Raising the Cost of Rebellion: Counter-Insurgency and the Colombia-FARC Negotiations

In 1984, FARC and the Colombian government signed a monumental first peace agreement, initiating a new chapter of negotiations between both parties despite a failure to resolve the conflict. Subsequent negotiations also failed and were accompanied by periods of escalation in terrorist attacks and domestic violence. However, engaging in talks enabled FARC to establish a political party, the Patriotic Union (UP), which participated in the 1986 elections and earned 14 senatorial and congressional seats, in addition to over 250 city council members throughout the country. By the end of the 1980s, the UP evolved into a viable political force, despite the murder of some party members, including their 1990 presidential candidate Bernardo Jaramillo. Nevertheless, peace efforts continued, including the 1992 Tlaxcala discussions in Mexico and the 1998 negotiations in the demilitarized zone of Caguan. The latest round of peace talks is the fourth effort to reach a settlement in the last 30 years.

Some observers believe the current conditions for talks are relatively more conducive for progress. There appears to be an enhanced willingness to negotiate within senior echelons of FARC’s leadership, suggesting that alternatives to armed struggle are viewed in a more favourable light. Moreover, the international dynamic has improved considerably compared to previous peace processes. Key global actors including the United States, Venezuela, Cuba, and the European Union support the current round of negotiations. Despite varying interests and goals among third party actors, a unified international front to resolve the conflict is a positive development. In addition, recent reports from FARC and government negotiators indicate that both parties are approaching more common ground on vital issues related to rural development and illegal narcotics.
 
However, significant political tension persists and much of the focus concerns controversial government concessional proposals. Colombian society appears divided with respect to the type of integration programs the government may offer to former FARC combatants in the event an agreement is reached. One of the main difficulties remains the process of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of FARC rebels into society, which failed to be fully implemented during previous negotiations since the group continued to engage in violent hostilities and criminal activities. In a recent interview, President Santos stated, “it’s not possible to pardon, to forget, those amnesties, those reprieves that were achieved in the past… [FARC] must understand that today’s world demands justice.”
 
Reports show that FARC members are actively garnering political support from local communities, indicating that the group views future political participation and disengagement from the conflict as a foreseeable outcome. For example, FARC reportedly transferred recruits from its camps to local villages for half of the year, in part to help with agricultural cultivation. The transfer of fighters to partake in agriculture labour may show FARC’s willingness to garner political support from the communities. However, this phenomenon also suggests that enhanced counter-insurgency strategies and discriminate government tactics have increased the costs of rebellion.
 
Counter-Insurgency and Targeted Killing 

There is no single over-arching formula for conducting successful counterinsurgency. Much of the scholarly literature argues that each case requires a unique set of tactics and historical examples are difficult to apply to contemporary insurgencies. However, relatively successful counter-insurgency warfare relies on highly discriminatory use of violence against insurgents coupled with offering various public goods to the civilian population and some concessions assuming the insurgent group is not pursuing maximalist objectives. Strong intelligence that helps differentiate between active insurgents and civilians is crucial, allowing governments to engage in more effective targeted killing.

FARC is at its most vulnerable position in light of Colombia’s recent effort to decimate the senior leadership and front commanders, according to interviews conducted with over 30 former and current U.S. and Colombian officials. With CIA covert assistance, approximately three times as many FARC leaders have been killed under the current President Santos administration than under his predecessor. The Colombian military is now focusing on eliminating the mid-level ranks and the most experienced fighters – a third of whom have reportedly been killed or captured. The ensuing chaos and dysfunction plaguing FARC is evident, as some leaders fled to Venezuela and Ecuador. Enhanced real-time intelligence capabilities are enhancing mistrust among FARC members concerned about spies within the ranks, resulting in executions of suspected collaborators.
 
Senior Colombian officials assert that the disarray is destroying the vital psychological connection with troops on the ground and is hindering recruitment. FARC units now rarely sleep in the same spot two days in a row due to fear of being targeted. The group no longer travels in large numbers and is incapable of conducting large-scale attacks, depending on lighter hit-and-run tactics. All of these factors derived from Colombia’s targeted killing campaign have significantly inhibited FARC’s operational capabilities, contributing to the organization’s insistence on direct negotiations.
 
Cautious Optimism