timelines, and connecting suspects to victims and each other. Unfortunately, the technology used in these types of investigations has been limited. Reconstructing timelines can take investigators many hours. And while hand-drawn link charts and paper maps have helped, they've lacked intuitiveness, and connections may be missed. Two-dimensional maps don't clearly show the necessary relationship between cell towers, call locations, cell phone movement, and criminal activity. Moreover, the lack of a temporal dimension—which tracks movement through time as well as space—limits the effectiveness of the map.

The Los Angeles Regional Criminal Information Clearinghouse (LA CLEAR) had implemented an innovative approach to addressing these challenges. Using a solution based on ArcGIS from Esri Partner Oculus Info Inc. (Toronto, Canada), the agency has rapidly streamlined the mapping process for tracking cell activity. It has overcome the time and dimension problem as well—sophisticated 3D

maps can show movement and activity over time, whether it's throughout the course of a day, a week, or an entire month.


LA CLEAR and the Need to Track in Both Time and Space

Based in Los Angeles, LA CLEAR is nationally recognized and modeled after the US

government executive branch's Office of National Drug Control Policy's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Intelligence Support Center. LA CLEAR provides strategic investigative research and postseizure analysis, tactical case support analysis, electronic surveillance capabilities with accompanying operational intelligence support, and training

and conference opportunities to the more than 184 LA HIDTA-specific agencies and task forces within the four counties of the LA HIDTA.

LA CLEAR is managed by sworn law enforcement executives and staffed by a fully integrated team of nonsworn law enforcement, military, and contract specialists organized into the following component units:



This screen shot shows a shooter's cell phone traveling with an associate's cell phone from the Los Angeles area to Las Vegas and back.

Reference: GeoTime, “Hardworking Crime Maps,” <https://geotime.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/GeoTime-Case-Study-LA-Clear-in-ArcNews-2013.pdf>

Appendix I: Comparison of gangs and extremist groups⁷⁰

There are a multitude of similarities between gangs and extremist groups.

Chief among them is the tendency for both gangs and extremist groups to be (predominantly) composed of young, disaffected men, who are often motivated by perceived injustice within the broader society.

Socioeconomic status and community/ familial ties are strong hallmarks for ripe recruits.

Gang members and radicalized individuals also tend to engage in petty crime.

Significantly, both entities often make a point of increasing the visibility of their crimes to send a message (whether social or political) as a means of increasing fear and asserting control (Curry, 98).

Additionally, recruitment for both gangs and extremist groups tend to occur within communities where “parochial and public [i.e., governmental] control” is lacking, or perceived to be lacking (Curry, 101).

Crucially, both gangs and extremist groups foster strong group identities and rely on an “us-against-them” mentality.

That said, current research indicates that gangs normally stem from concentrated geographic areas, while current trends in radicalization indicate that social media is a preeminent tool for recruitment.

Both groups, however, tend to have broader (often transnational) networks.

As such, gangs and extremist groups appear to have far more similarities than differences and thus deploying an anti-gang policy (such as LA CLEAR) to identify, monitor, and map extremist groups and radicalized individuals has merit.

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³ A lone wolf attack, also known as a lone actor attack, is a politically, religiously, or ideologically motivated attack committed in a public setting by an individual who plans and commits the act on their own.

⁴ A soft target is a civilian target that can be attacked easily because it is not militarily protected.

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¹⁴ IMVE is characterized by a broad spectrum of grievances (xenophobic, anti-authority, gender-driven) which are used as justification to perpetrate, incite, or enable violence. According to the ITAC, these grievances manifest in principally unsophisticated, domestic, lone actor attacks, stemming from radicalization and disinformation online. Economic uncertainty has proven, both historically and currently, to be one of the prerequisites for radicalization and disinformation. This has been severely compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic which has had wide-ranging effects on economic stability and social bonds and has further resulted in increasingly vocal distrust in existing institutions and science.

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<https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/2020-vltn-ccepv-ccecpv/index-en.aspx>

³⁸ “The Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence: What we heart,” Public Safety Canada (2018).
<https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/cnd-cntr-cmmnty-nggmnt-prvntn-vlnc/index-en.aspx>

³⁹ “Developing Canada’s National Strategy: Countering Radicalization to Violence,” Public Safety Canada (2018).
<https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/cntrng-rdclztn-vlnc/cntrng-rdclztn-vlnc-en.pdf>

⁴⁰ “Evaluation of the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence,” Public Safety Canada (2020).
<https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/2020-vltn-ccepv-ccecpv/index-en.aspx>

⁴¹ “Budget 2021: A Recovery Plan for Jobs, Growth, and Resilience,” Department of Finance (2021). <https://www.budget.gc.ca/2021/report-rapport/toc-tdm-en.html>

⁴² “Government of Canada launches Call for Applications for projects to address radicalization to violence,” Public Safety Canada (2021).
<https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2021/11/government-of-canada-launches-call-for-applications-for-projects-to-address-radicalization-to-violence.html>

⁴³ Office of the Attorney General, “Los Angeles Regional Criminal Information Clearinghouse (LA CLEAR),” California Department of Justice, updated 2021,
<https://oag.ca.gov/bi/laclear>.

⁴⁴ City of Los Angeles, “Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR) Program,” City of Los Angeles (2018), http://clkrep.lacity.org/online/docs/2019/19-1066_misc_09-13-2019.pdf.

⁴⁵ Esri, “Hardworking Crime Maps,” ARC News (Winter 2013), <https://www.esri.com/about/newsroom/arcnews/hardworking-crime-maps/>.

⁴⁶ Office of the Attorney General, “Los Angeles Regional Criminal Information Clearinghouse (LA CLEAR),” California Department of Justice, updated 2021, <https://oag.ca.gov/bi/laclear>; City of Los Angeles, “Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR) Program,” City of Los Angeles (2018), http://clkrep.lacity.org/online/docs/2019/19-1066_misc_09-13-2019.pdf.

⁴⁷ Entitled the Community Impact Team or CIT

⁴⁸ Esri, “Hardworking Crime Maps,” ARC News (Winter 2013), <https://www.esri.com/about/newsroom/arcnews/hardworking-crime-maps/>.

⁴⁹ City of Los Angeles, “Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR) Program,” City of Los Angeles (2018), http://clkrep.lacity.org/online/docs/2019/19-1066_misc_09-13-2019.pdf.

⁵⁰ There are a multitude of similarities between these two groups. Chief among them is the tendency for both gangs and extremist groups to be (predominantly) composed of young, disaffected men, who are often motivated by perceived injustice within the broader society. Socioeconomic status and community/ familial ties are strong hallmarks for ripe recruits. Gang members and radicalized individuals also tend to engage in petty crime. Significantly, both entities often make a point of increasing the visibility of their crimes to send a message (whether social or political) as a means of increasing fear and asserting control (Curry, 98). Additionally, recruitment for both gangs and extremist groups tend to occur within communities where “parochial and public [i.e., governmental] control” is lacking, or perceived to be lacking (Curry, 101). Crucially, both gangs and extremist groups foster strong group identities and rely on an “us-against-them” mentality. That said, current research indicates that gangs normally stem from concentrated geographic areas, while current trends in radicalization indicate that social media is a preeminent tool for recruitment. Both groups, however, tend to have broader (often transnational) networks. As such, gangs and extremist groups appear to have far more similarities than differences and thus deploying an anti-gang policy (such as LA CLEAR) to identify, monitor, and map extremist groups and radicalized individuals has merit.

⁵¹ National Institute of Justice, “Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs (July 28-30, 2015) <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249947.pdf>.

⁵² National Institute of Justice, “Gangs vs. Extremists: Solutions for Gangs May Not Work Against Extremism,” US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs (October 26, 2020) <https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/gangs-vs-extremists-solutions-gangs-may-not-work-against-extremism>.

⁵³ Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein, "Women and Terrorism: Hidden Threats, Forgotten Partners," Council on Foreign Relations (May 2019) https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/Discussion_Paper_Bigio_Vogelstein_Terrorism_OR.pdf.

⁵⁴ Fathali M. Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Review," *American Psychologist*, vol. 60, issue 2 (February-March 2005): 162.

⁵⁵ Greg Moreau, "Police-reported hate crime in Canada, 2019," Canadian Centre for Justice and Community Safety Statistics, Statistics Canada (March 29, 2021), <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2021001/article/00002-eng.htm>; Greg Moreau, "Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2020," Statistics Canada (July 27, 2021), <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2021001/article/00013-eng.htm>

⁵⁶ Fathali M. Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Review," *American Psychologist*, vol. 60, issue 2 (February-March 2005): 162.).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Kris Millett and Amy Swiffen, "Right Wing Extremism as Terrorism and the Law's Relation to Violence," *Surveillance & Society* 19, no. 3 (2021): 364-368.

⁵⁹ "Prime Minister's Remarks in the House of Commons on the Recent Tragedy in London, Ontario", Prime Minister of Canada. (June 8, 2021). <https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2021/06/08/prime-ministers-remarks-house-commons-recent-tragedy-london-ontario>.

Prime Minister Trudeau went on record in the House of Commons to state, "This was a terrorist attack, motivated by hatred, in the heart of one of our communities...We need to stand up to reject racism and terror, and work together to embrace what makes our country strong – our diversity."

⁶⁰ Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen, "An Introduction to the Danish Approach to Countering and Preventing Extremism and Radicalization," Danish Institute for International Studies (2015) <https://www.ft.dk/samling/20151/almindel/reu/bilag/248/1617692.pdf>.

⁶¹ National Institute of Justice, "Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Canada, the U.K. and the U.S." U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs (July 28-30, 2015) <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249947.pdf>.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Tore Bjørgo and Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik. “Norwegian research on the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism: A status of knowledge,” PHS Forskning (2015) <https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/dc64dbc441bc4a4db25f320eadd0d131/080615-norwegian-research-on-preventing-radicalisation-and-violent-extremism.pdf>.

⁶⁴ “The Aarhus Model: Prevention of Radicalization and Discrimination in Aarhus,” European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs (2019) https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/collection-inspiring-practices/ran-practices/aarhus_en.

⁶⁵ National Institute of Justice, “Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs (July 28-30, 2015) <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249947.pdf>.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ ExitUSA, “Life After Hate,” (Updated 2020), <https://www.lifeafterhate.org/>

⁶⁸ Public Safety Canada, “Intervention Programs in Canada,” Government of Canada (Updated November 2, 2021), <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/bt/cc/ntrvntn-en.aspx>.

⁶⁹ Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence, “About Us,” (2020), <https://cpnprev.ca/about-us/>.

⁷⁰ G. David Curry, “Gangs, Crime, and Terrorism,” in *Criminologists on Terrorism and Homeland Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).